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FOREWORD
An estimated 2.6 billion people live on less than $2 a day. Over 
a billion lack clean water, 1.6 billion lack electricity and 3 billion 
lack access to telecommunications. This represents huge unmet 
needs. As many of the world’s poor live in areas with limited 
state service provision they must rely on private markets for 
their livelihoods.  As consumers, poor men and women rely on 
markets to meet their needs for food and essential services.  As 
employees or producers, they sell their labour or products in 
these markets. But these markets are often difficult or costly 
to access for poor people. These markets may be informal, 
uncompetitive and may not meet the needs of the poor 
effectively.  
More widely, the world’s poor are not well integrated into 
the global economy and do not get access to its benefits. In 
Development as Freedom,  Amartya Sen describes participation 
in economic interchange as a basic part of social living and 
argues that economic freedoms are closely tied to political and 
social freedoms. The poor often lack these freedoms.
Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) is an approach to 
poverty reduction that donors such as the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC) have been supporting 
over the past few years. The central idea is that the poor are 
dependent on market systems for their livelihoods.  Therefore 
changing those market systems to work more effectively and 
sustainably for the poor will improve their livelihoods and 
consequently reduce poverty. More accessible and competitive 
markets enable poor people to find their own way out of poverty 
by providing more real choices and opportunities. Markets that 
function well have wider economic benefits too.  They stimulate 
investment and encourage firms to innovate, reduce costs and 
provide better quality jobs, goods and services to more people. 
The involvement of poor people in economic growth is the 
best way to get people out of poverty and represents the exit 
strategy for aid.  
The last few years have seen an upsurge of interest in market 
development approaches amongst aid agencies.  Alongside 
M4P there is UNDP’s Growing Inclusive Markets, the IADB’s 
Opportunities for the Majority and the IFC’s Next Four Billion. 
Amongst businesses, there is growing interest in social 
investment, sustainable business practices, fair trade and 
engaging with the Base of the (Economic) Pyramid.  Although 
terminology and emphasis may differ, all of these approaches 
see a market-based economic engagement with the poor as 
essential for sustainable development.
In order to improve the understanding and uptake of 
market development approaches and to consolidate existing 
experience, DFID and SDC have commissioned a series of 
three documents on M4P.  Aimed at agency and government 
officials, consultants, researchers and practitioners, these 
together provide a comprehensive overview of the approach 
in theory and practice.
The M4P Synthesis paper explains the essence of the M4P 
approach – its rationale, including evidence of impact, and key 
features in implementation. M4P Perspectives introduces the 
conceptual underpinnings of M4P and explores its application 
in different fields including finance, agriculture, water, labour 
and climate change. These first two documents have been 
sponsored by SDC. This third document, the M4P Operational 
Guide (sponsored by DFID), provides a substantial operational 
resource on how to implement M4P, including an overview of 
good practices, common management challenges and the main 
lessons from experience.
Development of these documents was led by a team from The 
Springfield Centre. They were assisted by advice and comments 
from Marshall Bear, Gerry Bloom, Richard Boulter, Don Brown, 
Jean-Christophe Favre, Tracy Gerstle, Alison Griffith, Justin 
Highstead, Joanna Ledgerwood, Marc Lundy, Luis Osorio, 
Alexandra Miehlbradt, Mark Napier, Kate Philip, David Porteous, 
Peter Roggekamp, Prashant Rana, Hugh Scott, Dominic Smith 
and Jim Tomecko.
All of these documents are also available in electronic form 
at www.M4Pnetwork.org.  We hope you find them helpful 
in meeting the challenge of developing market systems that 
benefit poor people.
Peter Tschumi
Head of Employment and Income Division
SDC, Berne 
Harry Hagan
Senior Economic Adviser and Head of Growth Team
Growth & Investment Group, Policy & Research Division
DFID, London
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GLOSSARY
agencies: development organisations – funded by aid or other 
non-commercial sources – that act as funders or facilitators with 
the aim of developing market systems. 
approach: a set of principles, frameworks and good practice 
points to guide both analysis of a market system and actions to 
bring about change.
asymmetric information: when one party in a market transaction 
– supplier or consumer – knows more than the other.
BMO: business membership organisation or business association 
(see Representative organisation).
cBO: community-based organisation.
core function: the central set of exchanges between providers 
(supply-side) and consumers (demand-side) of goods and 
services at the heart of a market system.  The medium 
of exchange can be financial or non-financial (eg through 
accountability mechanisms). 
crowding-in: crowding-in is the central process in – and purpose 
of – facilitation through which interventions catalyse or bring 
other players and functions into the market system so that it 
works better for the poor. Crowding-in can result in enhanced 
breadth (more transactions in the core of a market), depth 
(supporting functions) or reach (new areas or markets).
domestic: a player (particularly used to refer to government) or 
function that is part of a specific market system, in contrast to a 
facilitator which is external to the system.
embedded transaction: a good or service which is not paid for 
directly but is included or hidden within an exchange of another 
good or service which is paid for. 
externalities: negative or positive spill-over effects that are not 
reflected in a market price.
facilitation / facilitator: action or agent that is external to a 
market system but seeks to bring about change within a market 
system in order to achieve the public benefit objective of 
systemic change.
funder: an organisation – such as a development agency – which 
sets objectives and provides resources for the pursuit of market 
development, usually in the form of a programme or project.
impact logic: a model showing the chain of causality through 
which a programme’s activities lead to poverty-reducing 
benefits. Impact logics are tailored to specific interventions or 
markets and consequently are more detailed than a strategic 
framework (see Strategic framework).
institutions: structures and mechanisms of social, political 
and economic order and cooperation – formal and informal 
– in a society or economy which shape the incentives and 
behaviour of market players. Institutions therefore refer both 
to the supporting functions and rules – sometimes referred to 
collectively as ‘rules of the game’ – in a market system.
interconnected markets: a market system which, as well as being 
a market in its own right, constitutes the supporting functions or 
rules of another market system.
intervention: a defined package of temporary activities or 
actions through which facilitators seek to effect change in a 
market system. 
Lead firms: businesses capable of exerting a leading influence 
on other firms and other players, because of, for example, their 
size or their reputation for innovation.
led: local economic development.
M4p: the making markets work for the poor or market 
development approach.
Market: a set of arrangements by which buyers and sellers are 
in contact to exchange goods or services; the interaction of 
demand and supply. 
Market player: organisations or individuals who are active in a 
market system not only as suppliers or consumers but as regulators, 
developers of standards and providers of services, information, 
etc. This therefore may include organisations in the private and 
public sectors as well as non-profit organisations, representative 
organisations, academic bodies and civil society groups.
Market system: the multi-player, multi-function arrangement 
comprising three main sets of functions (core, rules and 
supporting) undertaken by different players (private sector, 
government, representative organisations, civil society, etc) 
through which exchange takes place, develops, adapts and 
grows.  A construct through which both conventionally defined 
markets and basic services can be viewed.
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M&e: monitoring and evaluation.
Mou: memorandum of understanding.
Organisations: entities with a formal structure that play a range 
of roles in the market system.
plausible attribution: an approach to M&E which aims to balance 
credibility with practicality when assessing a programme’s 
contribution to changes in growth, access and poverty reduction. 
public goods: goods or services which are non-rival and 
non-excludable and therefore cannot be offered by private 
firms. Sometimes referred to as merit goods.
representative organisation: an organisation which acts to 
advance the interests of a specific group, such as a trade union 
or a consumer rights body. Also referred to as a membership 
organisation (see also BMO).
right-sizing: ensuring that the scale and intensity of a facilitator’s 
interventions and the outcomes they promote are consistent 
with the norms and context of a market system.
rMa: rapid market assessment.
rules: formal (laws, regulations and standards) and informal 
(values, relationships and social norms) controls that provide a 
key input in defining incentives and behaviour in market systems. 
sla: sustainable livelihoods approach.
strategic framework: a hierarchy of objectives linking an M4P 
programme’s final goal of poverty reduction with an intervention 
focus on sustainable market system change.
supporting functions: a range of functions supporting the core 
exchange helping the market to develop, learn, adapt and grow 
including, for example, product development, skills enhancement, 
R&D, coordination and advocacy.
Sustainability (M4P definition): the market capability to ensure 
that relevant, differentiated goods and services continue to be 
offered to and consumed by the poor beyond the period of an 
intervention.
sWOT: a technique for situational analysis that takes into 
account strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
systemic change: change in the underlying causes of market 
system performance – typically in the rules and supporting 
functions – that can bring about more effective, sustainable and 
inclusive functioning of the market system.
Tools/instruments: relatively standardised methodologies for 
market analysis (eg value chain analysis or usage, attitude and 
image surveys) or for intervention (eg vouchers or challenge 
funds).
Triangulation: looking at a specific market system from multiple 
perspectives and using multiple sources to develop a more 
rounded view, testing preconceptions and assumptions and the 
natural biases of individual tools and information sources.
Vca: value chain analysis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 What is the M4P Operational Guide about?
The Guide is intended to provide an accessible operational 
resource to help put the M4p approach into practice. 
The Guide is the third in a trio of documents about the 
Making Markets Work for the poor (M4p) approach. The 
first – the Synthesis – introduces the approach. The second 
– the Perspectives – explores the application of M4P in a 
number of different fields. The emphasis of the Guide is on 
how to implement M4P, but it builds on the first and second 
documents and assumes that the reader has some familiarity 
with them. 
The Guide has four objectives:
l To identify key ‘start up’ considerations for organisations 
 wishing to design, commission or implement M4p programmes. 
l To explain the frameworks and principles which guide the 
 process of M4p implementation, setting out common 
 challenges and how they can be dealt with. 
l To identify important management and governance 
 considerations associated with M4p programmes.
l To provide an overview of good practices that can be used 
 in implementing M4p,  including lessons from their application 
 and references to more detailed resources.  
1.2 Who is the Guide aimed at?
The Guide is aimed at organisations sharing the public aim of 
making market systems work more effectively for poor people: 
l Practitioners: organisations implementing the M4P approach 
 – facilitators – and their funders.  
l Organisations that wish to incorporate M4P thinking and 
 practice into their existing work, rather than set up a separate 
 M4P programme.
l Organisations that play a more strategic role within markets, 
 for instance government agencies and industry associations 
 assuming leadership and coordination roles or think-tanks and 
 consultants playing innovation and advisory roles.
1.3  The Guide and how to use it 
The Guide is not intended to be read exhaustively from cover to 
cover.  Readers can go directly to the section that is most relevant 
to their needs without having to read every preceding section. 
The Guide introduces key M4P frameworks and principles, explains 
how to put them into practice, identifies common intervention 
challenges and explains how to deal with them. Throughout 
the Guide key sections of text are identified using the following 
symbols:
1
Tips
Definitions
Risks
Application examples
Practitioners’ experiences
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The Guide contains three types of examples: (a) brief illustrations 
or emphases within the main text; (b) fuller examples; and (c) 
application examples         which aim to walk the reader through 
key M4P principles or frameworks. Examples are anonymous, 
but are all based on real cases or amalgamations of several real 
cases.
The Guide is structured in five parts:
1.4 notes of caution about the Guide
The Guide is not a step-by-step manual. It aims to be a useful 
reference upon which practitioners can draw, but recognises 
that M4P implementation cannot be reduced to blueprints or 
formulae. Intervention in complex market systems is not about 
thoughtlessly following checklists: flexibility and creativity are 
essential.  That said, successful interventions are not delivered in 
an ad hoc manner; they are guided by strategy and underpinned 
by practical frameworks and principles based on experience. 
When exploring how to implement M4P over the following 
pages, this (potential) tension needs to be remembered. On the 
one hand M4P is a strategically coherent and rigorous approach. 
On the other – within this overarching ‘strategic framework’ – 
flexibility and creativity are required. 
The different components of the M4P approach relate to a 
typical project cycle and Section 3 is structured to reflect the 
chronology of such a cycle. However, while this explanation may 
give the impression of M4P as an orderly linear progression, 
in practice there is a requirement for continual learning and 
adaptation in interventions – taking steps backward in order to 
go forward.
section
1. inTrOducTiOn 
2. GeTTinG sTarTed 
 
3. cOMpOnenTs Of The M4p inTerVenTiOn prOcess
4. ManaGinG and GOVerninG M4p prOGraMMes
5. GOOd pracTice nOTes
Go here for:
Overview of objectives and structure of the Guide 
and how to use it
Basic requirements of effective M4P and implications 
for programme design and commission
Core M4P principles and frameworks and how to 
put them into practice
Important considerations for the management and 
governance of M4P programmes
Specific tools and good practices used in M4P 
programmes
1. INTRODUCTION
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2. GETTING STARTED
2.1 introduction: basic considerations 
Organisations wanting to design, commission or implement 
programmes which follow an M4p approach (see Box 1) 
need to recognise some basic considerations if they are to 
be successful: 
l M4p programmes need to be capable of dealing with diversity, 
 dynamism and risk; they need to be opportunistic and 
 responsive; and they need to be catalytic. 
l facilitators need to be close to markets; they need to possess 
 good knowledge and insight; they need to be able to behave 
 entrepreneurially; and they need to be independent. 
This section (a) outlines the characteristics of effective M4p 
programmes; (b) establishes the basic requirements for 
programme design and implementation which feed into the 
rest of the Guide and (c) identifies the immediate implications 
of these criteria for programme design, positioning, funding 
mechanisms, intervention portfolio and timeline.
Whilst the Guide is aimed mainly at programmes designed 
specifically as M4P interventions, the considerations described 
below are important for any public-funded initiative trying to 
develop markets in a systemic way.  The Guide is therefore also 
relevant to: 
l programmes already up-and running which were not 
 specifically designed as ‘M4P’ but wish to adopt a more 
 market-oriented approach.
l Governments considering their role in different situations and 
 seeking guidance from M4p.
equally, some organisations might want to ascertain whether 
they are suited to pursuing a market development approach 
at all. The basic considerations set out below can help 
organisations gauge their existing practices, people and 
structures to see how they can become more oriented to 
stimulating systemic change.
Box 1
What is M4p?
M4P is an approach aimed at effectively and sustainably improving 
the lives of poor people by understanding and influencing market 
systems.  Applicable to development agencies and governments 
working in economic and social fields, it is defined by several 
characteristics:
l An approach that provides guidance on understanding the 
 poor in market systems (analysis) and how to bring about 
 effective change (action).
l  A focus on developing market systems, by addressing underlying 
 causes (rather than symptoms) of weak performance. 
l An ambition to unleash large-scale and systemic change. 
l A commitment to sustainability. This means considering not 
 just the existing alignment of market functions and players but 
 how they can work more effectively in the future, based on 
 the incentives and capacities of players to play different roles.
l A facilitating role for external agencies; seeking to catalyse 
 others in the market system (while not becoming part of it 
 themselves). 
l A means to complement and strengthen established 
 development methodologies. 
2.2 Why are these basic considerations important?
l For funders: these basic considerations shape preliminary 
 decision-making about programme, design and the contracting 
 of facilitators.
l For facilitators: these basic considerations reflect the 
 operational realities of market development which they have 
 to deal with if they are to be successful. Frequently these can 
 be sources of tension between funders and implementers and 
 need to be addressed from the outset during negotiations and 
 the contracting process.  
2.3 characteristics and requirements of successful M4p 
programmes 
What are the critical ingredients of a successful M4P programme? 
Experience shows that M4P programmes are context-dependent 
and therefore need to be strongly process-oriented. To catalyse 
sustainable systemic change M4P programmes should be:
l Capable of dealing with diversity and dynamism: a focus on 
 improving market systems requires sufficient flexibility to deal 
 with complex and changing situations. 
l Opportunistic and responsive: achieving sustainability means 
 promoting local ownership. Programmes must be able to understand 
 the capacity and incentives of diverse market players and respond to 
 them in a way which is consistent with programme strategy.  
l Able to manage risk: programmes try to promote change in 
3
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 uncertain situations, often working through local players. Some 
 degree of failure is to be expected; therefore programmes 
 need to be able to spread their activities to avoid ‘putting all 
 their eggs in one basket’.
l Catalytic: programmes try to leverage wider change through 
 relatively small, focused and finite actions. They must therefore 
 be able to start small and then build on successes to achieve 
 scale and sustainability by crowding-in market functions and 
 players. 
What does this mean for facilitators? To be effective they should 
be characterised by:
l Closeness to markets: their relationships with market players 
 should be based on understanding and informed empathy, but 
 they should not be ‘captured’ by them. Facilitation can be seen 
 as acting as a bridge between the public objectives of funders 
 and the narrower aims of individual market players.
l Good knowledge and insight: sufficiently informed to be able to 
 analyse market systems and assess opportunities to stimulate 
 change.
l Entrepreneurial instincts: an orientation that allows facilitators 
 to spot opportunities and rapidly convey an ‘offer’ to different 
 players in the market that not only responds to their situation 
 but also addresses systemic constraints.
l Independence: a status that allows facilitators to be regarded 
 as impartial in the eyes of market players so that the facilitation 
 role is understood and accepted.
2.4 implications of these basic considerations
The characteristics and requirements described above have 
implications for practitioners, particularly funders, in terms of 
the flexibility of: programme design; programme positioning; 
funding mechanisms; mix of intervention activities; and timeline 
(see Box 2). 
l Funders: need to ensure that these basic considerations 
 have been incorporated adequately into programme design, 
 contracting and oversight. 
l Facilitators: need to assess whether potential contracts 
 from funders reflect these basic considerations and respond 
 accordingly in their proposals to and negotiations with 
 funders.
Box 2
Basic M4p programme design considerations
l Is the programme design sufficiently flexible? 
l Is the programme correctly positioned in a country’s  
 organisational landscape? 
l Will the programme fit within agency funding mechanisms?
l Does the programme design incorporate a portfolio approach?
l Is the programme timeline and funding appropriate?
is the programme design sufficiently flexible? 
Achieving change is an unpredictable process, especially in 
complex, dynamic socio-economic systems. The ability to 
monitor and periodically adjust the direction of programmes to 
respond to changes within markets is essential for success. M4P 
programmes need operational flexibility; therefore mechanisms 
for feedback and change should be integral to design. In practice 
agencies have dealt with this through:
l Programme designs which provide a clear framework, main 
 objectives and indicators to guide the overall focus and 
 direction of a programme (ie strategic) and which avoid 
 being too prescriptive or detailed about specific programme 
 outputs (ie not too operational). This is covered in more detail 
 in Sections 3A and 3E and in Good Practice Notes 5.4 and 5.14. 
l Management contracts (and budgets) which emphasise 
 outcomes and avoid overly specifying skills and inputs that 
 contracted facilitators are expected to provide.  This is covered 
 in more detail in Section 4.
is the programme correctly positioned in a country’s 
organisational landscape? 
Where an M4P programme is located within a country’s 
organisational landscape has important implications with 
respect to the desired characteristics of flexibility, closeness and 
independence. If a programme is too close to a specific player 
(eg if it is based within a specific government department) 
it might become captured and lose its perceived impartiality, 
undermining its ability to influence other public and private 
sector players. Conversely, a programme might only be successful 
if it has explicit endorsement from a high-profile champion for 
reform within government, the private sector or civil society. 
The positioning of an M4P programme depends on context and 
on three factors in particular : 
l The prevailing ‘political economy’, ie influential political, legal 
 and social factors. 
l The nature of targeted markets and the source of their 
 underperformance.
l The capacity of key players.
For example:  How far to involve government in M4P programmes 
will depend on the extent to which government is – or has the 
potential to be – influential in a specific sector, the extent to which 
it is pursuing pro-poor reform and its level of capacity to improve its 
role. Locating an M4P programme focusing on rural markets within 
a department for agriculture may make sense intuitively. However, 
doing this may constrain a programme from addressing rural 
distribution problems which fall under the purview of the department 
of transport or public works. Or, key decision-makers within the 
department may be unable or unwilling to contemplate necessary 
changes to government’s role with respect to (politically convenient) 
input subsidies or (traditional) extension services. These factors may 
prevent the department from being a positive force for change. 
2. GETTING STARTED
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2. GETTING STARTED
It is essential to distinguish between a programme’s political 
partnership or ownership (eg as part of a bilateral agreement) 
and the variety of partnerships a programme may have for 
intervention purposes (ie co-facilitators or market players). This 
is discussed in more detail in Section 4. 
It might not be possible during programme design 
to get a definitive understanding of these positioning 
factors. In such cases, caution needs to be exercised. 
Rather than partnering with an operational 
organisation that has a narrowly defined remit – say 
a specific government agency – a higher-level and 
more neutral body, such as a ministry, is preferable. 
Or, try to define government’s ownership over 
programme outcomes rather than programme 
structures.
Will the programme fit within agency funding mechanisms?
M4P programmes can take time to achieve impact and their 
expenditure tends to rise only after programmes have become 
credible in the market. Experience suggests that programmatic 
aid may be the most appropriate funding mechanism as it offers 
flexibility in disbursement. 
M4P is also relevant to other donor funding mechanisms such as 
budget support and sector-wide approaches (SWAps), both of 
which are channelled through domestic (ie host) governments. 
While these may offer limited scope to set up stand-alone M4P 
programmes, M4P frameworks can be useful to review and 
define government’s role in different markets.
Basket funding of programmes is appropriate for pooling and 
harmonising donor assistance but experience indicates that it 
is vital for the donors involved to develop a common vision of 
outcomes and a shared commitment to the M4P approach as 
the means of achieving those outcomes (see also Section 4).
does programme design incorporate a portfolio approach? 
Programme design should incorporate a ‘portfolio approach’ to 
manage risk and to ensure that programmes are flexible enough 
to be opportunistic and responsive to a dynamic environment. 
In a portfolio approach a programme maintains a 
flexible mix of markets, entry points, partners and 
types of intervention activity. In such an approach, a 
programme is less concerned with the performance 
of individual elements of the portfolio than with the 
overall performance of the portfolio. Unsuccessful 
elements can be dropped, new elements added and 
successful elements built upon or scaled up. This 
drop-add-build approach is harder to achieve with 
a strategy based on a single partner, entry point or 
type of activity.
Such an approach has several benefits: 
l It avoids the risk of programmes putting ‘all eggs in one 
 basket’. 
l It permits flexibility to incorporate new partners and activities 
 according to opportunity and changing circumstances. 
l It permits programmes to maintain a momentum of activity 
 without relying on pushing a single partner. 
Promoting local ownership often means working at 
the pace of local partners, whose ability to engage 
is not determined by the programme timeline 
but by political or budgetary cycles, a change in 
senior management or seasonality of production. A 
portfolio approach permits programmes to pursue 
multiple lines of activity with different partners, with 
some advancing rapidly, others on hold pending 
resumption and others dropped.
It is generally easier for large programmes to incorporate a 
portfolio approach across multiple markets. However small 
programmes face the same uncertainties as large programmes 
and can use a portfolio approach within a single market to 
spread their risk and reduce their dependency on a single 
partner, entry point or line of activity. 
The lesson from experience is that overly rigid specification 
of partners, entry points or activities at the design stage can 
undermine a programme’s ability to adopt a portfolio approach 
and therefore its ability to manage risk. 
is the programme timeline appropriate?  
Programme design should anticipate that the timeline (and 
trajectory of expenditure) of an M4P programme will not 
necessarily look like a conventional project. A typical timeframe 
for a M4P programme is approximately five to seven years.
Programmes tend to start small, taking time to build momentum, 
absorb resources and achieve results. Consequently programme 
expenditure usually ramps up after the first two years. It is 
important to emphasise that programmes always retain their 
‘light touch’ approach to intervention: their level of expenditure 
increases as they move beyond initial interventions to expand 
the scale and scope of their interventions, not because they 
become more heavy-handed in their approach. 
5
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3. COMPONENTS OF THE M4P INTERVENTION PROCESS
3.1 introduction 
in simple terms the M4p approach comprises (a) a strategic 
rationale for achieving poverty reduction objectives 
through market systems development; (b) a framework for 
understanding market systems and defining a realistic picture 
of sustainability; and (c) guidance for intervention action.
The Guide addresses the challenge of how to put the approach 
into practice – how to operationalise it. 
in operational terms the M4p intervention process is broken 
down into five components which correspond to the main 
stages of a typical project cycle (see figure 1):
a  setting the strategic framework.
B  understanding market systems.
C  Defining sustainable outcomes.
d  facilitating systemic change.
e   assessing change.
As noted previously, whilst these components are presented in 
a sequential fashion for the purposes of this guide, in practice 
implementation of M4P is rarely a linear progression. 
This section is divided into sub-sections A-E reflecting the five 
components of the M4P intervention process. Each sub-section 
follows the same structure:
l Summary sheet: provides an ‘at a glance’ overview of a sub- 
 section’s content.
l Introduction: highlights key points.
l Why important?: indicates the relevance to practitioners. 
l Key M4P principles and framework: explains the essentials. 
l Putting it into practice: examines in more detail how to 
 operationalise the principles and frameworks. 
l Key challenges and how to deal with them: discusses key 
 problems likely to be encountered.
Each sub-section contains application examples      which illu- 
strate the application of key M4P principles and frameworks 
within a mini-case experience. 
figure 1
components of M4p intervention process and the project cycle
Monitoring 
& evaluation
Vision 
& rationale
Identification
& research
Planning & 
designImplementation
& adaptation
Information
& feedback
M4p cOMpOnenT e
assessinG 
chanGe
M4p cOMpOnenT a
seTTinG The sTraTeGic 
fraMeWOrk
M4p cOMpOnenT B
undersTandinG 
MarkeT sysTeMs
M4p cOMpOnenT c
defininG 
susTainaBle OuTcOMes
M4p cOMpOnenT d
faciliTaTinG sysTeMic 
chanGe
7
The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
3. COMPONENTS OF THE M4P INTERVENTION PROCESS
3.2  The M4p lens
M4P is concerned with changing the way market systems 
work so that they offer more opportunities and benefits to 
poor people. Programmes therefore have to make sense of 
market systems so that they can shape market development 
in the interests of the poor. In order to do this, as outlined in 
more detail in the Synthesis, M4P uses a simple model of market 
systems that represents their multi-function and multi-player 
nature (Figure 2). Implementing M4P effectively means applying 
this lens. It forms a continual reference point in all components 
of the M4P intervention process.
figure 2
stylised view of the market system: the M4p lens
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3. COMPONENTS OF THE M4P INTERVENTION PROCESS
3A: SETTING THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
key points
l A strategic framework is a hierarchy of objectives linking the final goal of poverty reduction with a focus on sustainable market 
 system change  
l Facilitators and funders should set a strategic framework which provides a clear, overarching direction and establishes the basis 
 for monitoring and evaluation
key M4p principles and framework: strategic framework 
Reducing poverty as the basic rationale for any M4P programme
Enhancing the poor’s access to opportunities and their capacity to respond to 
opportunities either as entrepreneurs, workers or consumers as the route through 
which poverty is reduced
Stimulating sustainable change in market systems that are important for the poor
Changing market systems through interventions that are facilitative or catalytic in 
nature
putting it into practice: main steps
Step 1: Define poverty reduction objectives - profile of target group; nature of market exclusion or inequality; anticipated final 
    impact
Step 2:  Define growth and access objectives - pro-poor opportunity; potential to improve the target group’s position in the market 
    system
Step 3:  Define systemic change objectives - change needed in the market system so that it better serves the poor
Step 4:  Define broad thrusts of intervention strategy and approach - avoid rigidly defining operational detail and inputs 
key challenges and how to deal with them
l To what extent can the strategic framework be established in detail at the design stage?
l Which target group and which markets?
l How many markets?
Good practice notes (section 5) 
l Logical framework (log frame) (Note 5 .4)
l Impact logic (Note 5 .14)
poverty reduction
improved 
access and growth
Market system change
systemic
intervention
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3A: SETTING THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
3a.1 introduction 
M4P programmes need a clear strategic framework – a 
hierarchy of objectives – which coherently links the goal of 
large-scale poverty reduction with a focus on sustainable 
market system change. The direct objective of M4p 
interventions is to stimulate market systems to work better 
for the poor: an objective of systemic change therefore 
should be made explicit in a strategic framework. a strategic 
framework establishes the overarching direction and rationale 
of a programme and shouldn’t go into specific operational 
details.  
3a.2 Why important? 
A strategic framework provides facilitators with a clear, 
overarching direction for intervention and establishes the basis 
for monitoring and evaluating the effects of intervention. It 
provides funders with the basis to oversee M4P programmes. 
It also sets the parameters for assessment of specific markets 
and prospects for sustainability and provides the basis for more 
detailed market and intervention impact ‘logics’ (see Box 3 and 
Section 3E).
3a.3 key M4p principles and framework
The strategic framework is a simple logic model (eg contained 
in a logical framework, see Box 3): it lays out the flow of cause 
and effect of how a programme will achieve its objectives and 
the chain of different achievements necessary if interventions 
are to result ultimately in the realisation of a programme’s final 
goal (see Figure 3). 
poverty reduction
improved 
access and growth
Market system change
systemic
intervention
figure 3
strategic framework for M4p
Define poverty reduction objectives:
Which target group is being targeted and what is their economic profile?
What is the anticipated final impact on the target group?
Define growth and access objectives: 
What is the pro-poor opportunity? 
How might the target group’s position in the market system be improved?
Define systemic change objectives: 
In what way does the market system need to change so that it better serves  
the poor?
Define broad thrusts of intervention strategy and approach:
avoid rigidly defining operational detail and inputs
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3a.4 putting it into practice
Setting the strategic framework follows a top-to-bottom flow of 
logic.  This means defining a programme’s final poverty reduction 
objectives first, before defining intermediate objectives for 
improved growth and access and direct objectives for market 
system change. 
The strategic framework should not be defined in a tightly 
specific, operational way – it is about setting out a programme’s 
strategy for poverty reduction (hence the term ‘strategic’!). It 
should outline the rationale of the programme, its key objectives 
and general approach to intervention.
In practice this means:
l Recognise the practical reality. Typically there is insufficient 
 information available at the design stage to set details in 
 stone. 
l Use the strategic framework to establish the main objectives of 
 the programme. Once set these shouldn’t change (if they do, 
 the entire rationale for the programme changes).
l Ensure that the strategic framework has an objective of market 
 system change. But don’t try to specify precisely what changes 
 might be required unless detailed market diagnosis has already 
 been completed. 
l Start with ‘ends’ and not ‘means’.  At the design stage it is generally 
 not possible to be prescriptive about which intervention 
 approaches (eg a voucher scheme) a programme might use 
 – again, unless detailed diagnosis has already been completed. 
l Refine indicators associated with each level of objectives 
 throughout the course of a programme’s life. As a programme’s 
 market understanding develops, constant ‘reality checks’ are 
 need to ensure that indicators (contained in a programme’s 
 logical framework) remain relevant and up-to-date. 
For example: A market development programme was designed to 
stimulate more appropriate financial services for 100,000 poor 
consumers over 5 years, providing direct financial and non-financial 
support to non-bank providers. During intervention it became 
clear that wider industry change was both needed and feasible. 
Consequently the programme shifted its focus to large mainstream 
private and public players and to information services, regulatory 
reform and wider influencing. The programme’s means changed 
and indicators were redefined more broadly with impact targets 
of 2m consumers. However, its overall objectives remained the 
same because the strategic framework remained valid: market 
system change (more appropriate financial services) ➞ improved 
access (to financial services) ➞ poverty reduction (benefits to poor 
consumers). 
Box 3
strategic frameworks, impact logics and logical frameworks 
Because they are all forms of logic models, there are obvious 
similarities between strategic frameworks, impact logics (see 
Section 3E) and logical frameworks. How are they different?
l A strategic framework establishes the overall rationale 
 and direction for a programme – the programme’s strategy 
 for achieving poverty reduction. It doesn’t contain detailed 
 operational considerations (like an impact logic) or indicators 
 and assumptions (like a log frame). 
l An impact logic is more operational. It expands the number 
 of ‘boxes’ in the strategic framework, which allows for a more 
 detailed flow of cause and effect towards impact on poverty 
 reduction. An impact logic is used to map out the intended 
 and actual effects of individual interventions for planning and 
 measurement purposes. 
l A logical framework or ‘log frame’ is a generic (often formal) 
 planning and management tool used widely by development 
 agencies to design and implement projects and to allow 
 oversight and accountability. The objectives in a log frame will 
 reflect those of the strategic framework, but it also includes 
 indicators for those objectives, means of verification and key 
 assumptions.   
This is not just an exercise in filling boxes! The 
strategic framework is about thinking through the 
overarching rationale and direction of a programme. 
It is not just a formality to be completed at the design 
stage. It provides a programme with a coherent 
strategy and the discipline to assess the consistency 
of its actions with its objectives throughout its life.
Each step in the strategic framework is explored in turn below, 
illustrated by an example from an M4P programme. At the end 
of the section, each step from the example is brought together 
in a complete strategic framework (see page 14).
Context:
An agriculture development programme is focused on 
improving the livelihoods of rural households, whose 
main source of income is the raising of livestock. Their 
incomes are constrained by low output and productivity; 
unless these are addressed livestock producers’ incomes 
cannot rise. Poor output and productivity result from 
inappropriate knowledge and practices and limited 
access to urban markets. These producers are currently 
poorly served by private and public providers of services 
such as market information, animal health, production 
advice and transportation
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Step 1
Define poverty reduction objectives
The first step is to define specific poverty reduction objectives. 
Generally M4P interventions will have a final objective related 
to improving the socio-economic welfare of disadvantaged 
people, regions or countries.
This needs to be defined specifically, based on context and 
programme type. This means defining a target group and an 
objective for improvement in their poverty condition – ‘more’ of 
something positive (eg income or assets) or ‘less’ of something 
negative (eg deprivation, exclusion or inequality).
Key questions are: 
l Which group of poor people is being targeted and what is their 
 economic profile?
l What is the anticipated final impact on the target group?
Poverty reduction objective:
Improvement in the household incomes of small-scale 
livestock producers and those working with them, often 
family members.
Step 2
Define growth and access objectives
The next step is to define how the poor’s position might be 
improved. This entails understanding how obstacles to the 
poor’s access to opportunities or their capacity to respond to 
those opportunities can be overcome, represented as objectives 
for either growth or access. The ‘poor’ might be producers 
and entrepreneurs (ie businesses or farmers), workers (ie 
employees) or consumers, depending on context. 
Key questions are:
l What is the pro-poor market opportunity?
l How might the target group’s position in the market system be 
 improved?
This entails defining where pro-poor opportunities lie (see also 
Figure 5 on page 16), in terms of:
l Stepping up: potential improvements in the poor’s positioning 
 within existing market systems (eg by increasing their 
 productivity as producers, improving their level or quality of 
 employment and/or gaining access to more appropriate goods 
 and services).
l Stepping out: potential shifts of the poor into new market 
 systems (eg by gaining access to new markets, new employment 
 or new goods and services).
l Hanging in: for extremely disadvantaged groups ‘opportunity’ 
 can often mean the potential to reduce vulnerability to risk.
Growth and access objective:
Improved and sustained access to (and use of) a range 
of formal and informal public and private services is 
needed to enable small-scale livestock producers to 
step up their output and productivity. 
 
Step 3
Define systemic change objectives 
The direct focus of interventions is to stimulate sustainable 
change in market systems. The next step is to identify specific 
dimensions of those systems that need to be changed. The two 
key questions therefore are: 
l Why isn’t the market working? 
l In what way does the market system need to change so that it 
 better serves the poor?
Systemic change objectives obviously vary according to context. 
Generally it is not possible to define these in detail at the design 
stage. Market system change might include:
l Improved delivery of the market’s core function – a better 
 ‘deal’ for the poor (eg increase in access or participation 
 rates, improved quality or levels of satisfaction).
l Changed attitudes, perceptions or relationships of players.
l Changes in capacity and practices (eg investment, roles or 
 performance) of players and functions in the system.
l Demonstrated incentives and ownership of players (eg 
 responsiveness to changed conditions in the system).
l Independent and continuing activity in the system (ie the 
 extent to which changes are maintained after direct 
 intervention support has ceased).
System change objectives:
On the supply-side, the awareness of service providers 
(eg vets, input suppliers and trading companies) about 
opportunities to serve rural producers is low and must 
increase. On the basis of changed understanding and 
incentives, their services need to be adapted to suit the 
target group. On the demand-side, small-scale livestock 
producers’ understanding of the potential benefits of 
services and knowledge about how to access them 
must be enhanced. These changes should continue in the 
absence of programme intervention.
Step 4
Define broad thrusts of intervention strategy and approach
M4P programmes are characterised by responsive and multi-faceted 
interventions. This makes it difficult – in fact undesirable – to lock down 
detailed intervention outputs and activities at the design stage. The 
strategic framework should establish the primary focus and overall 
direction of a programme in a way which is sufficiently clear to guide 
decision-making, monitoring and evaluation in a dynamic context. 
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Typically, this means establishing a programme’s strategy and general 
approach to intervention, within which multi-faceted intervention 
activities that are responsive to prevailing conditions can be pursued. 
Intervention strategy:
Interventions should be concentrated on a number 
of potential areas. These include improving producer 
and service provider awareness by better availability 
of information about market scale and opportunities; 
linking demand- and supply-sides through facilitated
Flexibility at the intervention level does not mean 
‘anything goes’. Individual interventions need to 
be guided by a clear and rigorous logic, which 
is consistent with the programme’s overarching 
strategic framework. This need not be defined 
at the design stage but as part of individual 
intervention formulation throughout the course of 
the programme.
meetings and visits; building the capacity of producers’ representative 
bodies to secure services collectively in order to reduce delivery 
costs; and developing service providers’ capacities to deliver services 
by linking them to sources of training.
3a.5 key challenges and how to deal with them
To what extent can the strategic framework be established in 
detail at the design stage?
There is an obvious tension which needs to be dealt with. Funders 
will want to lock down as much detail as possible in advance for 
accountability purposes (contracting, planning and budgeting). 
Facilitators also want certainty for contracting purposes and to 
provide clarity and direction for their work. However facilitators 
will face an ever-shifting reality on the ground, which will require 
considerable flexibility to respond effectively.
So, what can be done to manage this tension? 
l Balance accountability and flexibility requirements.  At a minimum 
 funders need to set the basic programme design parameters. 
The strategic framework in practice:
A programme focused on improving the livestock-based livelihoods of rural households. Incomes are constrained by low output 
and productivity – in turn caused by poor practices. Producers are currently ill-served by providers of services such as market 
information and animal health.
Improvement in the household incomes of small-scale livestock 
producers and those working with them, often family members.
Improved access to a range of formal and informal services
aimed at increasing producers’ output and productivity.
Supply-side: 
l Increase awareness of providers of potential opportunities.
l Change incentives and capacities.
Demand-side: 
l Increase producers’ understanding about benefits of services.
l Improve knowledge about how to access them.
Interventions concentrated on:
l Better information on market scale and opportunities. 
l Facilitated meetings/visits to link supply- and demand-sides. 
l Build capacity of producers’ organisations.
l Linking providers to sources of training to develop capacity.
pOVerTy 
reducTiOn
iMprOVed GrOWTh 
and access
MarkeT sysTeM 
chanGe
sysTeMic 
inTerVenTiOn
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 This means taking some key decisions, such as: 
  - Defining target group and usually some combination of 
   geographic area or sector selection and ensuring consistency 
   with wider country strategy or policy. 
  - Setting the ‘big picture’ objectives in terms of poverty 
   reduction and improved growth and access, usually entailing 
   comparison of poverty, growth or access dynamics and 
   overall intervention feasibility. 
  - Emphasising systemic change and sustainability in programme 
   design.
Funders should be clear about what is really 
needed to satisfy their accountability requirements. 
It is common for initial programme designs to be 
excessively detailed, when usually only key objectives 
and main budget line items are required. Such detail 
is often insufficiently accurate for accountability 
purposes and unnecessarily restrictive for facilitators. 
It serves little purpose.
l Clarify who defines what. Beyond these basic requirements it is a 
 question of who is best placed to do what. How far are funders 
 able to undertake detailed diagnostic work as a pre-cursor 
 to project or programme design? How far should the detailed 
 diagnosis be left to facilitators? (ie how far should funders try 
 and go through the diagnostic process, outlined in Section 3B?) 
 For programmes which focus on a single, well-established 
 sector (eg finance) more extensive pre-design diagnosis is 
 possible. For larger, multi-sector programmes such detailed 
 diagnosis is more difficult to do upfront. There are a number 
 of advantages and disadvantages of doing detailed diagnosis as 
 a precursor to programme design (see Figure 4). 
Once design is up and running, managing the accountability-
flexibility tension requires good communication between 
funders and facilitators. Funders need to maintain an active 
involvement in programme oversight: they can’t just contract 
and withdraw. Facilitators need to actively ensure that their 
funders are informed about programme development and do 
not simply rely on routine reporting.
figure 4
advantages and disadvantages of detailed diagnosis prior to programme design
accOunTaBiliTy flexiBiliTy
detailed diagnosis by funder prior to design detailed diagnosis by facilitator post design 
adVanTaGes
Tighter framing of objectives and budget
Ensures consistency with wider funder or 
government country strategy
Clearer guidance to bidders
Permits stronger facilitator ownership; allows local players to 
be brought into assessment process
Intelligence and insight is vital for intervention so facilitators 
must have a role in assessment
Reduces time delay between analysis and action
disadVanTaGes
Separates analysis from intervention; time elapsed between 
getting information and taking action
Detailed planning creates unrealistic rigidity
Tight specification to bidders encourages overly narrow 
response (eg skills and solutions)
Less specific planning and budgeting 
More time-consuming to ensure accountability
Funders become distant from ‘what’s going on’
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Even if funders are able to undertake detailed 
diagnosis as part of initial design, things inevitably 
change during the course of implementation. It is 
impractical to regard programme design as fixed in 
stone. The need for flexibility is always there; design 
and plan for it.
For many funders revising log frames after contracts 
have been awarded is problematic (particularly the 
upper levels, ie goal and purpose). In these situations 
the important thing is to concentrate on getting 
the overall logic right (so that it doesn’t need to be 
revised once implementation has begun) and avoid 
being overly prescriptive about operational details 
at the output and activity levels. This may mean 
leaving identification of specific market constraints, 
intervention focus and methodology to facilitators.
Which target group and which markets? 
To achieve large-scale pro-poor impact funders and facilitators 
must identify market systems which are relevant to and have the 
potential to work well for significant groups of poor people and 
where there is a reasonable prospect of bringing about durable 
pro-poor change.
Selection of target group and markets is usually determined by 
three factors (Figure 5): 
l Potential for achieving large-scale impact (large numbers of 
 poor people).
l Markets with potential for achieving improved growth and 
 access.
l Feasibility of achieving systemic change within the short to 
 medium term (three to five years).
figure 5
key factors for target group and market selection
Key questions for market selection are therefore: 
l Are there reasonable prospects of affecting significant numbers of 
 poor people?
l How do poor people engage in those systems (as producers, 
 labourers, consumers)?
l In what ways might improving the market system(s) enhance 
 growth and access?
l Is intervention likely to be feasible given the resources available?
The presence of ‘triggers’ or ‘drivers’ for change 
which might be leveraged by intervention is also an 
important consideration in market selection. There 
are few markets which present a ‘perfect storm’ of 
circumstances for intervention but there may be 
particular developments which make them more 
amenable to change – for example, new regulations, 
technologies, competitive or political pressures or 
the presence of potential allies for a programme.
When choosing a target group it is important not to rush to where 
the poor are without first understanding whether there is realistic 
potential for change. It is essential that target groups are selected 
which have some measure of potential to engage within the 
economic mainstream, where population numbers are sufficiently 
high in terms of potential outreach and where intervention appears 
realistic. There is often a tendency to focus on the most extreme 
circumstances and ignore the lower of the three circles in Figure 5, 
with little consideration of how lasting change will be achieved.
Equally, when choosing a market, practitioners can’t just define 
a market focus without having a clear view of why that market 
is relevant to the poor. Programmes need to have transparent 
criteria for market selection. There is often a tendency to focus on 
obvious markets for commodities or goods that the poor produce 
directly (eg agricultural value chains) and ignore other markets for 
goods and services which support those value chains (eg seeds or 
transportation) or which are important to the poor as consumers 
or citizens (eg media).
Programmes need to reconcile these factors when selecting 
markets and be prepared for some tough trade-offs and painful 
decisions. 
For example: A programme identified the broiler sector within the 
poultry industry as a potential focus for intervention. It was initially 
chosen because large numbers of poor households were involved in 
rearing broilers and, because the industry was growing, it appeared 
to offer good prospects for raising their incomes. Closer analysis 
revealed that the medium-term (5 year) prospects did not favour 
small-scale producers because of an increasing trend towards industry 
consolidation around centralised large-scale producers with networks 
of well-established outgrowers.  The programme decided not to pursue 
intervention because outgrowing opportunities for poor households 
would be few.
poverty reduction
potential
Significant numbers 
of poor people?
pro-poor access or
growth potential
Stepping up? 
Stepping out?
Hanging in?
M4p intervention potential
Feasibility of stimulating
systemic change?
16
The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
3a
3A: SETTING THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
how many markets?
A related challenge is the breadth of coverage a programme 
should have (ie how many markets should it aim to work in?). 
This is determined by consideration of several factors: 
l The potential for significant outreach. In particularly ‘weak’ or 
 ‘thin’ market situations a single market focus might not offer 
 prospects for significant outreach, necessitating work in several 
 markets. 
l The nature of specific markets. Certain types of market may 
 be highly specialised and have little commonality with other 
 markets (eg land or finance) that require specialised expertise 
 or credibility, in contrast to other types of market where there 
 might be greater economies of scale from working in multiple 
 markets (eg agriculture or manufacturing).
l Mitigation of risk. A single market focus exposes programmes 
 to an ‘all eggs in one basket’ problem. There is also a danger 
 – for larger programmes in particular – that in focusing on too 
 few markets there is bureaucratic pressure to push excessive 
 resources through market systems without properly considering 
 what is required. There are real dangers of saturating markets 
 with external resources and stifling initiative in the process.
l Span of management control.  A multi-market focus can impose 
 heavy management burdens on a programme, particularly if 
 those markets are widely dispersed.  
l Spreading efforts too thinly. Operating in many markets – and 
 being seen to be busy doing many small things within them 
 – can present an image of superficial achievement. The risk 
 is that programmes spread themselves too thinly and don’t 
 develop the knowledge and ‘closeness’ they need to really 
 understand markets. Those concerned with leveraging more 
 substantial change are more likely to focus on a smaller number 
 of markets.
Multi-market programmes can be successful, but 
impact is enhanced when working in groupings of 
related markets; where markets are closely related 
or share similar geographic concentration or where 
the constraints and/or solutions are somewhat 
similar. This enables cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
impact. Where the portfolio is made up of isolated 
and unrelated markets and interventions, substantial 
impact is harder to achieve.
It is important to note that even when a programme has a 
single market focus it is likely to end up working in multiple 
markets, as it addresses constraints in markets which support its 
principal market of focus. 
For example: A financial services market development programme 
aimed at improving financial services for the poor (principal 
market: transaction banking) focused on strengthening market 
research services for the banking industry (supporting market: 
business services), as lack of market information about low-income 
consumers was identified as a critical obstacle to pro-poor product 
development. 
For smaller programmes it may make sense to have 
a single market or sector focus. In these cases it is 
critical that programme design is not defined too 
narrowly (eg by product type or market segment). 
Facilitators need to be able to operate a portfolio 
approach within a single market focus, examining 
different combinations of market segments, product 
types, entry points and partners to maximise impact 
and minimise risk.
Criteria for market selection and coverage will vary from agency 
to agency in terms of ambitions for scale and scope of market 
coverage, type of markets chosen and their relevance to agency 
objectives and priorities. To some extent, agency capacity and 
competence will also dictate scale, scope and market choice.
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3B: UNDERSTANDING MARKET SYSTEMS
key points
l Programmes need to be shaped by a good understanding of the operations of market systems and how they affect poor people 
l Programmes should go through a diagnostic process that narrows down to identify specific market system constraints to be 
 addressed by intervention 
l The process should distinguish symptoms of underperformance from their root causes
key M4p principles and framework: diagnostic process 
Market assessment is a process which starts by 
understanding the wider socio-economic context of the 
poor and then narrows down the focus of assessment 
to identify specific constraints affecting a market 
important to the target group, which might be addressed 
by intervention: going from identifying symptoms to 
understanding root causes 
putting it into practice: main levels
The diagnostic process involves developing a good understanding across three levels:
Level 1: Understand the profile of the poor and their wider context - including overall economic opportunities and key drivers of 
    change
Level 2:  Map out the specific market system, its dynamics and the position of the poor - specifically how the market is failing to serve 
    the poor currently
Level 3: Identify specific systemic constraints - the underlying causes of underperformance and opportunities and obstacles 
    for achieving change
key challenges and how to deal with them
l How much assessment is enough?
l When should you do assessment?
l Should market assessment be outsourced or done in-house?
Good practice notes (section 5) 
l Implementing demand-side surveys (Note 5.2)
l Access frontier (Note 5.3)
l Promoting value chain development (Note 5.8)
l Understanding incentives (Note 5.9)
l Guiding participation processes (Note 5.11)
Symptoms The poor and their context
Specific market system(s)
systemic 
constraints
focus of 
intervention(s)
Causes
l How do you decide which tool to use for market  
 assessment?
l How many markets should be assessed?
l Livelihoods analysis (Note 5.12)
l Understanding interconnected markets (Note 5.15)
l Understanding transactions (Note 5.17)
l Rapid market assessment (Note 5.18)
3B
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3B.1 introduction
M4p programmes need to be guided by a good understanding 
of specific market systems. Poor people are affected by the 
market systems in which they operate, which in turn are 
affected by other market systems and the broader socio-
economic context. programmes therefore need to understand 
how specific market systems work (or don’t work) and 
maintain an awareness of the wider socio-economic context. 
This requires a diagnostic process which enables programmes 
to move from broad awareness to sharper understanding 
of specific systemic constraints to be addressed by their 
intervention. This process seeks to distinguish the symptoms 
of underperformance from their root causes.
 
3B.2 Why important?
Appropriate information – and its effective interpretation – 
shapes intervention design, enables programmes to ascertain 
prospects for sustainability and guides interventions throughout 
the life of a programme. Market assessment should: 
l Help programmes understand the capacity and incentives 
 of market players to determine prospects for change and 
 sustainability. 
l Identify potential drivers of change and partners for 
 intervention.
l Generate intelligence and insight which can be used to 
 influence market players.
l Provide information for baseline and measurement purposes.
3B.3 key M4p principles and framework
The diagnostic process is like a filter, which starts with 
understanding the wider socio-economic context and then 
narrows down the focus of assessment to identify specific 
constraints affecting a market important to the target group. 
The process is about moving beyond a superficial description of 
the symptoms of a market’s underperformance to understand 
the root causes of this underperformance – which can be 
addressed by programme intervention (see Figures 6 and 7).
The diagnostic process focuses on the types of information 
required for decision-making and action, not on the use of 
specific tools to collect information. Once practitioners are 
clearer about the types of information they need, choices can 
then be made about where to get information, what tools to 
use and who should do what. 
Try to write a paragraph or two describing the 
market, its relevance to poverty and the systemic 
constraints. Then see what information you require 
to come up with the intervention focus. Only then 
determine the market research tools to be used.
Experience indicates that, rather than a specific tool or 
methodology, the most useful quality facilitators can bring to 
bear is the spirit of curiosity: not to take market underper-
formance at face value, but to continually ask ‘‘why?’’. In other 
words, facilitators need to keep digging down to identify the real 
causes of market underperformance rather than stopping at the 
superficial symptoms. 
21
The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
3B: UNDERSTANDING MARKET SYSTEMS
key information types
The poor and their context
(Target group, area etc)
Specific market system
(Where the poor conduct their economic 
activity and who they 
engage with)
Systemic constraints
(Supporting functions and rules around the 
core of the market)
need to know what...?
l Socio-economic, demographic, 
 geographic ‘picture’
l Growth, competitiveness potential and  
 challenges
l Key trends, prospects, drivers and  
 barriers to poor’s participation in  
 economic mainstream
l The structure of the market  
 system
l The dynamics of the market system  
 and dimensions of its performance
l The poor’s position within the market  
 system
l Key market functions and players
l Who does what and pays for what
l Incentives, capacity and  
 relationships
l Interconnected markets
in order to...?
Identify specific markets which offer pro-
poor opportunities which might feasibly 
be unlocked by intervention
Identify where the market isn’t working 
for the poor: ‘symptoms’
Identify underlying reasons for market 
underperformance and possible 
intervention points to stimulate systemic 
change: ‘causes’
(There may be multiple causes in more 
than one market!)
1 Note that the levels shown are indicative of a process of filtering down; they should not be regarded as absolutely fixed.
Symptoms The poor and their context
Specific market system(s)
systemic 
constraints
focus of 
intervention(s)
Causes
figure 7
information required from the diagnostic process1
figure 6 
The diagnostic process
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As discussed in Section 2, programme design will not necessarily 
identify specific market constraints at the outset. Funders must 
ensure provision is made in programme planning and budgeting 
for this kind of diagnostic process throughout the period of 
intervention. It is an integral part of what M4P programmes do.
3B.4 putting it into practice
The diagnostic process is about starting with the ‘big picture’ and 
narrowing down assessment until underlying market constraints 
– which can be addressed feasibly by intervention – have been 
identified. 
For the sake of clarity, this diagnostic process is presented in a linear 
manner, with distinct levels of market assessment. In practice, the 
process is not entirely linear and the various levels are likely to 
overlap. Programmes will find that they move up and down through 
the various levels of the diagnostic process as their understanding 
develops and they are forced to reappraise their initial assessment 
(see Figure 9 on page 29).
The levels of the diagnostic process are presented in more detail 
below and illustrated by an application example from an M4P 
programme. This example is then summarised on page 27.
Context: 
A major M4P programme is mandated by its funders 
to work in selected rural regions and to promote the 
competitiveness and growth of selected value chains. Its 
goal is to achieve large-scale pro-poor change in these 
regions. The facilitator has considerable experience and 
competence in developing rural value chains.
Level 1 
Understand the profile of the poor and their wider context
The assessment process starts by establishing an understanding 
of the profile of the poor and their wider context. To some 
extent this may already be given by programme design, usually 
based on a combination of:
l Geographic focus: eg a neighbourhood, town, province, country.
l Product focus: eg a specific type of goods or service such as 
 financial services or insecticide-treated mosquito nets.
l Target group focus: eg garment sector workers or female 
 business owners.
l Sector focus: eg agro-processing or small-scale manufacturing.
Initial programme focus will also be shaped by the characteristics 
of the funding or implementing agency in question:
l Strategic focus of funder: eg a priority target group or 
 environmental protection.
l Capacity of implementing agency: ie what the agency can do, 
 its experience and competence in certain types of intervention 
 (eg challenge funds) or with specific sub-sectors (agricultural 
 technology).
While it is sensible to consider facilitators’ 
competence when selecting markets, there is a risk 
of shaping the view of the market problem (and thus 
intervention) by what facilitators can do, not what 
the problem really is – in other words ‘a solution in 
search of a problem’! 
This means that most programmes do not start with a blank 
sheet of paper when deciding on their overall focus. This stage in 
the diagnostic process corresponds to the Strategic Framework 
described in Section 3A, particularly the three market selection 
factors: (a) overall pro-poor potential, (b) growth potential and 
(c) feasibility of bringing about change (described in Figure 5 on 
page 16). 
As discussed in Section 3A, depending on how much pre-design 
diagnostic work has been conducted this can be an opportunity 
for facilitators to examine more rigorously the basics of 
programme design and adjust programme focus as appropriate 
(for instance during the course of a pilot or orientation phase).
Programmes need to ensure that they have a reasonable 
understanding of:
l How the targeted population participates economically – as 
 producers, consumers or employees? This means developing a 
 clear profile of the poor and the nature of their livelihoods. An 
 indication of potential outreach is also necessary.
l Overall economic opportunities and prospects. Sources of growth, 
 important trends and, if possible, the dynamics of key sectors 
 which are relevant to the poor.
l ‘Drivers’. The triggers for change within the wider context, for 
 example policy reform, institutional or technological innovation, 
 a critical incident or crisis or powerful potential allies, which 
 shape the momentum for change in a market. This can help 
 practitioners determine the feasibility of stimulating more 
 specific changes. 
For example: An M4P programme was able to build successfully 
on a high-profile multi-party pledge between industry, government 
and civil society to improve the poor’s access to good quality, 
affordable services. Another programme used industry leadership 
potential as a selection criterion for markets.
As a result of this first level of assessment, facilitators should 
have a clearer idea of specific markets that offer pro-poor 
opportunities which may be unlocked by intervention and 
some of the wider drivers of change.
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Profile of poor: 
The main source of income for most households is 
agriculture but incomes are low with a high proportion of 
households below the poverty line. Vegetable cultivation 
is an increasingly important crop and income source. 
Vegetables are relatively easy to grow, can be cultivated 
on small areas of land and are employment-intensive 
(with a high proportion of women labourers). Consumer 
demand for vegetables is growing fast, prices are rising 
and, as consumer tastes change, this trend is set to 
continue. Since average consumption is well below 
recommended levels, increased production is good for 
the poor as consumers. In this context, it is recognised 
that the biggest problem for the sector is low productivity 
– less than half the level of international competitors. 
The potential of the vegetable sector to generate more 
growth and incomes will not be realised until productivity 
is increased.
How the parameters of market assessment are 
delineated determines the nature of assessment 
and its outputs. Generally speaking, for a given set 
of resources, if the market is delineated narrowly 
(eg small farm users of leaf testing services in the 
palm oil sector in region X) analysis can be much 
more specific, detailed and manageable – but might 
neglect the bigger picture. Conversely, with the 
same resources a broader market delineation (eg 
the entire palm oil sector nationwide) will generally 
yield an overview level of analysis and not be able 
to get into detail. It is important to be clear about 
what information is required and what resources 
are available for assessment when delineating the 
market.
There is a risk that programmes draw market 
system boundaries too narrowly around the core 
transactions of the market and ignore supporting 
functions and rules or interconnected markets. The 
risk of narrow delineation is that interventions often 
focus on symptoms rather than the root causes of 
underperformance.
Level 2
Map out the specific market system, its dynamics and the position 
of the poor
Once a picture of the poor’s context and a preliminary market 
focus is established, programmes need to develop a sound 
understanding of the structure and performance of the specific 
market system(s). More specifically:
l How does the market system work, what are its key functions and 
 who are its key players (private, public, formal and informal)?
l What are the dynamics of the market in terms of its overall 
 effectiveness, for example its competitiveness, productivity or level 
 of coverage or access?
l More specifically, in what ways is the market failing to serve the 
 poor (ie what are the symptoms of underperformance) or where 
 are potential opportunities for the poor?
The starting point is to map out the basic structure of the market 
system:
l Identify the functions played by different players and map the 
 relationships between players (for example in a value chain, 
 between consumers, retailers, processors, producers, input 
 suppliers). 
l Where possible identify alternative or competing structures, 
 channels and relationships.
l Don’t neglect the possibility of ‘embedded’ or ‘hidden’ 
 transactions and other forms of informality.   
Next, programmes should try to understand the dynamics of the 
system (ie where the system has come from and where it might 
be heading in future). This can include:
l Changes in the flow and nature of goods or services over time 
 (eg value, volume, type, profile of suppliers and consumers).
l Performance relative to competing, complementary or similar 
 sectors and regions (eg productivity, value-added, customer 
 satisfaction, level of competition).
l Major events and changes (eg new entrants, new legislation or 
 technological innovation). 
Then, programmes should understand the poor’s position within 
the market system and ascertain how the market is currently 
serving them – or not serving them. 
Assessment should focus on the core of the market initially: 
transactions (see Box 4). In what ways are the poor not getting 
what they need from this market – and what are the potential 
opportunities for the poor? 
Assessing transactions requires quantitative and qualitative 
information2 from actual or potential market players on 
the demand-side or supply-side. Note that the poor may be 
on either side of the transaction, depending on how they 
participate or potentially participate in the market, eg on the 
demand-side as consumer of a good or service, like vocational 
training or a loan, or on the supply-side as a worker or producer, 
selling their labour or rice.  
As a result of assessment at this level programmes should have 
a clearer idea of where the deal or transaction involving the 
poor is breaking down – but not necessarily a clear idea of why 
it is breaking down.
3B: UNDERSTANDING MARKET SYSTEMS
2 Quantitative information is vital to describe the market as it is currently working, eg in terms of its scale or levels of participation. Qualitative information is important to help understand why the market is 
 working the way it is.
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Market system: 
A number of factors contribute to the productivity 
problem, including market structure and farm size. 
But the most prominent factor is inappropriate use of 
inputs (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides) and poor practices by 
farmers. Vegetable cultivation is relatively new for farmers 
and there is widespread lack of understanding about 
best practices and input use. Farmers buy inputs from 
local retailers. Their sources of information are varied: 
small numbers of (usually larger) farmers have access 
to government extension workers and NGOs. However, 
retailers and other farmers are the most widespread 
source of information. There is general dissatisfaction with 
the quality and usefulness of information available. The 
productivity problem is, to a large degree, an information 
problem.
Box 4
factors that determine or inhibit transactions
When assessing transactions – including those which are 
‘embedded’ – it is vital to explore beyond current participation 
or non-participation (ie the ‘deal’ the poor are getting currently) 
to understand the factors that lead up to or inhibit the deal:* 
l Consumers’ awareness and understanding of their 
 requirements.
l Consumers’ awareness and understanding of a good or service 
 that could meet their requirements.
l Consumers’ valuation of and satisfaction with the good or 
 service. 
l The nature of the good or service and its appropriateness to 
 the requirements of consumers.
l Sources of supply and their acceptability to consumers/users.
l Suppliers’ awareness and understanding of consumers. 
Affordability is often identified as a barrier to transactions. It is 
important to identify whether there are genuine affordability 
problems or whether price is a symptom of an underlying 
constraint. 
* The factors apply to actual or potential consumers, suppliers and goods or services.
Level 3
Identify specific systemic constraints
Once an understanding of the structure and dynamics of the 
specific market system has been established – and the poor’s 
position within that – assessment needs to focus on identifying 
the specific causes of market underperformance. 
Key questions are:
l What are the underlying causes of a market system’s 
 underperformance?
l What are the primary obstacles and opportunities to overcoming 
 these problems?
To answer these questions, programmes usually need to explore 
the range of other functions which support and govern the core 
of the market – ie rules and supporting functions. This may lead 
programmes to explore an interconnected market system (see 
Section 3C). 
Remember that underperformance in the core of 
the market is often caused by underlying problems 
with supporting functions and rules. So, programmes 
need to go beyond the symptom of the problem (eg 
transactions are not happening) to understand the 
causes – from the ‘what’ to the ‘why’. 
At this level programmes should avoid simply describing specific 
market functions and the players that are currently performing 
those functions. It is essential to go deeper than that: to get an 
insight into players’ capability and motivations for performing 
specific market functions and how well they are performing 
them. This means understanding: 
l Incentives of players.
l Capacity of players.
l Relationships between players. 
For example: In a value chain where small producers suffer from 
low working capital, a programme might need to explore the 
nature of relationships between various players and identify and 
understand reasons for differences between, say, one large buyer 
that pays small producers cash on delivery whereas the industry 
norm is to pay after 30 days. What explains the difference? Is that 
buyer particularly altruistic? Is the deal only extended to certain 
small producers with social ties to the buyer? Is there a commercial 
benefit to offering preferential payment terms? If so, why don’t other 
buyers do the same? 
Incentives and capacity are critical. Programmes need to explore 
the reasons why players are acting they way they are and 
their motivations and ability to change. Assessment must help 
programmes to understand the ‘political economy’ of change, 
which is grounded in the incentives and capacities of market 
players in the private and public sector, be they formal or 
informal, large or small, local, national or international.
In order to understand incentives programmes 
often need to understand political, legal and social 
and cultural factors – ie the ‘political economy’ – as 
well as economic factors: what is valued and why; 
how values are shaped by prevailing norms and 
behaviour; and how these social factors encourage 
or inhibit change. 
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Systemic constraints: 
The accessibility of retailers makes them the most 
common source of information for farmers. Farmers 
seek advice from retailers but often are suspicious 
of the value of information received – retailers push 
products rather than solve problems. Retailers in the 
main don’t recognise the value of the information 
‘service’ they provide.  The retailers in turn are reliant 
on large input supply companies for their information 
but currently this information is narrowly focused on 
products – not on vegetable cultivation practices per se. 
It is in the interests of input suppliers and retailers that 
farmers are more successful; for that to happen more 
and better information needs to be provided by the 
input supplier to retailers and from retailers to farmers. 
The information problem is a business model problem. 
The logical intervention focus is to work with input 
supply companies – with the capacity and incentive 
to change – to improve the quality of information and 
advice available through retailers to farmers. For input 
suppliers and their retailers this can enhance their 
reputation, strengthen customer loyalty and increase 
sales.
Don’t forget the end-purpose of market assessment: 
to identify the underlying causes of market underper-
formance and potential entry points for intervention. 
Information gathering can draw from a variety of 
sources but, whatever the source, M4P places a 
premium on intelligence and deploying it effectively. 
Programmes don’t do market assessment out of 
academic interest. Information shapes intervention 
strategy and guides actions to change the nature of 
the core of the market – a better deal for the poor 
– usually by altering the way in which supporting 
functions and rules work. 
Market assessment tools and sources of information
At the first two levels of the diagnostic process – the poor 
and their context and specific market systems – a range of 
relatively assessment standard tools can be used (see Figure 8) 
with greater or lesser degrees of adaptation. As facilitators get 
further through the diagnostic process, to explore the systemic 
constraints affecting performance, they rely less on standard 
tools and more on focused interaction with a limited number 
of selected informants, which have emerged from the preceding 
assessment. This interaction might take the form of one-to-one 
meetings, focus group discussions or brainstorming workshops, 
depending on the nature of the players involved.
3B.5 key challenges and how to deal with them
 
how much assessment is enough?
A programme’s understanding of market systems will never be 
perfect. Understanding has to be sufficiently strong to provide 
the basis for informed action, but ‘paralysis by analysis’ must be 
avoided. It is not the case that before any action takes place, 
exhaustive, formal market assessment needs to be conducted. 
In reality the extent and nature of market assessment is a function 
of knowledge gaps (ie a consideration of what we already know 
and what we still need to know) and the resources available to 
bridge these gaps. 
The means by which programmes acquire information need 
not be formal or comprehensive. It is also often possible to 
draw on secondary sources of information which are already 
available or to participate in the ongoing research activities of 
other organisations.  
As a rule of thumb, the more distant an organisation is from 
a market in question, and the larger its scale, the more formal, 
extensive and periodic market assessment needs to be (eg 
funders). However, scale and distance from markets make 
it harder for such organisations to get and use information 
promptly. 
Smaller organisations, which have shorter feedback loops 
and which are closer to the market, are more immediately 
responsive and are able to acquire and rely on informal and 
regular assessment, learning-by-doing and pilots (eg facilitators). 
Practitioners sometimes lose sight of why they’re 
doing market assessment in the first place. They 
get carried away with the process, generating 
lots of information of limited practical value, but 
at considerable time and expense. They fail to 
consider how assessment is going to shape potential 
intervention strategy and actions, so tend to be too 
broad and descriptive and miss the dynamics and 
systemic dimension.
The diagnostic process is not a fixed, sequential market 
assessment but a way of thinking through information needs 
(what do we really need to know?) and organising information 
(what is information telling us?) to guide programme strategy 
and action in a practical way.
When should you do assessment?
There is a tendency to regard assessment in a rigid manner, 
something that is done at the start of a programme. In practice, 
information is required throughout the life of a programme. 
3B: UNDERSTANDING MARKET SYSTEMS
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Market assessment needs to be an iterative and affordable 
process – not just a large, one-off formal study.  Acquiring and 
using relevant information is a central part of the M4P 
intervention process, not just for design, planning and 
measurement but to guide a programme’s actions. It is something 
that continues throughout the period of intervention and 
adequate resources need to be made available for it. Intervening 
in dynamic socio-economic contexts requires constant 
feedback and adaptation (see Figure 9). 
Information is also valuable to facilitators as a way of developing 
credibility and influencing others. An intervention’s new insights 
developed through assessment can enrich weak information 
environments and serve as a powerful tool for changing the 
perceptions or behaviour of market players, often more 
effectively than financial support. This continuing need for 
information has implications for how it is collected and by 
whom (see below). 
Developing greater market understanding through pilot 
intervention is also critical to achieving wider and sustainable 
market change (see Section 3D).
The diagnostic process in practice:
3B: UNDERSTANDING MARKET SYSTEMS
The pOOr and Their cOnTexT
l Facilitator’s objectives are for large-scale pro-poor growth in rural regions 
l Rural area; hundreds of thousands of small farmers below poverty line; agriculture is main source of household income
l Rice is principal crop but some vegetable cultivation also: demand for vegetables significantly outstrips supply
l Declining crop yields recognised as key problem within the sector
specific MarkeT sysTeM
	 l Vegetable value chain serves local or regional markets
	 l Farmers use a variety of inputs bought from local retailers
	 l Income from vegetable production is low due to low productivity
	 l Farmers lack knowledge about appropriate inputs and cultivation techniques
	 l Farmers get information from a variety of sources: other farmers, 
   government extension workers, agricultural supply retailers and NGOs
	 l Farmers are dissatisfied with information they receive from all these sources
sysTeMic cOnsTrainTs
	 	 l Farmers are most likely to turn to retailers for information as they are most widespread and accessible
	 	 l Retailers tend to push products to maximise their own modest income; 
    they do not see themselves as a source of information
	 	 l Retailers buy their supplies from large input suppliers, who also provide them with information 
    and support but only about their own products
	 	 l Input suppliers have the capacity and incentive to support retailers to become 
    more effective sources of information: satisfied farmers are good for business
inTerVenTiOn fOcus
	 	 	 l Changing the distribution channel development practices of large input suppliers
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Use market assessment to identify market players 
and their interests and so their appropriateness for 
engagement. This helps reduce the tendency of many 
programmes to engage with as broad a range of 
stakeholders as possible in the interests of ensuring 
participation and building consensus, and sometimes 
therefore wasting resources on the wrong people. 
Market assessment can help facilitators approach 
stakeholder engagement and participation in a more 
targeted and efficient manner.
should market assessment be outsourced or done in-house?
Information is the stock-in-trade of effective facilitators, so it 
is a mistake for facilitators to outsource market assessment 
completely. External specialists or secondary sources can be 
important sources of technical expertise and can be used to 
undertake some of the analysis feeding into decision-making. 
But the process of market assessment should always involve 
programme personnel to a considerable extent. External 
specialists can only give a limited perspective in their reports 
and presentations. 
As far as possible, programme staff should undertake regular 
assessment themselves. If external specialists are used, staff 
should work closely with them so that no barrier is created 
between staff and market realities. Doing assessment in-house 
is especially important to identify (and respond quickly to) 
opportunities and establish relationships with market players – 
in other words, market assessment should be regarded as part 
of a programme’s process of engagement in the market.
Recognise that a paucity of information in weak 
market situations is often an indication that 
information gathering and analytical capacity 
within market systems is limited. It can be useful 
for facilitators to draw in selected market players 
into assessment processes to build ownership and 
develop the analytical capacity of market players – 
for example by working hand-in-hand to conduct 
analysis – so that the information function (gathering, 
interpretation and distribution) might continue in 
the future. 
how do you decide which tool to use for market 
assessment?
The range of tools and sources of information available for 
market assessment is extensive (see Good Practice Notes, 
Section 5). All tools have their advantages and disadvantages, 
depending on context and type of information required. The 
key point for practitioners to remember is that seldom will a 
single tool, assessment approach or source of information be 
sufficient to develop good understanding of a market. 
Programmes can easily become tool-led rather 
than information-driven. Choice of tools needs to 
be determined by the context and objectives of 
assessment (ie the information required) – not the 
other way around! 
Recognise that some tools are better suited to certain contexts, 
such as:
l Geographic, political or public administration focus. In situations 
 where key market players define themselves by geo- 
 political boundaries (eg a district or province) certain kinds 
 of participatory or stakeholder-based assessment tools, which 
 have emerged in the field of Local Economic Development 
 (LED), are well suited for information gathering. Public sector 
 stakeholders often have explicit geographic boundaries and 
 remits and tend to be comfortable with the openness and time 
 required for participatory discussions. Conversely, geo- 
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Symptoms The poor and their context
Specific 
market system(s)
systemic 
constraints
focus of
intervention(s)
Causes
potential tools and sources
Focused interaction with relevant informants: interviews, 
focus group discussion, brainstorming
Access frontier, value chain analysis, consumer research, 
productivity studies, regulatory reviews, organisational appraisal 
tools, stakeholder analysis, participatory and consultative tools
Socio-economic studies, census data, 
poverty assessments, livelihoods analysis, investment climate 
surveys, competitiveness analysis, drivers of change
figure 8
Tools and information sources for the diagnostic process
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 graphically defined approaches are less useful in situations 
 where key players operate across defined boundaries (eg a 
 value chain). 
l Population density. Certain kinds of tools, such as formal 
 surveys, are easier and cheaper to conduct in locations with 
 high population densities. In more remote areas, the costs of 
 achieving appropriate levels of coverage can be prohibitive. 
l Nature of players. Assessment approaches which are 
 formalised and require direct interrogation, such as large-scale 
 surveys, can be intimidating for micro- or informal enterprises or 
 marginalised groups, who often fear they are a form of scrutiny 
 by the authorities. Informality also presents a challenge for accurate 
 sampling and identification of potential respondents because, 
 by definition, these groups are seldom included in formal public 
 records. Large commercial players tend to be uncomfortable with 
 ‘open’ participatory approaches (eg PRA) and find them overly 
 time-consuming.
l Nature of activity. Certain tools are better suited to assessing 
 specific kinds of activity. For instance, value chain analysis tends 
 to be easier to apply to sectors where there are clear stages 
 of production or transformation. It is more difficult to map 
 out sectors which are less linear or transformational in nature, 
 for instance service industries. Moreover such tools – unless 
 modified considerably – tend not to assess the operation of 
 supporting functions and rules. Tools for assessing regulatory 
 conditions are well suited to formal policies and regulations, 
 but less able to explore non-statutory or informal rules.
Specific tools generate specific types of information. 
Over-reliance on a single tool tends to restrict 
understanding and bias potential solutions. The 
diagnostic process helps programmes decide what 
information is needed and what kind of tool might 
help get that information. Whilst programmes may 
start with a ‘dominant’ tool they should recognise 
that they’ll need to use other tools from time to time 
according to context and information requirements. 
Facilitators need to be smart about their use of tools. Recognise 
that a combination of tools and sources of information are likely 
to be more effective than a single tool or source. ‘Triangulation’ is 
a useful concept to apply in market assessment: always looking at 
a specific market from multiple perspectives to develop a more 
rounded view, testing preconceptions and assumptions and the 
natural biases of individual tools and information sources.
Triangulation is a technique used by navigators when 
unsure of their position. One identifies a number of 
distinctive landmarks (ideally three) and then derives 
a compass bearing from each. The intersection of 
the three sets of bearings results in a triangle, within 
which the navigator is located. In a similar way, market 
assessment using multiple tools and sources – for 
example, project-commissioned or secondary analysis, 
information from key informants and action research 
or pilots – is a good way of cross-checking the veracity 
of information and narrowing down more accurately 
on the information that is really required.
3B: UNDERSTANDING MARKET SYSTEMS
figure 9
Understanding markets in reality – an iterative process
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It is important to emphasise again that what matters for effective 
intervention is good, up-to-date knowledge of the market 
system in question, however it may have been acquired. While 
programmes can always learn from the information gained by 
these tools, people with experience and a practical feel for a 
market situation may not need such extensive investigation of 
the market through these techniques.
how many markets should be assessed?
The underlying causes of one market’s underperformance may 
lie in the weaknesses of another market system (ie markets 
are interconnected). This raises a practical challenge. Market 
assessment is like peeling an onion – how many layers (ie market 
systems) do programmes need to peel back to understand root 
causes? How many market systems should be assessed? 
My rule of thumb is that one target group leads to 
two to three markets, which lead to five to eight 
main interventions, each of which may have two or 
three phases of activity.
Programmes need to continue to ask why the market isn’t working 
and avoid leaping into a market system and delivering a solution 
themselves. However, asking ‘why’ could become an endless quest. 
The point is to arrive at an analysis of constraints that allows effective 
action to be taken; this is a key judgement for facilitators to make.
In practice, how far programmes need to keep ‘peeling the onion’ 
depends on the identification of critical ‘leverage points’ – ie key 
market functions which, if introduced or strengthened, offer a 
programme the best prospects of large-scale and sustainable 
impact (see Good Practice Note 5.15 in Section 5).
For example: To improve the productivity of small farms (Market 1) 
farmers needed access to better information. A programme could not 
achieve sufficient scale, or sustainability, if it provided this information 
directly: its leverage was limited. It recognised that improving the flow 
of information to farmers through the input supply chain offered better 
prospects for scale and sustainability (Market 2). This entailed improving 
the supply chain management practices of large agriculture input 
suppliers: the programme could achieve better leverage by working 
through a few large suppliers to reach many farmers, sustainably. 
To achieve greater leverage still, the programme might focus on a 
third market: research, information and specialised services in supply 
chain management for large firms provided by business schools or 
management consultants. By doing this the programme could stimulate 
wider diffusion and continued upgrading of more pro-poor business 
practices across industry as a whole.
3B: UNDERSTANDING MARKET SYSTEMS
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3. COMPONENTS OF THE M4P INTERVENTION PROCESS
3C: DEFINING SUSTAINABLE OUTCOMES
key points
l Sustainability is central to the M4P approach
l In parallel with an analysis of market constraints, it is important to develop a clear view of how the market system will operate sustainably 
 in relation to market functions and the roles of market players
l Sustainability shapes intervention actions; it ensures consistency between actions and ambitions
key M4p principles and framework: sustainability matrix 
Definition of sustainability: the market system capability to ensure that relevant, differentiated goods and services continue to be 
produced and/or consumed by poor people beyond the period of intervention
putting it into practice: key steps
Step 1:  Recognise sustainability as part of market assessment - as facilitators’ understanding of a market system develops they need 
    to think through how the market might work more effectively in the future
Step 2:  Understand the current picture of the market - what functions – core, rules and supporting functions – are being performed 
    by different players and who is paying for them?
Step 3:  Identify and analyse interconnected markets - understanding the current market picture often leads to the identification of 
    an interconnected market as a supporting function
Step 4:  Take account of the ‘given’ factors influencing a future view of market systems - the nature of the market, its historical 
    context and the innovation landscape beyond the market in question 
Step 5:  Take account of the ‘open’ factors shaping a future view of market systems - capacity and incentives, which can be shaped 
    directly by interventions
key challenges and how to deal with them
l When to consider sustainability?
l What is a realistic timeframe for achieving sustainability?
Good practice notes (section 5) 
l Vision building (Note 5.1)
l Developing BMOs (Note 5.6)
l Understanding incentives (Note 5.9)
l Observing and measuring sustainability
l Winning partners over to a view of the future
l Guiding participation processes (Note 5.11) 
l Interconnected markets (Note 5.15)
Determined by:
Capacity
Incentives
Nature of market system
History
Innovation landscape
cOre
rules
suppOrTinG funcTiOns
players
functions
Who does? Who pays?
currenT siTuaTiOn
cOre
rules
suppOrTinG funcTiOns
players
functions
Who will do? Who will pay?
fuTure  VisiOn
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3c.1 introduction
sustainability is central to the M4p approach. The focus of 
interventions is determined by understanding the constraints 
that inhibit pro-poor market development. in parallel with this 
analysis, programmes need to develop a clear view of where 
an intervention is going: an exit strategy which transparently 
envisages how the market system will operate in a sustainable 
manner in the longer term. 
for this ‘view of the future’ to provide coherent direction to 
interventions, sustainability in market systems needs to be defined. 
In practical terms, this means defining market capability in detail, 
linking specific market players with specific market functions by 
addressing two key questions: who does (and, in the future, who will 
do) and who pays (and who will pay)?
3c.2 Why important?
l Sustainability is the essence of development and of M4P: 
 addressing underlying causes of underdevelopment through 
 short-term interventions, to achieve long-term, lasting change. 
l Functioning market systems are never static; they have within 
 them the capacity and incentives to be dynamic, to grow 
 and to change. Determining how growth and change will take 
 place in the future without further aid intervention is a central 
 sustainability challenge.
l A clear view of sustainability imposes discipline and direction 
 on interventions. If this longer-term picture is not clear there 
 can be inconsistency between a programme’s actions and 
 what it is trying to achieve. 
l Sustainability needs to be operationalised into all components 
 of M4P intervention. Market assessment initially identifies which 
 players are currently performing and paying for different market 
 functions. To define sustainability transparently, programmes 
 need to consider who will do and who will pay for these 
 functions in the future. 
3c.3 key M4p principles and framework
Sustainability in M4P can be defined as: 
The capability of the market system to ensure that 
relevant, differentiated goods and services continue 
to be produced and/or consumed by the poor 
beyond the period of an intervention.
A transparent view of sustainability is one that defines market 
capability in depth, linking market players with market functions 
by addressing two key questions: 
l Who does (and in the future who will do)? 
l Who pays (and who will pay)?
These two questions, together with the basic market system 
concept, can be used to form a simple sustainability matrix which 
can be used to examine the specific combinations of market 
functions and players which are necessary for a market system to 
work better in the future (Figure 10).
The consequences of not considering sustainability 
are clear. Not to develop a vision of market system 
sustainability is to tacitly concur with the status quo 
and endorse the continuation of market systems in 
paths of under-performance. This blunt truth has to be 
accepted by facilitators and funders who sometimes 
fret over suggesting a different role for market players 
(such as government or membership organisations). 
Intervention brings with it inescapable responsibilities 
– one of which is to have a considered view of what 
the future should be.
3C: DEFINING SUSTAINABLE OUTCOMES
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3c.4 putting it into practice
Most market development facilitators have a strong intuitive 
sense of sustainability – M4P’s emphasis on stimulating local 
ownership and light touch facilitation stems from a concern with 
sustainability. The matrix is a more formal way of operationalising 
this concern. 
The purpose of the sustainability matrix is to link functions and 
players. This first involves identifying potential functions and 
players which are important for the market in question (Figure 11). 
figure 10
from market systems to a view of sustainability 
cOre
rules
suppOrTinG funcTiOns
players
functions
Who does? Who pays?
currenT siTuaTiOn
cOre
rules
suppOrTinG funcTiOns
players
functions
Who will do? Who will pay?
fuTure  siTuaTiOn
suppOrTinG
funcTiOns
cOre
rules
The existing market 
system…
… Reinterpreted in a 
matrix format…
… As a basis for developing a view of 
the future
Private sector
Government
Membership organisations
Not-for-profits
Networks
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figure 11
functions and players in market systems
3 The matrix focuses on the main supply-side functions in the market and the players that perform them. It doesn’t consider the demand-side (ie the function of consumption and consumers) explicitly. However 
 these are captured by ‘who pays’ for the core function.
cOre
The supply and consumption of goods and services; the core set of exchanges or transactions between supply- and 
demand-sides. This might include the poor as consumers, producers or workers and includes non-monetary exchange as 
well as cash-based transactions.
rules
Formal and informal rules (and their enforcement) act to shape market outcomes and govern players’ participation and 
behaviour. Rules can be of several types:
l Generally applicable rules such as contract, property, consumer and environmental protection, weights and measures,  
 health and safety, competition and tax laws. 
l Sector-specific rules such as banking codes, telecommunications acts and land use and ownership laws.
l Non-statutory regulations such as industry codes of good conduct and quality standards. 
The enforcement of rules depends on the functioning of various organisations including the judiciary, systems of 
regulation, inspection and licensing, revenue authorities, company and land registries, industry regulators, local tax offices, 
and self-regulation mechanisms. 
How rules are interpreted and applied is often shaped by social, cultural and political norms and practices as much as by 
the letter of the law. Where formal rules and their application are weak, the environment is governed by the informal. 
suppOrTinG funcTiOns
A range of other functions support the core exchange, including:
l Product innovation and development: ranging from adaptation of products in existing markets to new products for new  
 markets. 
l Skills and capacity enhancement: to ensure that market-specific skills and knowledge of different market players are  
 updated and refreshed.
l Research and development (R&D): the essential knowledge base that will allow specific products to be developed, new  
 insights into market mechanisms, underlying market trends.
l Policy formulation and review: the mechanisms by which government sets and assesses the impact of policy, laws,  
 regulations and other interventions which affect markets.
l Basic information provision that, for example, supports the development of markets generally rather than specific  
 products. 
l Advocacy: to ensure that the interests of different market players are appropriately represented.
l Coordination: to foster cooperation and mutual interests above and beyond those of any single market player.
players
Players3 in the market system can be of several types:
l Government and government organisations: this can be broken down further (eg national and local) but is essentially  
 the public sector.
l For-profit businesses, of any size or ownership form, ranging from informal to formal and self-employed to substantial 
 corporations.
l Networks: formal or informal, business networks can be a powerful source of ‘services’ – advice, contacts, skills etc.
l Membership or representative organisations: industry associations, chambers of commerce, employers’ organisations, 
 trades unions and consumer groups, whose principal role is advocacy.
l Not-for-profit organisations: this could include NGOs and community groups but also universities and educational 
 institutions that have some autonomy from government.
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Development agencies should not be included in a 
view of the future. Their role is regarded as facilitative 
and short-term without a valid longer-term rationale. 
Of course, foreign-funded aid agencies may continue 
to be active in developing countries but building them 
into a picture of sustainability as long-term players 
runs the risk of cementing developing countries into 
debilitating dependence.
To use the framework a number of steps are required.
Step 1
Recognise sustainability as part of market assessment
The sustainability matrix helps programmes take an 
understanding of specific systemic constraints in the existing 
market system and develop it into a realistic vision of change 
– of how the market can work better in the future. In practice, 
therefore, defining sustainable outcomes is inseparable from the 
ongoing process of understanding specific market systems and 
the constraints that affect them. 
Assessment of market systems should: 
l Not be static: it needs to be analytical and capture the dynamics 
 of the market system.
l Identify constraints, but also the potential and feasibility of 
 change. 
l Help programmes understand different players, functions and 
 relationships both as a source of market weakness and as a 
 source of potential solutions to improve market performance.
The matrix is not an exercise in box-filling. It has to 
be used hand-in-hand with developing understanding 
of a specific market system, as facilitators engage 
with an emerging array of functions and players and 
need to think through how they might work more 
effectively in the future. 
There is always a risk of just describing an existing 
market system and not identifying priorities or 
pathways to change. 
Context: 
Water supply is a major concern for people in a war- 
and famine-afflicted country. Urbanisation is increasing 
but the public organisations that administer ‘public 
services’ in urban areas are in a state of near-collapse. 
Water supply is intermittent and of a poor quality.  Aid 
organisations are active in a number of ways but their 
activities are scattered and focused primarily on relief 
– they are short-term. In this context, a severe water 
shortage is causing mounting public concern. A local 
university takes the initiative to bring organisations – 
from government, civil society and the private sector 
– together to consider what can be done. It is clear that 
short-term ‘fixes’ are not wanted. People want a lasting 
solution; this is central to their discussions and to their 
request for assistance from a development agency.
Step 2
Understand the current picture of the market
The main question here is: who’s doing what?  That is to say: 
what functions – core, rules and supporting functions – are being 
performed by different players? 
It is important to identify not just the formal providers of functions 
but – especially in weak markets – informal or ‘embedded’ 
provision between different players. Facilitators need to be wary 
of the ‘there’s nothing there’ reaction to market assessment.
For example: Most small-scale businesses will not have formal fee-
paid advisors – yet they have informal sources of information that 
they draw upon. In such cases, it is wrong to think of services as 
free. ‘Payment’ will be included within the cost of another product or 
through the quid pro quo nature of the relationship. 
Informal rules are often more important than 
formal ones in understanding markets. For example, 
legally binding targets for lending to disadvantaged 
groups in many countries have largely failed; the 
informal (and formal) rules impinging on bank staff 
– management pressure on risk and client portfolio 
linked to individuals’ career prospects – have been 
more important than government targets.
Current picture: 
The existing situation is – on paper – simple to 
understand. The supply of water is the responsibility of 
the local municipality operating under rules set by the 
Ministry of Water.  Various parts of government are 
also responsible for other supporting functions, including 
maintenance and monitoring quality. Government, in 
one form or other, is supposed to provide everything to 
consumers. In reality, due to the intermittent supply and 
poor quality of mains water, consumers are forced to rely 
on alternative, informal mechanisms of water provision.
Step 3
Identify and analyse interconnected markets
Understanding the current market picture often leads to the 
identification of an interconnected market as a supporting function. 
Sustained better performance in the initial market is dependent on 
sustained better performance in the interconnected market. For 
instance, business services are commonly arrived at by facilitators 
through another initial market focus, such as a commodity sector 
(see Box 5).
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Interconnected markets: 
Interconnected markets such as human resource 
development, maintenance and security are all 
supposed to be taken care of by government. But 
these, as with the core function of water supply, are – 
by common consent – not working.
Box 5
Interconnected markets – the example of business services
For economies to move beyond competing solely on the basis 
of price they need to find other means of adding value. This 
requires the development of a range of business services, eg 
design, logistics, training, process consulting, etc. Improved 
competitiveness requires that market systems for business 
services develop and function effectively.
A facilitator may start with analysis of the initial market system – 
textiles, furniture, agriculture, finance etc – and undertake a ‘who 
does/who pays’ analysis of it. However, if the competitiveness 
issue lies with the services which are supporting functions to 
the market system in question, then these services should also 
be examined through the same analytical lens.
If facilitators don’t do this the risk is that they: 
l Intervene inappropriately by performing supporting functions 
 themselves.
l Do not address sustainability in an effective manner.
Interconnected markets such as business services are features 
of all market systems, often providing the means for learning, 
change and growth.
Step 4
Take account of the ‘given’ factors influencing a future view of 
market systems 
For facilitators considering the future the main question is: what 
should the alignment of key functions and players look like in a 
market system which is working more effectively and inclusively?
You’ve got to look beyond the obvious. Examine 
who your target group is interacting with and who 
they could interact with so that they get a better 
deal.
It is usual to start with the core function of the market – the deal 
the poor are currently getting: the vision of change starts here. 
However, for the core to develop – to meet the changing needs 
of consumers – a variety of rules and supporting functions need 
to work effectively too. So, in considering who does what in the 
future, a programme must also consider the respective roles of 
private, government and civil society players for the range of 
functions required in a market system.
A number of factors influence the view of the future. Some 
of these factors are ‘open’ to influence through interventions 
(see Step 5, below); others are ‘given’.  This latter group includes 
three main sets of factors: (a) the nature of the market system(s) 
in question; (b) the historical context of the market system(s); 
and, (c) the prevailing ‘innovation landscape’ which may have 
implications for the alignment of players and functions that 
make up the market system.
l The nature of markets. Certain markets have inherent 
 characteristics, such as the degree of information asymmetry 
 or externalities (the extent to which the actions of one party 
 impact on others in the market). These characteristics vary 
 between different types of market. 
 For example: Public health issues pertaining to agriculture and 
 food demand a public concern beyond individual consumers. 
 Other markets – such as finance and land – also have 
 externalities associated with them which require significant 
 public roles. Conversely, there are other types of markets – 
 such as textiles or advertising – where public roles are more 
 limited. 
 These differences mean that there is no single specific 
 government role in market systems but there are some 
 markets where government (or other players acting in the 
 wider public interest) has a clear, legitimate role.
l The historical context. The evolution of market systems varies 
 between countries, with different traditions associated with, for 
 instance, government, representative organisations or business- 
 to-business cooperation. The past is always a factor in shaping 
 the roles of players in the future; in some cases opening up 
 new possibilities, in others acting as a barrier to change.
 
l The innovation landscape.  The arrangements – the combination 
 of public and private roles – by which market systems work 
 change over time. Most obviously, as technologies have become 
 more complex, the regulatory arrangements required for 
 markets have become more demanding, and the 
 appropriateness of a direct provision role by government in 
 market systems more open to question. Facilitators need to 
 be aware of the nature of the wider changes in the ‘innovation 
 landscape’ around markets. These are regarded as given, in 
 the sense that they emerge from outside the market system 
 in question. The challenge for facilitators is to recognise that 
 the nature of innovations in one market can help provide an 
 impetus for change in another market. 
3C: DEFINING SUSTAINABLE OUTCOMES
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In considering the roles of different players in the future, 
facilitators have to be aware of these factors and ensure that 
their vision of the future takes cognisance of them.
Given factors: 
In considering the possible future picture of the water 
system, the development agency and all the stakeholders 
are aware of a number of factors. The failure of government 
to play an all-encompassing provision role is obvious – no 
one believes that this can work in the future. So history does 
not restrict future options. It is equally clear that health, 
pollution and ‘right to access’ concerns make some form 
of public role vital. If private providers are to be involved, 
this could only be on a regulated basis with detailed 
agreements on prices and quality and supply targets. In 
other words, if, after a competitive process, a private firm 
was awarded a time-defined contract to supply water on a 
monopoly basis, stronger rules and enforcement would be 
required to shape the firm’s behaviour. Fortunately, there 
is wider awareness of the many institutional innovations 
in water internationally as well as in other markets where 
government once played a dominant role (eg telecoms).
Use the sustainability matrix to think through the 
‘difficult’ issues in considering the future. The matrix 
does not provide answers for facilitators but, because 
it leaves ‘nowhere to hide’, forces programmes to 
openly take a view on where market systems should 
go in the future. 
Step 5
Take account of the ‘open’ factors – capacity and incentives – 
shaping a future view of market systems
The ‘given’ factors above are beyond the scope of facilitators to 
influence directly. Capacity and incentives, on the other hand, can 
be shaped directly by interventions and are therefore critical in 
shaping a realistic future view of market systems. 
A future view of the market, therefore, needs to consider how 
facilitators can bring about change in these factors.
l Incentives for change. Interventions must strike a balance 
 between striving for change that is ambitious and change 
 that has a realistic chance of success. The process of change 
 therefore is as important as the vision of the future. For 
 this reason, the incentives of different players are central to 
 any consideration of the roles they play now and might play 
 in the future. Understanding these incentives is important so 
 that interventions can be aligned to them to pursue a valid and 
 realistic vision of the future (see Box 6).
Understanding incentives is central to any process of 
change. A key entry point for intervention has to be 
to identify and leverage the principal ‘drivers of change’ 
in any market system to stimulate a momentum for 
change. This means understanding different groups and 
key individuals within organisations and considering 
how to take advantage of emerging circumstances (eg 
crises, elections) to engage with them.
l Capacities for change.  A player’s role has to fit with its capacity. 
 Interventions need to be guided by a realistic assessment of the 
 distinctive core competence of market players – of what they 
 can do. This is a function of both technical and organisational 
 capability – know-how and know-who – and is related to 
 organisational structure and culture.
Beware of exporting organisational roles from high- to 
low-income economies – there are two problems. In 
high-income contexts: (a) organisation performance 
is often not explored in depth, so the ‘model’ being 
promoted often lacks efficacy even in its country of 
origin; and (b) vastly more resources are usually available 
so organisations can do more. In low-income contexts, 
more limited capacities make it more important to 
focus on priority roles for organisations – especially 
government – and to guard against encouraging them 
to do ‘too much’.
Open factors: 
Consideration of the capacities and incentives of 
key players confirms the general direction of change 
required for the future. The private sector is competent 
to deliver water services and – given the right 
agreement with regulators on connections, prices, 
production and quality, and appropriate accountability 
arrangements – is motivated to deliver.  A 10-year 
agreement gives them appropriate incentives to 
invest and to reap the return on that investment. To 
balance this private sector monopoly tight regulations 
are required which only government is in a position to 
impose and enforce. Supporting functions around water 
supply – security of pipelines, monitoring water quality 
and environmental control – are also public roles 
best performed by government. The natural monopoly 
given to the private utility also requires arbitration 
between consumers and the firm and this will be 
provided by an independent committee from civil 
society.  The university will be available to offer business 
and management advice. This future picture provides 
the basis for technical support and capacity building 
from the development agency.
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Box 6
Making incentives real
For change processes to be effective, they need to be 
understood in relation to the individuals and groups who make 
up organisations and who contribute to decision-making. The 
nominal, formal incentive of organisations may differ from the 
real-world incentives of their stakeholders:
l Business membership organisations (BMOs): are supposed to 
 be concerned with advancing their industry but in practice are 
 also driven by the power, social esteem and personal business 
 interests of office bearers.
l Departments of Agriculture: are supposed to be concerned 
 with an effective role for government but in practice are often 
 driven strongly by staff (eg extension officers) concerns over 
 maintaining their existing roles and positions.
l Businesses: are supposed to be profit-maximising but, in 
 reality, are often happy to pursue low-risk and moderate return 
 options, especially when the downside to innovation – failure 
 and individual blame – are penalised in corporate cultures.
3C: DEFINING SUSTAINABLE OUTCOMES
Developing sustainable outcomes in practice:
In this war- and famine-afflicted country, water services – delivered by the government – are near collapse and there is an 
emerging consensus that short-term relief interventions are not appropriate.
l Short-term fixes have not worked; a sustainable solution is needed 
 requiring a longer-term perspective.
l The local municipality delivers water under rules set by the 
 ministry. 
l All supporting functions – potential interconnected markets – are 
 government-delivered.
l The failures of past government-led approaches mean that history 
 does not restrict options for change.
l Health, environment, rights and monopoly issues make public 
 roles important.
l Examples of new public-private arrangements are widespread.
l The private sector has the capacity to play the delivery role.
l Government must shape appropriate incentives through ‘rules’ 
 on prices, connections, production and quality.
l Security and quality checking are also public roles.
l Civil society is best placed to provide an accountability 
 and arbitration function.
recOGnise susTainaBiliTy 
as parT Of MarkeT 
assessMenT
undersTand 
The currenT picTure
idenTify 
inTercOnnecTed MarkeTs
Take accOunT Of 
The ‘GiVen’ facTOrs
CaPaCITy aND INCeNTIveS – 
shapinG a VieW 
Of The fuTure
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3c.5 key challenges and how to deal with them 
When to consider sustainability?
There is a tendency for programmes to consider sustainability 
towards the end of their life. Consequently it is relegated to 
an afterthought. Successful M4P programmes, rather than only 
considering sustainability at a point in time, see sustainability as 
an intrinsic part of their facilitation approach, enabling others ‘to 
do’ rather than doing directly by themselves. Ultimately, the real 
benefit of developing a view of the future is the impact this can 
have on facilitators’ orientation and approach.
What is a realistic timeframe for achieving sustainability?
There is no stock answer here: it is highly context dependent 
and determined by the scope and difficulty of the intervention 
challenge. The bottom line is that programmes should be 
concerned with what they leave behind after the period of 
intervention. Most market development programmes have a 
timeframe of three to seven years. The key consideration is: 
what change is feasible within a given period? 
If timeframes are short, the vision of change needs to be 
adjusted accordingly. Where the proposed programme duration 
is very short, there may be no realistic possibility of achieving 
sustainable impact – in which case the rationale for intervention 
needs to be revisited.
The sustainability matrix can be used for any point in 
the future. Indeed, it is possible to use the matrix in 
an iterative manner to develop a ‘mid-point’ as well 
as a final picture.
Observing and measuring sustainability
A central premise of sustainability is that functions and players 
continue to survive, thrive and adapt after the period of 
intervention. The problem is that ‘after the period of intervention’ 
means that nobody is around to observe and measure such 
activity! Funders need to ensure that programme design and 
mechanisms for oversight establish clear objectives for achieving 
‘independent activity’ and provide sufficient space and resources 
during the programme term to observe and measure whether 
independent activity has actually occurred. Two implications 
flow from this:
l Make sure that programme objectives explicitly include 
 sustainability, meaning indicators related to, for instance, new 
 products and relationships or independent activity.
l Focus in particular on market ‘depth’ – on supporting functions 
 and rules. The capability that market systems require to adapt, 
 learn and grow is usually located here. Increased ‘depth’ 
 provides the basis for wider ‘breadth’ of access.
Winning partners over to a view of the future
A view of a sustainable, inclusive and effective market system 
is important not just for facilitators; it can also be important 
for other market players if they have a strategic, coordination 
role – usually governments, representative organisations or 
think tanks. How to work with market players to develop a 
coherent and justifiable view of the future is a key challenge. 
Scenario building approaches (and other tools) can be used in 
this process. However, it is important that facilitators are not 
passive partners; informed by analysis and research they must 
be able to engage knowledgeably to influence the shape of a 
future vision.
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key points
l M4P programmes are facilitative or catalytic: they try to bring about change which alters the way in which a market system operates into 
 the longer term so that it better serves the poor 
l They do so by stimulating market players to perform market functions that they are either currently not performing or performing 
 inappropriately 
l The strategy of M4P intervention is to determine a pathway which leads to ‘crowding-in’ of market functions and players, using their 
 resources to leverage a response from market players
key M4p principles and framework: pathway to crowding-in 
pathway to crowding-in
The strategy for M4P intervention is to determine a pathway which leads to the ‘crowding-in’ of market functions and players to 
increase the breadth and depth of a market system
putting it into practice: main steps and factors
There are three main steps to pursuing a ‘pathway to crowding-in’:
Step 1: Assess and identify the key achievements from initial interventions - what is there to build on?
Step 2: Define the size and nature of the market system in the future, given initial intervention experience
Step 3: Design and implement supplementary interventions to stimulate wider market development
In pursuing a pathway to crowding-in facilitators should be guided by five factors:
l Where a facilitator intervenes in relation to functions in a market system
l Who a facilitator engages with in the market system 
l How facilitators conduct their relationships when they engage with the market system
l How much support facilitators should provide in seeking to stimulate market change (right-sizing)
l The consistency of actions with the pathway to crowding-in
key challenges and how to deal with them
l When is it ok for a facilitator to subsidise?
l How to find and select appropriate partners?
Good practice notes (section 5) 
l Developing the offer (Note 5.5)
l Making a deal with lead firms (Note 5.7)
3. COMPONENTS OF THE M4P INTERVENTION PROCESS
3D: FACILITATING SYSTEMIC CHANGE
l What if there’s nothing there or no one to work with?
l How can facilitators demonstrate the quick results that many  
 funders demand?
l Giving grants to business (Note 5.10)
l Stimulating demand (Note 5.16)
Market working better for the poorMarket not working for the poor
Period of temporary intervention
Entry Trial and pilot Crowding-in Exit
Multi-faceted intervention actions to promote system change
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3d.1 introduction
M4p programmes are facilitative or catalytic: they try to bring 
about change which alters the way in which a market system 
operates into the longer term.  They do so by stimulating 
market players to perform market functions that they are either 
currently not performing or performing inappropriately.
The strategy of M4p intervention is to determine a pathway 
which leads to ‘crowding-in’ of market functions and players. 
facilitators use their resources to leverage a response from 
players within a specific market system.
To implement this strategy successfully a facilitator’s actions 
need to be guided by consideration of five guiding factors: 
l Where a facilitator intervenes in relation to functions in a 
 market system.
l Who a facilitator engages with in the market system. 
l how facilitators conduct their relationships when they 
 engage with the market system.
l how much support facilitators should provide in seeking to 
 stimulate market change.
l consistency of their actions with a ‘pathway to crowding-in’. 
3d.2 Why important?
Any form of intervention is, by definition, active: it is about doing 
something. Consequently M4P interventions always have the 
potential to influence market functions and players in either 
positive or negative ways, ie they can develop or they can distort 
market systems. It is vital that facilitators continually assess the 
potential and actual influence of their actions on the market 
system and ensure they are consistent with their objectives for 
market development.
 
3d.3 key M4p principles and frameworks
A facilitator is an action or agent that is external to 
a market system but seeks to bring about change 
within a market system in order to achieve the public 
benefit objective of systemic change. A facilitator is 
a ‘catalyst’ that stimulates the market but does not 
become part of it. A facilitator should have a clear, 
realistic view of the future functioning of a market 
system.
intervention strategy: a pathway to crowding-in
The strategy for any M4P intervention is to determine a 
pathway which leads to the crowding-in of appropriate market 
functions and players into the market system. Facilitators use 
their resources to leverage a response – changes in behaviour, 
practices, investment, relationships – from players within a 
specific market system. 
This ‘pathway to crowding-in’ recognises:
l That interventions are finite in terms of time and resources. 
 Genuinely sustainable outcomes can only be achieved if market 
 functions are undertaken by players who are actually part of 
 the market system in question. 
l The importance of indigenous ownership within the market 
 system.  Market systems need to survive and thrive based on the 
 capacity and incentives of players within the system. Therefore 
 new market solutions need to be sufficiently innovative to 
 change the status quo but in a way which is consistent with 
 local norms and conditions.
l That large-scale and sustainable impact depends both on 
 the ‘breadth’ of the market (ie volume of transactions in the 
 core) and on its ‘depth’ (ie diversity of supporting functions 
 and rules).
3D: FACILITATING SYSTEMIC CHANGE
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A pathway to crowding-in requires that facilitators think through 
and make explicit how their initial interventions will induce 
changes that result in widespread, large-scale and sustainable 
change in the market system (see Figure 12). 
Crowding-in is the central process in – and purpose 
of – facilitation through which interventions catalyse or 
bring in other players and functions into the market 
system so that it works better for the poor. Crowding-
in can result in enhanced breadth (more transactions 
in the core of a market), depth (supporting functions) 
or reach (new areas or markets). 
key factors to guide facilitation actions
Whilst facilitation is often ‘light touch’ compared to conventional 
intervention approaches, it is not passive: it is an active role. 
However, given the diversity of market contexts in which 
facilitators operate and the array of potential market problems 
that they face, a blueprint for what a facilitator should actually 
do (or not do) is unrealistic. Facilitators will always face choices 
on how best to structure their interventions so that they 
develop rather than distort market systems. To implement a 
strategy for crowding-in effectively they should be guided by 
the considerations contained in Box 7.  
Box 7
factors to guide facilitation actions
l Where a facilitator intervenes in relation to functions in a 
 market system: are intervention activities likely to be a market 
 function in the future or are they purely temporary?
l Who a facilitator engages with in the market system: is there 
 someone appropriate to work with? 
l How facilitators conduct their relationships when they engage 
 with the market system: is there potential for an effective 
 relationship?
l How much support facilitators should provide in seeking to 
 stimulate market change: is there potential for ‘right-sizing’ 
 support to market norms? 
l Consistency of actions with a pathway to crowding-in: is there 
 potential to pull others in? 
These considerations represent the guiding factors against 
which facilitators need to continually check the influence of 
their actions. It is possible to frame key intervention decisions 
with regard to these factors, with the purpose of transparently 
thinking through, appraising and if necessary revising, actions in 
relation to the pathway to crowding-in.
Market working better 
for the poor
Market not working 
for the poor
Period of temporary intervention
Multi-faceted intervention actions to promote system change
Entry ExitCrowding-inTrial and pilot
Attitudes
Capacity & practices
Relationships & alignment
Incentives & ownership
figure 12
The pathway to crowding-in
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3d.4 putting it into practice
pathway to crowding-in: building on initial interventions
M4P interventions typically start with an initial, relatively small 
intervention, such as research or some form of pilot, as programmes 
try to find their footing to initiate a change process. Some of these will 
work and some won’t.  The challenge is how to build on successful 
initial interventions to induce wider and sustained change.
To do this three steps are required (see Figure 13):
Step 1
Assess and identify the key achievements from initial interventions: 
what is there to build on?
There are two main criteria for assessing an initial intervention’s 
results:
l Are initial outcomes substantial and new?
l Are initial outcomes consistent with incentives and the capacity 
 of market players to change behaviour, practices, investment or 
 relationships?  
The extent to which these criteria are fulfilled determines the 
validity of initial interventions and therefore the potential for 
crowding-in and the nature of further interventions required. If 
the quality or relevance of initial interventions is weak, crowding-
in measures will not be successful. Initial outcomes that might be 
the basis for further change could include:
l Research that changes government’s awareness of the impact 
 of existing regulations on the poor’s access to a product.
l Vision-building that encourages an association to reappraise its 
 role in response to emerging trends.
l Constructive collaboration with a lead firm on new pro-poor 
 product ideas in a particular sector.
l Well-received pilot testing of a new product directly by a 
 project.
Context: 
Research conducted by a programme focused on 
improving rural livelihoods revealed that small farmers 
are unaware of the potential of mechanised rice 
threshing, despite the fact that research also indicated 
that significant numbers of farmers complain about 
the inefficiency of manual threshing. Most threshing 
machines currently available are imported, large and 
expensive.  
The objective of intervention is to stimulate a 
more vibrant market for small, low-tech threshing 
machines, in terms of local manufacture, affordable 
and sustainable availability and increased and 
sustained use by small farmers. A facilitator decides 
to collaborate with a local manufacturer to adapt an 
existing simple design from another country and pilot 
a new low-cost threshing machine. 
3D: FACILITATING SYSTEMIC CHANGE
Market working better 
for the poor
Market not working 
for the poor
Period of temporary intervention
Step 1: Initial interventions
Step 3: Interventions to crowd-in
Step 2:
Overall market 
vision
figure 13
Operational steps along the pathway to crowding-in
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To demonstrate the effectiveness of the new machine 
the facilitator provides 100 machines to farmers on a 
subsidised basis, in the belief that once a few farmers 
have benefited from the new machine, a demonstration 
effect will encourage others to buy and use them 
without programme support, leading to a functioning 
market. The facilitator’s initial thinking is: pilot machines 
developed and delivered to farms ➞ machines used by 
farms ➞ ‘benefit’ of machines assessed by farmers.   
However, while direct delivery may demonstrate 
benefits for the user of the machines, it is necessary 
to ask: how will these initial interventions achieve the 
facilitator’s market development objectives? 
Step 2
Define the size and nature of the market system in the future, 
given initial intervention experience 
The next step is to develop a picture of how the market should 
operate in the future. This is driven by the ambition of a facilitator 
with respect to different features of market change:
l Breadth: will more transactions take place in the core of the 
 market?
l Depth: will supporting functions around an initial change 
 develop?
l Reach: will an initial change in one area, sector or target group 
 spread to others?
Step 2 is a natural point – after initial interventions 
– at which programmes can revisit some of the 
gaps in their strategic framework (Section 3A) and 
preliminary market assessment (Section 3B) to 
gauge the potential scale and scope of intervention 
and more tightly define indicators (Section 3E).
Size and nature: 
So far the pilot has only been conducted in one district with 
one manufacturer and the programme has distributed 
100 machines directly. How will threshing machines reach 
the 45,000 other rice farmers who are the feasible target 
market? What about a further 100,000 farmers in other 
grain sectors that require threshing technology too? It is not 
healthy or feasible for one manufacturer to supply the whole 
market – how will the 4 other manufacturing companies 
take advantage of this new market opportunity? How 
will machines be distributed, financed and maintained in 
the future? Different farmers have different and evolving 
requirements – will the same threshing machine work for all? 
 
In reality, the pathway to crowding-in for a demonstration-
based intervention is more complex, requiring other 
facilitation actions to encourage take-up of manufacture, 
distribution and consumption.
Step 3
Design and implement supplementary interventions to stimulate 
wider market development and progress
The market system needs to be encouraged to move towards 
the future picture developed in Step 2. In doing so, facilitators 
need to consider: 
l The processes through which natural crowding-in could happen 
 and, in particular, the incentives, capacities and relationships 
 required for this to happen. 
l The constraints that might prevent this process from taking 
 place, eg information about potential benefits from change, 
 ‘how to’ knowledge and perception of risk.
Supplementary interventions to support crowding-in might 
typically include:
l Demand-side stimulation. Targeted measures to overcome 
 consumers’ resistance to trying new products or engaging with 
 new suppliers. This might include actions to familiarise 
 consumers with a new product (eg demonstrations of new 
 equipment or social marketing) or limited financial subsidies 
 (eg vouchers) to induce trial.
l Social marketing. Used to promote widespread awareness 
 of an issue and stimulate behaviour change. Unlike product 
 marketing, which commercial players use to promote their 
 own specific (branded) products, social marketing focuses 
 on more generic issues in the wider public or collective interest. 
 It has been widely used, for instance, to raise awareness of the 
 need for use of condoms or insecticide-treated mosquito nets. 
 Consumer education in financial services is another example. 
 Individual firms producing these products might then advertise 
 their own branded products at their own cost. 
l Newsletters. Requires a common focus for readers – ideally a 
 specific market niche – that builds on other facilitator activities, 
 events and networks (ie they are not an isolated event). 
 Successful newsletters can be news- or research-focused 
 – each requiring a different writing style and content but only 
 succeeding when presented in a professional manner that fits 
 the newsletter audience.
l Stakeholder forums. Similar to newsletters but a more active 
 measure requiring considerable organisation. As with 
 newsletters, attracting interest requires a strong message 
 – either coming from direct programme experiences or from 
 other innovation. More likely to be successful when focused 
 on a specific market (finance, agriculture, water) rather than 
 multiple markets.
l Supply-side engagement. Direct technical (and financial) 
 support for one or more market players to take advantage 
 of new opportunities revealed by a programme (ie to 
 deepen the market system). Partners here are likely to be 
 consultants, researchers, think tanks, specialist service providers, 
 representative organisations or government, depending on the 
 nature of the market and specific functions in question.
l One-to-one replication.  Repeating a successful experience with 
 other partners, say from one lead firm to other competitors. 
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 This may appear relatively straightforward but, in practice, 
 relationships with partners are rarely the same. Interventions 
 here may encourage more critical mass to develop but also 
 (a) strengthen the precedent for direct subsidy and (b) do not 
 address how the market will learn without subsidy.
Supplementary interventions: 
The network of agricultural equipment supply through 
which natural crowding-in might occur is risk-averse and 
prone to poor information flows. The programme might 
need to pursue a range of other actions to promote 
crowding-in:
l ‘Signpost’ success stories so that other farmers 
 understand the benefits of the new machines.
l Encourage other manufacturers,distribution agents 
 and equipment leasing companies to produce and sell 
 similar technology to ensure competition and 
 maximise outreach.
l Improve information flows between suppliers and 
 potential consumers. 
l Stimulate further transactions between suppliers and 
 consumers using demand incentives (eg vouchers), 
 rather than direct delivery. 
l Strengthen supply-side capacity for further research 
 and product development of equipment.
l Persuade the Department of Agriculture to 
 endorse  the new equipment and play a role in 
 coordinating wider market take-up.
In practice, successful crowding-in interventions take 
a number of forms, with varying degrees of resource 
intensity. In each case, these are concerned with 
developing the market system’s capacity to learn 
and to act on the basis of learning. Facilitators have 
to address the difficult question: in future, who’s 
going to do what we have done?
Facilitators should recognise that a ‘do nothing’ 
option based on the belief that an initial spark will 
result in a large-scale demonstration effect is usually 
over-optimistic. Other than in the most innovative 
and resource-rich environments, change does not 
happen in this manner.
facilitator guidance factors
For an intervention strategy to be successful facilitators need 
to ensure that their actions are consistent with that strategy – 
the pathway to crowding-in. In practice there are a number of 
guiding factors that can provide discipline to facilitators as they 
confront the inevitable dilemmas which emerge during their 
interventions. These factors – questions – are a mental checklist 
for facilitators (see Figure 14). 
Once again, these factors are presented sequentially in the Guide. 
In reality, facilitators will find themselves asking these questions 
in a different order, at different times. The first question – where 
– is probably the most significant, as it triggers the subsequent 
questions.
Each question will now be considered in turn.
Where - are intervention activities likely to be a market 
function in the future?
Where facilitators focus their interventions in relation to key 
market functions and players can positively or negatively affect 
progress along the pathway to crowding-in and the attainment 
of market development objectives. 
The critical consideration here is whether or not the actions 
performed by a facilitator are (potentially) likely to be part of 
the market in the longer term (see Figure 15). If the activities are 
genuinely of a one-off nature, there is more scope for a facilitator 
to undertake these directly. If it is envisaged that activities (or 
those closely related to them) are likely to be needed in the 
future, facilitators need to proceed with more caution and, if 
possible, look to engage with appropriate market players who 
have the potential to assume such functions in the future.
It can sometimes be difficult to ascertain definitively 
whether an activity might be a market function or 
not. That being the case, facilitators should err on 
the side of caution and try and ‘leave the door open’ 
for market players to assume activities in the future. 
That means subjecting all intervention activities to 
scrutiny against the guidance factors.
3D: FACILITATING SYSTEMIC CHANGE
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figure 14
facilitator guidance factors
Where?
Are intervention activities likely to be a 
market system function in the future?
WhO?
Is there a market system player 
appropriate to work with or through?
relaTiOnship?
Is there potential for an effective 
relationship with market system player?
inTensiTy?
Is there potential for effective right-sized 
support to market system player?
assess whether current intervention 
actions are likely to be required in 
the market in the future... … are they 
really temporary?
if action is a market function, identify 
market players with incentives and 
capacity to play this role (or seek to 
‘leave the door open’ for this to happen 
in the future)
interactions between interventions and 
market players should encourage them 
into roles and practices consistent 
with the market system, building on 
indigenous incentives and ownership
actions must be consistent with 
local norms not development norms: 
otherwise facilitators distort functions, 
displace ownership, disorient players 
–‘crowding-out’ not ‘crowding-in’
crOWdinG-in?
Are actions consistent with pathway to 
crowding-in?
keep asking ‘‘should we be doing this?’’: 
always look for opportunities to 
crowd-in market functions and players 
that better serve the poor
Where?  
The facilitator might undertake a nationwide social 
marketing campaign to raise awareness about small-
scale threshing mechanisation. Unlike specific product 
marketing, social marketing is unlikely to be a regular 
activity in the market. It might be justified for the facilitator 
to do this on its own. However, other players with a 
strategic interest in the market – say the Department 
of Agriculture or the Association of Manufacturers – 
might have an interest in the profile the campaign 
generates and their endorsement of the new equipment 
may be valuable. Therefore, whilst the facilitator covers 
the bulk of the costs it might be pragmatic to involve 
these players and ensure they also engage with 
 
 
the social marketing specialist – keeping the door 
open. Conversely, product design and development are 
recurrent requirements: existing designs will need to be 
updated, new machines will be needed. The facilitator 
must take care not simply to give the technology to 
other manufacturers but try to link them to sources of 
design or expertise who can help them develop their 
own products, whether that is a freelance designer or 
engineer, a university technical design department or 
a source of information from overseas. It is important 
that manufacturers and other relevant players are 
crowded-in to take ownership and invest in the product 
development function.
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Who - is there someone appropriate to work with? 
If a programme is focused on stimulating a market function, 
inevitably it means thinking about who can perform that 
market function (‘who does?’ and ‘who pays?’ – see Section 
3C). A shift in the focus of intervention towards the 
development of market systems calls for a shift in thinking 
regarding who interventions work with. In a multi-function 
and multi-player market system there tends to be a greater 
range and diversity of market players with which facilitators 
might need to engage in order to pursue market development 
objectives. 
In practice, that means that facilitators are faced with a much 
‘messier’ and less rigid picture of partner4 choice than in 
conventional programmes, within which the following trends 
are emerging: 
l The need to work with multiple partners, with less focus on 
 any single specific partner organisation or individual.
l The need to work with a greater diversity of types of player, 
 including:
	 	 -	 	Private and public sector players
	 	 -	 	Increasingly specialised and differentiated players
	 	
	 	 -	 	Smaller, informal and non-organised players (eg informal  net- 
   works or individuals), especially relevant in weaker markets 
Such diversity has positive and negative implications for 
facilitators: it offers greater flexibility, but also increases 
uncertainty about the appropriateness of potential partners. In 
conventional programmes partners are often given as part of 
bilateral agreements or on the basis of a historical relationship. 
In such cases a key consideration is for a partner which serves 
as a ‘safe pair of hands’ in which a project implementation unit 
can be housed. 
In M4P, whilst recognising that facilitators will often have ‘political’ 
partners, the main concern is to engage with partners that are 
appropriate for the prevailing market norms and in relation to 
the specific functions upon which the programme is focusing. 
Specifically:
l Which market functions is the programme focusing on?
l Does the partner(s) have the actual or potential incentives and 
 capacity to perform that function appropriately? (see Box 8)
3D: FACILITATING SYSTEMIC CHANGE
Where?
Is the intervention activity likely to be a market function in 
the future: is it recurrent or one-off?
recurrenT One-Off
How will crowding-in or 
scaling up happen?
no Does one-off produce
sustainable change?
yes
facilitator should 
consider other 
guidance factors
facilitator might 
intervene more 
directly
4 Here ‘partner’ is used to refer to market players. Of course facilitators have other partners: their funders, co-facilitators and specialists who help them implement interventions (see Box 9 on page 51 and 
 Section 4).
figure 15
Key decision – is intervention activity likely to be a market function in the future?
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Box 8
considerations for partner selection
Given the diversity and dynamism of market systems, there is 
no fool-proof approach to partner selection. Personal factors 
(such as the character and motivation of individuals running 
organisations) will play an important role, but are difficult to 
capture in a list of criteria. However there are a number of 
considerations that facilitators should bear in mind:
l Appropriate capacity to perform and continue performing 
 specific market functions.
l Clear incentives (eg to reform, to improve practice or perform 
 a new market function).
l Demonstrated ownership or initiative over a reform process 
 or market function.
l Existing momentum upon which engagement can be built 
 (assuming that it is in a direction consistent with facilitators’ 
 objectives and strategy). 
l Potential for viability to continue to perform and adapt market 
 functions.
l Responsiveness to facilitators’ overtures, vision and way of 
 working.
Start with an open and pragmatic view about 
partners; recognise the need for multiple and 
changing partners over time; avoid getting locked 
into long-term partnerships.
Who? 
The Department of Agriculture (DoA), with an official 
mandate to develop small-scale agriculture, seems the 
obvious candidate to coordinate wider take-up of small-
scale threshing technology.  However the DoA operates 
schemes to subsidise distribution of agricultural 
equipment (usually imported) in regional centres. These 
tend to be captured by well-connected individuals 
and rarely result in improved access for small farmers, 
contradicting the DoA’s official objectives. Given its 
vested interests in the existing schemes it is unlikely 
that DoA would be an appropriate partner in this case. 
The Association of Manufacturers has new energetic 
leadership, agricultural equipment manufacturers are 
active in the Association and they (together with the 
Department of Industry) are concerned by rising levels 
of manufacturing imports (implicitly supported by the 
DoA scheme). The Association may be a more fruitful 
partner for activities focused on coordination. 
relationship - is there potential for an effective relationship?
Facilitators work with partners as a means to an end: to 
stimulate wider and sustained market system change. Therefore 
the relationships facilitators have with partners should foster 
appropriate behaviour in partners to accomplish objectives of 
market system change.
In practice an effective relationship typically has to balance two 
considerations:
l Providing the right incentives to a market player partner to 
 ensure their engagement and commitment and sustainability.
l Achieving wider market system change and avoiding unfair 
 competition or disproportionate capture of benefit – in other 
 words ‘keeping the door open’ for others.
Working with industry innovators or role models 
is an important part of a strategy for crowding-in. 
However there are also risks to ’picking winners’ 
and raising entry barriers for competitors – this 
has to be carefully managed. When negotiating with 
partners, facilitators need to make it clear that the 
deal on offer isn’t exclusive and that they intend to 
work with others in the future.
To do this facilitators need to ensure (a) that their support to 
partners is ‘transactional’ and (b) that their ‘offer’ to partners is 
clear and credible.
Ensuring support to partners is transactional
If programme support is to crowd-in market functions and 
players, it is important that it should be structured in such a way 
as to stimulate commitment and ownership (ie it gets market 
players to invest in the market system). 
This typically means making support transactional, ie it should 
involve a quid pro quo – something in return for something. This 
might mean matching financial contributions, some form of in-
kind contribution like personnel or premises or a significant 
level of effort (‘sweat equity’). Support that is transactional has 
a number of benefits: 
l It requires reciprocity and therefore has the potential to 
 leverage partner resources and commitment.
l It fosters more realistic incentives and behaviour. 
l It links support to performance and attaches a value to 
 support, encouraging prudent and effective utilisation and 
 ensures appropriate ‘intensity’ of support (see below).
l It mimics and reinforces relationships in a manner that is 
 consistent with market norms. 
Conversely, unconditional or ‘soft’ support can send the 
wrong messages to partners and the wider market system; it 
undermines market signals or incentives and is more likely to 
distort rather than develop markets.
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Transactional support. The core of a market system 
is about exchange or transactions between two 
parties. Transactions are the means by which 
consumers signal their demand, preferences and 
valuation to suppliers and the way in which suppliers 
are made responsive and accountable to consumers. 
The relationship between a facilitator and a market 
player is not in the market system per se, but the 
effectiveness of the relationship between them can 
be enhanced if it is also transactional in nature, ie 
there is a reciprocal deal which fosters commitment 
and responsiveness in both parties.
A clear and credible offer to partners
‘‘What’s our offer? ’’ is a critical question for facilitators in market 
development. Because M4P programmes rely less on providing 
direct financial support, their offer – what they provide, what they 
expect in return and how that deal is presented – to partners needs 
to be clear, well-understood, credible and valued, if it is to result in 
productive engagement.  Turning up without a chequebook forces 
facilitators to think more creatively and tangibly about the value 
they can add. Note that facilitators tend to have more than one 
offer (see Box 9).
Facilitators need to take care when entering the 
market. It is easy to be seen as an arrogant outsider if 
you approach an experienced market player and say “I 
understand your market better than you do” or “I can help 
improve your organisation”. This needs to be handled 
sensitively and smartly. For example, your offer is much 
more credible if you work with respected industry 
experts or insiders as consultants to your programme.
Box 9
Multiple relationships in the market… and outside it
One important lesson from experience is that facilitators have to 
deal with multiple relationships. On the one hand a facilitator might 
need to engage (and have different offers to) a range of market 
players during the course of an intervention. At the same time 
facilitators also have a contractual relationship with their funders, in 
the world of development (see Section 4).
The key point to understand here is that the development world 
often has different objectives, norms, structures, capacities and 
resources from those of the local market system. Arguably, the 
raison d’être of a facilitator is to act as a bridge between these 
two worlds, ensuring that their requirements are met in a manner 
consistent with their own norms, but also ensuring that inappropriate 
influences, signals and practices are not transmitted from one to 
the other. For instance, a funder may require a facilitator to report 
on the gender dimensions of a programme’s interventions. It is 
entirely appropriate that the facilitator monitors this kind of impact. 
It would not be appropriate to transfer the burden of assessment 
to a market player (eg a private firm) for whom gender objectives 
are not a concern.
 
Relationship: 
If the facilitator chooses to work with the Association of 
Manufacturers it should look carefully at how it structures 
that relationship. BMOs often have the potential to play 
important – and typically absent – coordination functions 
in market systems. However their capacity is usually 
limited. Programmes often form substantial relationships 
with BMOs at the heart of their intervention strategies. 
Many BMOs have been encouraged to expand, assuming 
inappropriate roles beyond their capacity and the interests 
of their members. As a result their orientation shifts away 
from their members and towards development agencies, 
and their new roles can only continue with aid funding.
In this case the facilitator should ensure its support to 
the Association is carefully targeted on specific technical 
assistance to bolster the Association’s ability to coordinate. 
For instance, organising meetings of key industry 
stakeholders or briefing the media – activities that are 
consistent with its likely future role. The facilitator should 
not try to channel other intervention activities aimed at 
other market players through the Association (eg technical 
support to other manufacturers to produce new equipment, 
arranging lease financing or operating a voucher scheme to 
stimulate consumption) as these would be inappropriate 
and potentially distorting. 
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intensity of support - is there potential for effective right-
sized support?
An important factor determining the extent to which an 
intervention develops or distorts a market system is the 
intensity of interventions by a facilitator towards either market 
functions, players or the market as a whole – ie how much 
support is provided.  Too much (or the wrong kind of) support 
can ‘overload’ market players and functions in ways that are 
inconsistent with market development objectives (see Box 10).
 
Box 10
Overloading market players and functions
Overloading players: Facilitators need to find ways to operate 
which are consistent with the mandate and practices required 
by their funders (eg in terms of objectives, resource allocation 
and reporting requirements) and at the same time operate 
sensitively in weak market situations. Experience suggests that 
by transferring the norms of the development world to market 
systems facilitators can overload market players in a number of 
different ways: 
l Transferring development objectives to partners that are 
 inconsistent with market norms, diluting their focus, adding to 
 costs and undermining their sustainability by moving them 
 away from their natural roles and competencies. 
l Excessively influencing partners, reducing the relative value of 
 ownership.
l Unrealistic reporting requirements requiring partners to 
 develop burdensome systems and procedures.
l Excessively support for equipment, staff, products or systems, 
 resulting in costly structures and recurrent financing 
 requirements that undermine partners’ sustainability.
Overloading functions: By the same token, facilitators can overload 
market functions by pursuing standards or processes which are 
inappropriate for local conditions, resulting in functions that 
are overly comprehensive, unwieldy, expensive and unsuited 
to ongoing maintenance and adaptation through local capacity. 
Such overloading can also crowd-out more appropriate initiative 
and investment. 
Examples of overloading include: agricultural market information 
systems using sophisticated data compilation and dissemination 
technologies, which collapse on withdrawal of international 
funding; or the introduction of regulatory impact assessment 
methodologies which require a level of technical competence, 
resources and bureaucratic coordination that is far beyond the 
capacity of domestic government.
It is essential that facilitators ‘right-size’ their support so that it 
is consistent with the norms and context of a market system. 
Right-sizing support requires:
l Assessment of prevailing market norms. Such as comparable 
 products and organisations, common institutions and prevailing 
 levels of capacity, costs and prices. This knowledge allows 
 interventions to be geared towards supporting appropriate 
 and viable products, organisations, people and mechanisms. 
l A portfolio approach. This entails working with multiple 
 partners and interventions, rather than just one (see Section 
 2).   As with an investment or lending portfolio, the performance 
 of the entire portfolio is more critical than any single constituent 
 part. The benefits of such an approach are that: 
  - It reduces pressure to achieve results through a single 
   partner or intervention, hence support can be less intensive, 
   and it reduces a programme’s dependency on a single player 
   or course of action. 
  - A portfolio of partners or interventions means that overall 
   programme objectives (eg gender outcomes) can be 
   assigned and assessed on the portfolio in aggregate, rather 
   than on the basis of a single partner or intervention.
Intensity of support: 
The facilitator might wish to introduce a system of 
certification – either of the manufacturers’ production 
processes or of the final product – to ensure quality. 
The facilitator would have to ensure that the burden of 
compliance for manufacturers was realistic given their 
resources, and beneficial to small farmers. It is common 
for standards to be introduced which are beyond the 
levels needed in weak market situations because they 
are modelled on international norms. Such standards can 
drive up costs and affect affordability. 
The facilitator would also need to assess how the standard 
could continue to operate in the future: who can set the 
standard, who can enforce the standard, who can help 
firms to comply with it? If resources are insufficient to 
permit such a sophisticated system, it would be better 
if the facilitator considered a more right-sized solution, 
perhaps promoting an information-based approach 
where consumers are informed about ‘what to look for 
in a good rice thresher’ and use demand-side pressure to 
assert quality control.
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crowding-in - are actions consistent with the pathway to 
crowding-in?
Cutting across all the factors discussed above is consideration of 
the potential for crowding-in. A pathway to crowding-in requires 
that facilitators think through how their actions today will stimulate 
positive market changes in the future.  This means explicit and active 
consideration and actions to crowd-in from the outset. Facilitators 
should continually assess the consistency of all actions with the 
pathway to crowding-in and keep asking: ‘‘should we be doing this?...’’ 
or ‘‘is there potential to bring others in?’’
In simple terms, facilitators should be concerned with stimulating 
new or improved take-up of market functions by market 
players. This is most easily defined in terms of sustainable activity, 
independent of development assistance. In practice crowding-
in might mean both breadth and depth of the market (see also 
Section 3C).
l Breadth of crowding-in is concerned with increasing the level 
 and diversity of transactions in the core of the market which 
 results in greater access and participation for the poor. 
 It is also useful to think in terms of crowding-in players, not 
 just activity levels. For instance, in very weak market situations 
 crowding-in may entail stimulating new entrants (eg from more 
 developed areas). Another consideration regarding crowding- 
 in players is competition: more activity is not necessarily a 
 good thing per se, if it comes about as a result of increased 
 market dominance by one player. 
We use pathways as a management tool to assess 
the progress and impact of our interventions. Besides 
outreach and sales, we monitor the adoption and 
ownership of desired changes in behaviour over 
time. We have found that significant changes in firm 
behaviour (eg outsourcing services, better internal 
systems and operations, etc) have been more 
reliable predictors of sustainability – firms’ readiness 
to continuously upgrade as a strategy for growth – 
than just outreach or sales.
l Depth of crowding-in recognises that competition is often 
 not enough to make markets work better for the poor. For 
 instance, in weak or ‘thin’ markets or in the case of many public 
 functions, strong competition may not be feasible or desirable. 
 In these cases crowding-in may mean the take-up of other 
 market rules or supporting functions which can ensure 
 transparency, scrutiny and means of redress, and compensate 
 for a lack of competition.
The key point is that programmes should always start by 
identifying the market functions required – the ‘where’ question. 
Thinking through sustainability then leads to the ‘who’ question 
and the other factors to guide intervention.  
3d.5 key challenges and how to deal with them
When is it ok for a facilitator to subsidise?
The point for facilitators to remember is that subsidies are not 
all the same. It is crucial to differentiate between two forms of 
subsidy: 
l Public finance from public bodies which are part of the market 
 system for ongoing functions required by the system (eg 
 recurrent government expenditure on a customs authority 
 or funding for public infrastructure). This can be regarded 
 as a legitimate feature of a market system and needs to be 
 sustainable from within the capacity and resources of domestic 
 government revenues. 
l Temporary, stimulating finance of an ‘external’ agent such as a 
 development agency, which is time-bound and not sustainable 
 and therefore not part of the market system. 
This distinction is important when thinking about what a 
facilitator does. It is generally recognised that direct financial 
intervention in the core of the market – transactions of goods 
and services – has a high potential for distortion and is best 
avoided (see Box 11). 
 
However, it is important to recognise that any form of direct 
injection of cash into market systems is potentially distorting. 
Subsidies for transactions in the core of market systems carry 
the highest risk, but there are also considerable risks if facilitators 
directly finance or perform rules and supporting functions. These 
too can be distorted, ownership crowded-out and sustainability 
undermined (be those private or public functions). 
For example: It is generally accepted that agencies should not 
subsidise the provision of financial services. However, if agencies 
conduct consumer research or product development in the place 
of banks or assume scrutiny functions in the place of regulatory 
authorities, the integrity and sustainability of the market system is 
also likely be impaired.
A number of general lessons can be drawn for facilitators 
considering subsidising any market function or player :
l Justified openly in relation to market constraints. As mentioned 
 above, support has to have clear justification and objectives 
 for overcoming market constraints and developing sustainable 
 access to goods or services.5
l Finite period of support. There has to be a clear end point to 
 support related to measurable and achievable objectives. For 
 instance this might focus on volume of transactions taking 
 place between consumers and suppliers without any subsidy.
5 For further consideration of subsidies and private firms see Good Practice Notes 5.7 and 5.10 in Section 5.
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l Limited in scale. There are real dangers of flooding a market 
 system with funds causing long-term distortion.
l ‘How delivered’ is important. Careful consideration needs to be 
 given to the structure of the support, what incentives it creates, 
 and how support is expected to achieve objectives.
l Consistent policies and approaches - need to be developed with 
 other facilitators and funders. For instance, as the lessons from 
 microfinance demonstrate, widely differing approaches and 
 policies on subsidy among agencies can hinder progress towards 
 market system development.  There is a need for openness and 
 coordination between agencies to develop consensus and 
 avoid damaging undercutting between agencies.
How to find and select appropriate partners?
As noted above, there is no ideal organisational form for a 
partner in market development, so finding and selecting partners 
inevitably involves trial and error and needs to be grounded on 
the basis of ‘what works’ in any given context.  
Typically facilitators use a combination of the following types of 
identification and selection processes: 
l Relationship-based selection.
l Tender-based selection.
l Market assessment-based selection.
Relationship-based selection
Partners can be identified through the personal knowledge, 
existing networks and acquaintances of funders and facilitators. 
This approach has much to commend it: it is cheap, working 
relations may already exist, and uncertainty can be reduced. It 
does have a number of drawbacks:
l It limits the field of selection – you only work with those 
 known to you.
l There is some risk of continuing established relationships 
 and expectations: this is particularly problematic if a funder or 
 facilitator has a high profile or a history of more conventional 
 intervention approaches. 
Box 11
Why are direct subsidies for transactions risky?
The more directly an intervention becomes involved in transactions between consumers and suppliers, the more it influences 
incentives and signals in the core of the market, where the potential for distortion is greatest. This does not mean that subsidies for 
delivery of goods and services cannot be justified. However, it does mean that facilitators need to be aware of the risk and act with 
caution. Such subsidies are typically justified for the following reasons:
Typical jusTificaTiOns
Provide tangible incentives to change behaviour.
Overcome risk and demonstrate benefits of change.
Can reinforce market forces and stimulate further market 
development.
People are poor – they can’t afford to pay and therefore need 
subsidy!
Direct support is highly ‘visible’. 
We need to find a way to spend our money!
cOMMenT
Where resistance is entrenched or an idea is new, limited delivery 
subsidies to test ideas or demonstrate value may be effective. 
However there is a danger that ‘limited’ can become ‘longer-term’ 
and that subsidies undermine the connection between price and 
value, and crowd-out initiative and ownership.
Possibly, if used sparingly, to reinforce transactional relationships and 
address specific constraints.
Many dangers here:
l Is this emergency relief?
l Is this social protection? 
l How will activity continue in the long term? 
l Potential for endless subsidy.
l Limited outreach and potential for scale-up.
l Undermines poor consumers’ sovereignty.   
Subsidised delivery does have higher visibility and permits 
greater disbursements, but this is a bureaucratic rationale, not a 
developmental one.
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A relationship-based approach to partner selection 
underlines the importance of facilitators being 
business-like themselves; developing linkages and 
maintaining networks in the marketplace, and not 
operating from the confines of a ‘developmental 
vacuum’.
Tender-based selection
A tender-based approach invites applications to bid for facilitator 
support. In an open or competitive tender, opportunities to 
apply are advertised, tender documents are drawn up and made 
available for a fee payable on application, selection criteria and 
processes established, and selections are made on the basis of 
information provided and qualitative assessments. 
The advantages of this kind of selection process are that it:
l is transparent (which may be important to comply with funder 
 accountability);
l allows a wider range of applicants to be considered, which 
 may be useful when a facilitator’s networks are limited;
l permits a facilitator to project a business-like, focused image 
 towards potential partners.
The disadvantages of tender-based selection include:
l If done properly it can be expensive and time consuming. It 
 often requires sifting through a large number of inappropriate 
 applicants to identify a few good ones.
l If criteria selection and assessment are not rigorous, the 
 success of the process is jeopardised.
l It creates a ‘big splash’ which may be unwelcome when a 
 programme is still trying to find its footing. 
A closed tender strikes a balance between the two approaches, 
where invitations to bid are extended to a number of potential 
partners, most or all of which are relatively well known to the 
facilitator. 
Formal selection criteria and approaches are often 
unsuitable and difficult to comply with for the small 
and informal partners with which facilitators often 
have to engage in weak markets.
Market assessment-based selection
As a result of market assessment, information on appropriate 
partners often comes to light. Indeed, market assessment and 
sustainability analysis (see Sections 3B and 3C) should actively 
consider the potential for partner engagement as an integral 
part of their processes.
Ultimately, successful partner identification and 
engagement is based on a combination of informed 
market understanding, opportunism and trial and 
error (hence the value of multiple partners!). There 
is simply no substitute for facilitators being close to 
and engaged in a market situation, with their ‘finger 
on the pulse’. No amount of formal research and 
selection processes can overcome the isolation of a 
distant and desk-based facilitator. 
What if there’s nothing there or no one to work with?
M4P is about making market systems work better for people 
who are currently disadvantaged by the current market 
situation: it is always about markets which are weak in some 
way or another. However some facilitators may ask “what about 
really weak markets – what should we do if there is nothing or no 
one there?”
In these circumstances facilitators need to:
l Look again or rethink how the market really works. In very 
 weak markets what initially appears to be completely absent is 
 often hidden or works in a less-than-obvious way. For instance, 
 services are more likely to be embedded within other types 
 of transactions or provided informally rather than sold on 
 a stand-alone fee-paying basis. Key ‘drivers’ may be located 
 outside the area in question (eg a lead firm, a trader or an 
 influential politician). People may travel to the market rather 
 than the market coming to them (eg nomadic livestock herders 
 visiting regional markets periodically). In very weak markets a 
 facilitator’s approach to market assessment has to be adjusted 
 to capture informality and invisibility.
l Reconsider the feasibility of change and the rationale for 
 intervention. If a context is genuinely so weak that there is 
 nothing going on – ie a ‘viability void’ exists – then facilitators 
 need to be honest with themselves and their funders: what 
 can intervention realistically achieve?  
 
 There is a risk that intervention ends up being about providing 
 emergency relief. Whilst such relief is vital to saving lives, it is 
 about coping with symptoms rather than addressing underlying 
 causes. This is not the realm of the M4P approach or indeed 
 any form of development which seeks to promote lasting 
 change. 
 In such situations if M4P intervention is warranted, it is more 
 likely to focus on improving government’s redistributive 
 policies and mechanisms or other forms of merit goods. 
 However, weakness typically extends to the government: it will 
 often be absent or dysfunctional as well. In these circumstances 
 interventions might focus on improving the poor’s access 
 to information about migration opportunities and enhancing 
 their mobility, eg by increasing the availability of identity cards, 
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figure 16
spectrum of economic weakness
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vacuum
Varying degrees of:
Resource allocation & mobility
Economic, social, political integration
Institutional strength & diversity
Access to goods & services
Demand for goods & services
ViBranT, 
resilienT ecOnOMic sysTeM
Equitable, effective governance
Investment in people
Stable macroeconomy
Competitive microeconomy
Global linkages
increasing levels of cash-based exchange:
l Own-account production
l Participation in labour markets
l Consumption of goods & services
l Concentration of human settlement patterns and economic activity
 access to travel and accommodation services or mechanisms 
 for remittance of income. Such interventions will require 
 considerable time and effort from a facilitator.
l Weigh up the level of effort required to bring about change. 
 Assuming that there is not a complete viability void, 
 facilitators will face a spectrum of weakness which might affect 
 how they intervene – or indeed whether they intervene at all 
 (see Figure 16).
Towards the right end of the spectrum, market development 
becomes less challenging. Here the role of the facilitator is likely to 
be more light touch in nature, focusing on improving information 
and awareness, linking players, stimulating new kinds of relationship 
and promoting competition. The level of effort required from a 
facilitator might be relatively low and the duration of intervention 
short. Self-evidently, in well-functioning markets intervention is not 
justified at all!
At the left end of the spectrum, the market development challenge 
is more pronounced and likely to require greater effort from the 
facilitator, in terms of time, resources and nature of activities. The 
facilitator’s role will necessarily be more direct and intensive and 
entail interventions aimed at, for instance:
l Influencing the underlying culture or attitudes of the potential 
 demand- and supply-sides.
l Informing basic understanding about the market, how it works, 
 its opportunities and constraints. 
l Encouraging market entry by new players from other 
 established markets.
l Developing and testing new products, players or delivery 
 mechanisms.
l Developing supporting functions and rules. 
specTruM Of ecOnOMic Weakness
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For example: Two market development programmes stimulated 
the integration of thousands of poor, small-scale producers into 
the economic mainstream on more favourable terms, resulting 
in improved quality, productivity and sales. One programme 
operated in a sparsely populated and geographically inaccessible 
area, in a sector historically characterised by high barriers to 
participation. Its cost of intervention was approximately US$80-
100 per producer affected, reflecting this complex intervention 
challenge. The cost of intervention for the second programme 
was less than US$1 per producer affected. It operated in a 
more densely populated and accessible area and in a sector 
with fewer barriers to the poor’s participation. Both interventions 
were valid and both were successful in their own contexts, but 
they required very different activities and levels of resources to 
respond to different market development challenges.
how can facilitators demonstrate the quick results that many 
funders demand?
It is common for facilitators to find themselves under pressure 
from their funders to demonstrate results (and disburse funds) 
quickly. The challenge for facilitators is to demonstrate progress 
sufficiently quickly without intervening in a heavy-handed, 
potentially distorting way. 
To overcome this dilemma it is essential that facilitators are 
smart about ‘sequencing’. They need to think through what is 
likely to happen and when during the course of a programme, 
and signal and explain this clearly to funders.
The pathway to crowding-in helps facilitators do this:
Step 1
At this stage of intervention considerable effort is directed 
towards research, identifying and engaging with partners and 
undertaking initial interventions to test the market and create 
‘quick wins’ which might generate interest and credibility. Such 
activities will absorb resources from a disbursement perspective. 
More importantly, elements of the intervention process can 
quite legitimately be measured and presented as short-term 
results. 
For example: Research-related activities can be framed in terms 
of raised awareness and buy-in of important market players; joint 
activities with partners as strengthening capacity; stakeholder 
consultation processes as establishing new mechanisms for 
advocacy and representation. Mini-case studies can be developed 
from successful initial activities and quick wins to give an indication 
of types of impact the programme will achieve.
Step 2
Following initial interventions facilitators are in a position to 
start adding more detail to the strategic framework in terms 
of targets for both market system level and higher-level impact. 
If properly communicated, this detailed framework can be the 
first opportunity for a funder to get a concrete sense of what 
to expect from a programme.
Step 3
Pursuing a variety of interventions to stimulate crowding-
in usually sees a programme ramping up its activities and 
consequently its impact. Note, however, that this increase does 
not occur because interventions become more resource-
intensive during the course of programme implementation. It 
happens because the scope and diversity of interventions tends 
to increase as facilitators pursue a strategy of broadening and 
deepening market development.
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key points
l M4P programmes must rigorously assess their direct impact on market systems: it is critical to capture their contribution to market 
 system change as the basis for assessing wider impact   
l M4P programmes need to credibly and practically attribute changes across the chain of causality to their intervention, based on a clear 
 strategic framework: they must establish ‘plausible attribution’
key M4p principles and framework: measuring across the strategic framework to establish plausible attribution 
It is not feasible to measure with complete certainty a programme’s impact at higher levels. Assessment should aim to balance 
credibility with practicality to achieve ‘plausible attribution’ of programme impact
putting it into practice: main steps
Step 1: Develop impact logics for each market system and related interventions in that market system, based on the overall 
    programme strategic framework
Step 2: Use the impact logics to identify appropriate indicators to monitor the outcomes of specific interventions and their 
    impact on the market system
Step 3:  Establish a baseline for key indicators
Step 4:  Predict at the beginning of intervention the amount of change in each indicator that may be expected to result from each 
    intervention
Step 5:  Design and implement a plan for collecting data to monitor and measure performance 
Step 6:  Analyse the information generated and feed into regular decision-making (internal) and report the appropriate outputs 
    of analysis (external)
key challenges and how to deal with them
l Can small programmes measure rigorously?
l Should M&E be outsourced?
Good practice notes (section 5) 
l Logical framework (log frames) (Note 5.4)
l Knowledge management system (Note 5.13)
l Intervention impact logics (Note 5.14) 
poverty reduction
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Market system change
systemic intervention
attribution of 
programme impact 
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3e.1 introduction
M4P programmes have several characteristics which influence 
the way in which they assess change.  assessment needs to: 
l Rigorously assess the direct impact of programmes on 
 market systems. M4p programmes focus on developing 
 market systems that surround and affect the poor, but they 
 do not directly interact with each beneficiary. It is critical 
 to capture definitively a programme’s contribution to market 
 system change as the basis for assessing wider impact.  
l Establish ‘plausible attribution’ of programme impact. M4p 
 programmes address the causes of market underperformance, 
 which means that the ‘chain of causality’ linking their 
 interventions to poverty reduction can be lengthy and 
 subject to many influences. Programmes need to credibly 
 and practically attribute changes across the chain of causality 
 to programme intervention, based on a clear strategic 
 framework.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3e.2 Why important?
Assessing change serves two main objectives7:
l To prove. So that programmes can be transparent and 
 accountable to their funders and other stakeholders.
l To improve. To provide programmes with feedback on 
 implementation so that they can improve their performance 
 and contribute to wider learning.
 
3e.3 key M4p principles and frameworks 
Assessment – or monitoring and evaluation (M&E) – of M4P 
programmes needs to comply with the same general principles 
of M&E as for any other development programme. It is not 
possible for the Guide to explore these principles in depth, but 
they are summarised in Box 12. 
Measuring across the strategic framework to achieve plausible 
attribution
The starting point is to accept that it is not feasible to measure 
with complete certainty a programme’s impact at higher 
levels (ie growth, access and poverty). M&E therefore should 
aim to balance credibility with practicality to achieve plausible 
attribution of programme impact (see Figure 17). That is to say: 
l Credibly demonstrate a programme’s contribution to market 
 system changes and validate the relationship between those 
 changes and improvements in growth, access and poverty 
 reduction. 
l Generate useful information for programme decision-making 
 within the practical limits of a programme’s resources.
The foundation for M&E in M4P is the strategic framework (See 
Section 3A). This sets the overarching assessment logic for a 
programme. The strategic framework establishes a hierarchy of 
objectives or levels of achievement – assessment at each of these 
levels requires different approaches and levels of resources. 
l M&E should rigorously assess the programme’s contribution to 
 changes in market systems – the levels at which it engages 
 most directly. M&E should generate robust information on 
 changes resulting from intervention in specific markets 
 systems. 
l Based on this information, reasonable estimates – rather 
 than definitive proof – should be made of the contribution of 
 market-level changes to overall changes in access, growth and 
 poverty reduction. 
6 See GTZ reference in Good Practice Note 5.4 on log frames in Section 5.
7 Terminology derived from David Hulme’s paper Impact Assessment Methodologies for Microfinance: Theory, Experience and Better Practice; Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of 
 Manchester.
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Box 12
General principles of M&e
l Clarity about the rationale and requirements of M&E:
  - Who needs to know?
  - What do they need to know?
  - When do they need to know it?
  - How will information be collected and analysed?
  - Who will be responsible?
l Balanced assessment: M&E should assess the overall balance 
 of programme performance – outreach, efficiency, effectiveness 
 and sustainability.
l Adherence to the basic ‘rules’ of M&E, especially with regard to 
 the development of indicators:
  - Relevant? M&E should throw light on the right areas.
  - By when? M&E should define the timescale for
   measurement.
  - How much? M&E must contain targets and assess change.
  - How well? M&E should offer insight into the quality of the 
   change that intervention achieves.
  - Feasibility? M&E needs to be appropriate given the practical 
   limitations of resources available.
  - Intermediate dimensions of change? M&E should measure 
   changes closer to the point of intervention and not just final 
   impact (which may be influenced by many other factors).
  - Precise? M&E needs to be specific – without this assessment 
   is impossible.
  - Context-specific? M&E needs to reflect the realities of the 
   specific context of intervention.
l Provision of guidance to implementers: M&E should set 
 appropriate incentives for the implementers of interventions 
 (ie facilitators). 
As M4P programmes tend to make multiple interventions in one 
or more markets, the strategic framework needs to be further 
broken down so that change can be tracked against a series 
of chains of causality or ‘impact logics’ developed for specific 
markets and specific interventions within those markets. Impact 
logics are, in effect, mini-strategic frameworks (see Box 13).
In M&E for M4P it is essential to frame objectives in terms 
of achievements at the market system level, not just at the 
levels of growth, access and poverty reduction. If these 
higher levels take precedence, facilitators are encouraged 
not to follow the systemic rationale of a market 
development approach and may neglect the underlying 
causes of underperformance. Facilitators may then pursue 
higher-level objectives and neglect the systemic changes 
necessary to secure sustainable and large-scale impact. 
If funders want sustainable outcomes these have to be 
framed and prioritised in programme objectives and M&E
3e.4 putting it into practice
 
The process
The process of M&E for M4P can be broken down into six basic 
steps (see Box 13): 
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8 This example has been simplified considerably. In practice, the M&E system described is highly specific and extensive, requiring a level of detailed explanation that cannot be accommodated in the Guide.
Box 13
The main steps in M&e for M4p
l Step 1: Develop impact logics for each market system and 
 related interventions in that market system, based on the 
 overall programme strategic framework.
l Step 2: Use the impact logics to identify appropriate indicators 
 to monitor the outcomes of specific interventions and their 
 impact on the market system.
l Step 3: Establish a baseline for key indicators.
l Step 4: Predict at the beginning of intervention the amount of 
 change in each indicator that may be expected to result from 
 each intervention.
l Step 5: Design and implement a plan for collecting data to 
 monitor and measure performance. 
l Step 6:  Analyse the information generated and feed into regular 
 decision-making (internal) and report the appropriate outputs 
 of analysis (external).
Each step is considered in more detail below and is accompanied 
by an Application Example from a market development 
intervention in the freshwater pond fishery sector.8
Step 1
Develop impact logics for each market system and related 
interventions in that market system, based on the overall programme 
strategic framework
Programmes need to have impact logics for individual 
interventions in a market (‘intervention impact logic’). Typically, 
programmes will make multiple interventions in a market, so 
they will also have an impact logic to capture the changes 
expected from all interventions in a market (‘market impact 
logic’). Impact logics should be consistent with the programme’s 
strategic framework (see Box 14). 
Impact logics ask explicitly: What are the series of expected 
changes leading from intervention to impact on growth, access and 
poverty reduction?  
Freshwater fish are a key source of protein and the sector is 
important for poor farmers who raise fish in ponds as additional 
source of income. Changing diets mean that demand outstrips 
supply considerably, despite sector growth of 15% per year. Fish 
rearing is complicated, involving many different stages of rearing 
(see simplified value chain on left).
The sector is failing to meet demand because of low productivity, in 
terms of slow growth of fish and high mortality rates. Low productivity 
is the result of pervasive problems across the sector :
l Farmers lack knowledge about pond preparation, stocking 
 practices, disease identification and use of inputs.
l Transportation methods are unsuitable.
l Fingerlings (which farmers buy to rear into fish for sale) are of 
 poor quality. 
l Hatching techniques (for fry which grow into fingerlings) are 
 inappropriate.
l Brood stock is limited and of limited quality.
An M4P programme pursues a multi-faceted intervention strategy 
across the sector, working with a range of partners. This example 
focuses on a single intervention, to address a single constraint: poor 
practices at the farmer level.
The programme targeted nurseries who are critical players in the 
sector.  Working in partnership with the Fisheries Association the 
programme trained nurseries in better pond management practices. 
It was anticipated that, in turn, nurseries would serve as source of 
information and support to farmers (and hawkers).
Context:
pOnd fish Value chain
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Box 14
impact logics 
Impact logics show the chain of causality through which a programme’s activities lead to poverty-reducing benefits. The logic 
describes key changes that are expected at each level of the strategic framework as a result of these activities. Each logic should be 
tailored to a specific intervention or market and consequently has a more detailed chain of causality – ie more links in the chain 
than a strategic framework (or logical framework). Each market has a set of impact logics; one market impact logic and within that 
several intervention impact logics (see below). 
While both market impact logics and intervention impact logics map out changes expected or achieved, intervention impact logics 
provide greater detail on a programme’s activities, their immediate outputs, as well as expected changes in markets and expected 
changes in growth and access. (See also Section 3A and Good Practice Notes 5.4 and 5.14 in Section 5.)
INTERVENTION 
IMPACT LOGICS
Provide basis for 
understanding extent to 
which specific intervention 
activities are resulting in 
specific changes in market 
systems and affecting 
growth and access 
Used to collect basic 
information and steer 
intervention strategy and 
actions
AGGREGATION 
Compile key information 
from a series of 
intervention impact 
logics to assess overall 
impact on market 
system
MARKET IMPACT LOGICS
 Provide basis for gauging 
progress of overall market 
system change and estimating 
programme’s contribution to 
changes in growth, access 
and poverty reduction in a 
particular market system 
Uses aggregated information 
from intervention impact 
logics to assess overall impact 
on a market as a result of 
a series of interventions to 
steer programme’s strategy 
for a market and to report to 
funders
intervention impact 
logics
Market and intervention impact logics do not need 
to be established at the start of a programme; they 
will need to be established throughout the course of 
a programme’s life, as market focus and interventions 
are refined or new markets are entered and new 
interventions initiated. Impact logics map out and 
measure the changes in the market system along the 
pathway to crowding-in (see Section 3D) and assess 
how these changes result in impact on growth, 
access and poverty reduction. 
Step 2
Use the impact logics to identify appropriate indicators to monitor 
the outcomes of specific interventions and their impact on the 
market system
By definition impact logics are a series of links (see Figure 18). 
This means that indicators should cover both intermediate and 
final change. 
Intermediate indicators: Indicators that measure change 
along the chain of causality from intervention to final 
impact (eg new product introduced ➞ consumer 
awareness of a new product ➞ consumption of 
new product ➞ satisfaction with new product ➞ 
demonstrated benefit of new product).  
Proxy indicators: Indicators of one dimension of change 
that tell us something useful about another dimension 
of change that may be difficult to measure (eg housing 
improvements as a proxy for increased household 
income).
Intelligent selection of proxy indicators is important 
in M4P. Some dimensions of change are inherently 
difficult to assess, so programmes have to find 
more readily identifiable and measurable substitutes. 
Markets are about interdependence: what one 
player does affects another; one market function 
relates to another. This inter-dependence means that 
proxy indicators have extra significance in assessing 
market systems.
1 2 3 Poverty 
reduction
Growth and 
access
Market system
change
Market impact
logic
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One of the most important considerations in M&E 
for M4P is an assessment of sustainability applied to 
all areas of change. Sustainability might be assessed in 
a variety of ways, but essentially it is about ascertaining 
the extent to which market activities continue 
independently without programme support.
Step 3
Establish a baseline for key indicators
This is something that is frequently omitted by programmes. 
Without a baseline, programmes can only count outputs 
delivered; they cannot assess the level of change they have 
caused. Baseline data on key indicators should be obtained 
from market assessment (see Section 3B) or as a result of initial 
interventions (eg Step 2 of pathway to crowding-in, see Section 
3D). If additional data is required, baseline studies may need to 
be commissioned specifically. 
Step 4
Predict at the beginning of intervention the amount of change 
in each indicator that may be expected to result from each 
intervention 
Predictions only need to be realistic ‘best estimates’ based on 
current information. Although such estimates can never be precise, 
they are important to give programmes a sense of something to 
aim for and to gauge whether interventions are likely to result in 
sufficient impact to justify expending resources. Such estimates are 
required during the development of strategies for crowding-in (see 
Section 3D).
Step 5
Design and implement a plan for collecting data to monitor and 
measure performance
This means thinking pragmatically about how information can 
be collected and by whom. It also means thinking about how 
information can be gathered to assess the relationship between 
the observed changes and programme interventions.
Quantitative information needs to be complemented 
by qualitative information. Qualitative information helps 
programmes to understand the reasons behind changes in 
quantitative indicators, to assess the sustainability of change and 
to estimate attribution. Combining quantitative and qualitative 
information can help programmes to understand:
l Are expected changes happening?
l To what extent are expected changes occurring?
l How and why are changes taking place?
l To what extent are changes sustainable?
l To what extent are changes attributable to the programme? 
 (see Box 15).
figure 18
impact logic and typical types of indicators
POVERTY REDUCTION
Indicators relating to the change in the target group’s specific poverty condition (eg income, employment, assets). 
GROWTH AND ACCESS CHANGE
Indicators relating to the target group’s position within a specific market system, relating to ‘stepping up’, ‘stepping out’ 
or ‘hanging in’ (eg productivity, sales, access to goods or services, usage and satisfaction, vulnerability to risk).  
MARKET SYSTEM CHANGE
Indicators relating to progress along the pathway to crowding-in in terms of changes in core market transactions, 
supporting functions and rules: 
l Core - quantity and quality of transactions and outreach to target groups.
l Supporting functions and rules - their effectiveness in supporting more pro-poor market performance (eg  
 appropriateness of rules, the availability of ancillary services or processes or structures for innovation and  
 representation).
l Crowding-in of independent activity and investment.
Development of market players should be assessed in terms of:
l Attitudes - awareness, understanding and behaviour in relation to desired changes.
l Capacity and practices - ability to perform and continue to perform appropriate market functions. 
l Relationships and alignment - the nature and quality of relationships, mechanisms and underpinning institutions.
l Incentives and ownership - recognition and realisation of incentives to change in relation to different market functions.
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Impact logics, indicators, baseline and prediction (Steps 1-4):
programme intervention
reduce farmer poverty
increase farmer 
productivity
strengthen farmer 
practices
Better information flow 
between nurseries & 
farmers
improve nursery 
knowledge
Step 1: 
Conceptualise impact logic
Increase in farmers 
income or employment 
levels [by target date]
Farmers productivity 
increases [by target date]
Farmers apply better pond 
management practices 
[by target date]
Farmers seek & get information 
on pond management from 
nurseries [by target date]
Nurseries are more aware of 
importance of providing pond 
management information to 
farmers [by target date]
Nurseries trained on pond 
management & providing 
service [by target date]
Step 2: 
Identify key indicators
Baseline: Income or employment levels not captured 
Assumption: Productivity and output increases are 
proxies for income and employment
Baseline: Productivity = 100 for target & control group 
Prediction: 5,000 farmers increase productivity by at 
least 20% (& above any change in control group)
Baseline: Investment in inputs pond management = 
100 for target & control group; 48% of farmers 
able to recognise & remove unwanted fish
Prediction: 5000 target farmers improve pond 
management practices above baseline & control 
group
Baseline: 90% of farmers feel nurseries should 
provide information to farmers, but are currently 
dissatisfied
Prediction: At least 50% of targeted farmers receive 
more satisfactory information than 12 months ago
Baseline: Less than 50% of nurseries feel it is 
important to provide information on pond 
management practices
Prediction: 65% of trained nurseries provide improved 
knowledge to 14,000 farmers
400 nurseries to be trained out of total of 800
Step 3: 
Establish baseline
Step 4: Predict expected change
Box 15
Measuring attribution
Changes at higher levels of impact logics are a result of many 
factors and complex inter-relationships beyond a programme’s 
control. Programmes not only need to know what changes have 
taken place over time, but also to what extent changes are a 
result of programme interventions as opposed to other factors, 
ie they must be able to attribute changes to intervention. 
This is never straightforward to achieve (see ‘Tools for M&E’), 
but in simple terms programmes should:
l Assess the situation before the programme intervention.	
l Assess changes after the programme intervention.  
l Estimate the amount of change that would have occurred 
 anyway without intervention.
l Compare actual changes that did happen with the estimate 
 of what would have happened without intervention in order 
 to isolate the results of intervention.  
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Collecting data to monitor and measure performance 
(Step 5):
Preliminary baseline data is compiled through initial 
market assessment, a combination of value chain 
analysis, secondary sources of industry data, surveys 
and focus group discussions and interviews with key 
informants. Initial interventions add to this information. 
Information derived also enables the programme to 
make assumptions for predicting outcomes (eg average 
outreach of a nursery is 60 farmers and 30 hawkers). 
At this stage possible control groups or areas can be 
identified.
During intervention, staff maintain field diaries to 
record their observations and complete routine 
intervention reports. As well as maintaining records of 
their activities and interactions with stakeholders, these 
capture information about intermediate and qualitative 
changes and significant changes in the sector and its 
environment. This information helps shape the design of 
more substantial quantitative assessments.
Towards the end of the estimated target date for the 
end of intervention, and once there have been concrete 
indications of change, formal surveys of a statistically 
valid sample of the target group and control group are 
conducted, using external specialists. The survey covers 
over 500 individuals (nurseries, hawkers and farmers) 
split evenly between control group and target group, 
and assesses changes in practices, values and volumes, 
investments, relationships, information and productivity 
or output.
Step 6
Analyse the information generated and feed into regular decision-
making (internal) and report the appropriate outputs of analysis 
(external) 
Programmes are likely to generate a diversity of data from a host 
of sources. Individually, none of these are likely to be complete 
and some data may appear to contradict other data. Therefore 
it is important that programmes use ‘triangulation’ (see Section 
3B) to cross-check individual data and derive best estimates.
The nature of analysis and reporting will depend on intended 
use:
l For internal programme management purposes, key questions are: 
 Have existing interventions worked and is the intervention strategy 
 working? 
 Programmes need to be able to use information to update their 
 understanding of market dynamics, adjust the programme’s 
 vision of market development and review and revise 
  interventions accordingly. For larger programmes, managers 
 need to review the overall portfolio of markets in which the 
 programme is operating and whether the current market mix is 
 generating sufficient impact to achieve programme objectives.
l For external reporting purposes, programmes need to extract 
 and present data which is relevant and accessible to funders 
 and external stakeholders. Reporting should be tailored to the 
 specific requirements of different users.
 To do this, data from individual interventions and markets 
 must be ‘aggregated’ across the whole programme: bringing 
 together key market changes and estimating their contribution 
 to improved growth, access and poverty reduction (see Box 
 14). Cross-cutting dimensions of programme impact (eg g 
 ender balance) should be presented as part of this overall 
 picture of programme impact.  Aggregation requires that there 
 is commonality across high-level indicators across all markets 
 and interventions – the strategic framework helps ensure this 
 commonality.
There is a tendency in development to share all 
information with everybody in the interests of that 
elusive term ‘participation’. In reality this scattered 
approach is unhelpful and can even be damaging. It 
leads to information overload which can undermine 
the credibility of data generated, put inappropriate 
information in the hands of people who are not in a 
position to interpret it correctly and adversely affect 
perceptions and expectations. 
Programmes need to be sophisticated in their 
treatment of information, taking real care to think 
through who needs to know what, understanding 
the specific requirements of prospective users of 
information and package information accordingly 
(see Section 4).
Analyse and use information generated (Step 6):
The routine information generated is used for 
intervention steering and adjustment (eg alterations 
to nursery training and new measures with the BMO 
to increase farmers’ awareness and demands towards 
nurseries).
The programme uses ‘headline’ impact data and 
qualitative information for its routine reporting to 
donors. It prepares mini-cases (which give the basic 
story-line of intervention) aimed at time-constrained 
funders. It commissions external specialists to prepare 
a more comprehensive case study for wider public 
consumption. 
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Impact data generated includes:
l 89% of trained nurseries state that providing 
 information to farmers is important for their 
 business.
l 80% of target group farmers state they receive more 
 information than they did 12 months ago. 72% of 
 these report being “satisfied” or “very satisfied” 
 with the service they receive from nurseries. 
l 68% of target group farmers are able to recognise 
 and remove unwanted fish.
l Target farmers’ investment in pond management 
 inputs increased by 20%, compared to 10% in 
 control group.
l Target farmer’s productivity increased 
 by 25%, compared to 5% in control group (and 
 mortality reduced by 15% compared to 3% in 
 control group).
Tools for M&e
As in market assessment (see Section 3B) the range of tools 
that can be used for M&E is diverse and cannot be covered in 
the Guide. Choice of tools for M&E is partly dependent on the 
nature of specific markets and target groups, but should also be 
guided by two considerations:
Consistency between tools used for market assessment and 
intervention and those used for M&E
For reasons of coherence and efficiency, market assessment and 
M&E need to be closely linked. Tools used for market assessment 
can also be used to provide evidence of overall market change 
and, in particular, of the specific dimensions of the market 
changed by intervention. Tools might have to be selected and 
adapted to suit different dimensions of the market system. This 
is the priority focus for M&E in market systems – and relatively 
more rigour and resources are justified here.
Whether information is needed for prove and improve purposes
The issue of attribution is important in market development 
when trying to ‘prove’ impact, particularly in terms of poverty 
reduction. There is no magical fix for this issue. Methodologies 
for proving final impact need to be able to determine strong:
l Causality. Where the link between an intervention and 
 market level (cause) and consequent higher-level change 
 (effect) is plausible.
l Generalisability.9 Where it is reasonable to draw wider 
 conclusions on the basis of analysis of an observed change 
 (ie to extrapolate).
9 A term coined by Eric Oldsman.
figure 19
Types of tool for measuring attribution
case studies experimental
Quasi-experimental
rapid techniques
participant judgement
Comparisons made between two 
groups: one targeted and one 
unaffected 
(eg sample surveys, open to  
statistical analysis)
Techniques such as Focus Group Discussions or 
semi-structured interviews, ‘what if ’ 
questions, secondary sources
Asking participants directly to estimate 
change without taking wider 
effects into account
Detailed analysis of particular 
cases to assess specific causes 
of change and test intervention 
hypotheses
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As can be seen from Figure 19 there are very few measurement 
methods that are able to ascertain both causality and genera-
lisability. Experimental and quasi-experimental approaches are 
difficult, requiring expertise and resources. Yet, if programmes 
are serious about proving final impact, there is no real alternative 
to these approaches. 
A mix of methodologies is therefore usually required to estimate 
attribution:
Quasi-experimental methods
Comparative assessments (eg surveys) of affected and control 
groups should be used when practical and when the scale of 
intervention justifies the cost of assessment. Quasi-experimental 
methods allow for the comparison of changes between a target 
group affected by programme intervention and a group that has 
not been targeted. Differences in the level of change between 
these two groups can be used to estimate the degree of change 
resulting from programme intervention.  
Quasi-experimental methods are not valid when the targeted 
group is unique and does not have a suitable comparison group 
or when interventions can influence the control group as well as 
the targeted group. Methodologies using control groups work 
best for specific interventions and well-defined target groups 
within a homogenous population rather than across entire 
markets or areas. 
Trend analysis
Programmes should compare change in areas where the 
programme is active with changes in other areas as well as 
national and historical trends. Again, any differences between 
the changes identified in programme areas and non-programme 
areas (or national and historical trends) can be used to estimate 
the change attributable to programme intervention.  
Programmes should also track other critical incidents 
that might cause changes such as macroeconomic 
factors, new infrastructure or regulations or climatic 
events. The effects of other aid programmes should 
also be taken into account. If such factors might also 
have influenced change, programmes should adjust 
their estimates of the degree of change which can 
be attributed justifiably to programme intervention. 
Qualitative methods
Qualitative methods are useful to investigate change processes 
(eg intermediate changes in terms of behaviour or practices). 
Qualitative assessment can help understand the role of 
programme interventions in contributing to observed changes 
and identify other contributing factors unrelated to the 
programme. For instance: 
l Field diaries of observations during staff field visits can be 
 used to document what changes are really happening and why. 
l In-depth interviews or focus group discussions can be 
 used to capture the opinions of relevant market players in 
 order to explore why changes have occurred and the factors 
 that contributed to change, including the role of programme 
 intervention in any change.
level of effort required
Plausible attribution is about balancing credibility with practicality. 
Programmes typically only have limited resources with which 
to conduct M&E. Therefore programmes should focus their 
effort on measuring some levels of the strategic framework and 
indicators with more rigour than others.  
The starting point is to recognise that if change is happening 
at one level of impact logic, but not at the next, then the chain 
of causality is broken. Before a programme can estimate its 
higher levels of impact in terms of growth, access and poverty 
reduction, it is vital to establish that change has occurred at 
lower or intermediate levels, ie market system change; only 
then is it possible to establish that change has occurred at each 
subsequent, higher level.  
The emphasis of measurement changes as focus shifts up the 
strategic framework, from attributing change definitively to 
programme intervention at the lower or intermediate levels 
to transparently testing the validity of the links in the chain of 
causality or impact logic at the higher levels:
l Changes at the market level as a result of interventions should 
 be measured rigorously. At these levels, programmes should 
 aim to assess the intervention’s impact – be that direct or 
 indirect – with certainty.
l Changes at the growth and access level should be measured to 
 estimate the extent to which they have resulted from identified 
 changes in the market system. Measurement should not try 
 to prove definitively the programme’s contribution to 
 improved growth and access but gauge whether the link in the 
  causal chain between market systems and growth and access is 
 valid.
l Changes at the poverty reduction level should be measured to 
 estimate whether they have resulted from improved growth 
 and access amongst the targeted population. Measurement 
 should aim to gauge whether the link in the causal chain 
 between growth and access and poverty reduction is valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69
The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
3E: ASSESSING CHANGE
3e.5 key challenges and how to deal with them
can small programmes measure rigorously?
Rigorous measurement undoubtedly requires resources and this 
has to be accommodated within programme design. However, it 
is not the case that a rigorous approach is something that only 
large M4P programmes can do. 
If programmes are genuinely so small that they lack the resources 
to measure what they do appropriately, then more fundamental 
questions should be asked of programme design. On the one 
hand, such limited resources are unlikely to result in meaningful 
impact. On the other hand, programmes will be starved of the 
information necessary for effective intervention and assessing 
and demonstrating impact to funders.  
That said, programmes can often use the resources at their 
disposal more smartly: 
Make sure that the prove and improve objectives of M&E don’t 
get blurred
Many programmes tend to focus on accountability requirements 
and allocate the bulk of their scarce resources to this. This 
tendency often causes them to focus disproportionately on 
measurement at the higher levels of the strategic framework, 
because “that’s what funders want to hear about”. However, as this 
section has made clear, definitively attributing higher-level impact 
to programme intervention is extremely difficult, irrespective of 
the level of resources available. 
Consequently M&E may fail to achieve both its objectives: it 
does not generate the information that programmes need 
for decision-making (improving) nor does it generate credible 
information for accountability purposes (prove).
The concept of plausible attribution is explicitly about trying to 
tailor M&E to the level of resources available to a programme. 
The emphasis is on generating a credible impact story-line 
for funders rather than providing scientific proof. In this way 
programmes need not sacrifice the collection and analysis of 
information for their own intervention-steering purposes, which 
is vital for effective intervention.
Be smart, be selective
Programmes also have a tendency to try and collect as much 
information as possible, which is expensive and unproductive. A 
clear strategic framework and impact logics can help programmes 
to focus on information that is essential rather than ‘nice to 
have’. A distinction between improve and prove uses can also 
help efficiency. Information for routine internal consumption 
does not need to be 100% accurate, comprehensive and 
polished. Information for external consumption tends to focus 
on a small selection of indicators or success stories captured 
and presented periodically.
Information has to be ‘good enough for now’ to 
allow you to make timely decisions and estimate 
and report progress. Otherwise you run around 
endlessly collecting and measuring, trying to get it 
perfect – by the time you’re finished it is usually too 
late! Our experience has been that regular reality 
checks using multiple sources of information are 
more useful.   
Build M&E into regular work
Finally, M&E need not be left to large-scale, periodic assessments 
conducted by (expensive) external specialists. Most of the 
information can be collected routinely by programme staff 
involved in programme intervention – it should be something 
that everybody can do. Clear impact logics can help staff do 
this.
should M&e be outsourced?
M&E does require some level of technical expertise. If that does 
not exist within the programme team then this may need to be 
outsourced. However the routine nature of M&E in M4P means 
that some form of in-house capacity is desirable, to establish 
impact logics, support staff in basic monitoring and information 
collection (see above), interpret and aggregate information for 
reporting purpose and maintain appropriate rigour.
However, some aspects of M&E can be usefully conducted by 
external parties, if resources permit. This provides programmes 
with access to a larger pool of technical expertise, frees 
up programme staff time and can ensure a measure of 
independence in M&E which may be important to ensure 
information has credibility in the eyes of funders (eg external 
evaluations). One of the most common areas to outsource is 
large-scale data collection (eg surveys), which require specialised 
methodologies and considerable human resources. Another area 
might be where a programme needs to ‘hide’ its involvement in 
assessment processes, perhaps for cultural reasons or due to 
political sensitivities, and so uses a third party which is regarded 
as more impartial or acceptable. 
As with market assessment, the key point is that outsourcing 
does not mean handing over all elements of the M&E process. 
Programmes need to set the overall framework for M&E, 
supervise data collection and, in particular, ensure that they are 
involved in the interpretation of data. Experience indicates that 
the more closely programme staff are involved in the process 
the more useful the results are. 
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4.1 introduction
The management and governance of development programmes 
is a broad and important topic that cannot be codified into 
hard-and-fast rules which are common across all agencies and 
contexts. This section focuses only on salient implications that 
arise from operationalising the M4p process as outlined in 
the Guide. for the sake of simplicity these implications are 
grouped under three headings:
l Personnel and capacity requirements: skills sets and orientation, 
 leadership, balance between in-house and outsourcing and 
 building facilitation capacity. 
l External relations: differentiating types of partner, relationship 
 management, and credibility and branding. 
l Systems and structures: budgeting and financial management, 
 contracting, programme structure and programme steering.
some of the implications covered in this section relate closely 
to the ‘Getting started’ considerations covered in section 2.
4.2 personnel and capacity requirements
As an approach that requires insight, innovation and influence 
rather than financial firepower, M4P is especially dependent on 
good people. Finding, training and motivating the right people is 
therefore critical. 
There are four issues in particular that programmes need to get 
right: (a) skills mix; (b) leadership; (c) balance between in-house and 
outsourcing; and (d) building facilitation capacity.
skills mix
Facilitating market system change requires a blend of skills sets 
or personality types: generalists and specialists, innovators and 
strategists, planners and searchers. 
The general experience is that the M4P approach can be learned 
and does not need specific technical expertise. Some programmes 
have successfully hired non-specialist, bright and dynamic people 
and then developed their capacity to pursue an M4P approach in 
specific markets. They haven’t relied solely on specialists with lengthy 
CVs (who can sometimes be resistant to new ways of working).
A balance of skills sets is likely to be needed in a typical M4P 
programme:
l Management skills. Particularly in larger programmes, with 
 multiple interventions in a range of markets. Some ability in 
 M&E is also important for all staff. 
l Political economy skills. The status quo often represents a 
 ‘political’ settlement which favours vested interests. Pro-poor 
 change tends not to favour entrenched vested interests, which 
 may resist change. M4P programmes therefore need a sound 
 understanding of the political economy of change and to be 
 skilled in overcoming resistance to change. 
l Analytical skills. The ability to stand above individual market 
 players’ perspectives and look at the wider sector context (an 
 economist’s perspective). Programmes need to be able to 
 analyse and identify constraints and opportunities at a systemic 
 level.
l Business knowledge and skills. It is essential for programmes to 
 understand the private sector. Many interventions are through 
 or with the private sector, so having people with the right skills 
 and credibility with private sector is important.
l Technical skills. People who possess a strong interest in a target 
 sector or specialised function or tool.
It is not possible to find people who have this complete package of skills. 
Even in the largest programmes, it is not feasible or practical to maintain 
a team of staff which covers the entire range of skills and orientations 
described above. Depending on the nature of specific markets and 
interventions, programmes need to use external people to supplement 
the core competence of programme staff with specific technical or 
sectoral knowledge (see below). These requirements tend to change 
over time as interventions evolve and programmes shift their focus.
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leadership
The role played by managers of M4P programmes can be 
different from conventional development programmes. 
Conventionally, managers are typically tasked to deliver specific 
outputs. The role of M4P managers is to serve as catalysts of 
change. Managers need to be entrepreneurial, anticipating and 
reacting to developments in the market and the ambitions and 
ideas of market players. Managers need to have credibility and 
vision and be able to act entrepreneurially, investing in the ideas 
and ambitions of others. Their personal credibility and ability to 
create an effective programme culture and bring stakeholders 
together is often critical to programme success. 
The selection of managers should emphasise their ability to 
think strategically and display entrepreneurship rather than focus 
solely on technical skills or track record in managing inputs and 
outputs within conventional development programmes. Terms of 
reference for managers will need to reflect these differences.
M4P programmes are often organised around major themes 
corresponding to particular markets or market segments 
(eg housing or insurance in a financial market development 
programme or wool and textiles in a commodity and service 
market development programme).  Other M4P programmes are 
organised around particular market functions (eg market research 
or regulation). Each of these themes typically has its own budget 
and intervention strategy, but otherwise has considerable freedom 
to develop their own lines of work. For such flexibility to work, a 
‘theme champion’ might also be needed drive work forward with 
consistent focus and energy and also represent the programme 
to market players. Consistency and continuity is needed to build a 
programme’s profile and credibility with relevant market players. 
Sub-dividing programme leadership in this way allows larger 
M4P programmes with broad remits to specialise and, in so 
doing, to penetrate deeper into the development of specific 
markets or parts of markets. However, to be successful theme 
champions need to be guided by an overarching programme 
strategy to ensure that all lines of work add up to a coherent 
whole and contribute to programme goals.
Getting good people is part of the challenge. But 
once you’ve got them and agreed a strategy, you’ve 
got to give them space, resources and support to 
get on with it (within reason, of course!).
Balance between in-house and outsourcing
It is not realistic for most programmes to recruit staff with all the 
requisite skills or orientations for the duration of a programme. 
Programmes need to strike a balance between maintaining in-
house core competencies and outsourcing specialised roles for 
defined periods of time.  
Experiences differ in this regard depending on context 
and programme type (see Figure 20). What is clear is that 
specialised inputs need to be delivered within a wider process 
of facilitation. Therefore, someone needs to decide what skills 
are needed, when, how they will be used and where they will 
come from.  Programme staff need to be competent to make 
such determinations, ie as a basic minimum they need to have 
clear ownership and understanding of the process of market 
facilitation. Specialist skills can be recruited as needed.
figure 20
skills sets and sources
Beyond core competence in the M4P approach and 
programme management, it is difficult to be definitive 
about which skill sets are best done in-house and 
which are best outsourced. For instance, with regard 
to political economy, influencing government may 
be better achieved by well-placed political advisers 
which the programme contracts temporarily rather 
than a full-time lobbyist on the programme staff.
The extent of outsourcing can vary (according to context and 
programme type) from the commissioning of specific tasks 
to specialised suppliers to contracting-out entire parts of the 
facilitation process to ‘sub-facilitators’.
Commissioning specific tasks
Programmes need to contract a range of suppliers to provide 
specialised services. This might include working with market 
research companies to generate market information or conduct 
impact assessment surveys, using a communications specialist to 
conduct awareness-raising campaigns or hiring a technical specialist 
to analyse a specific market constraint.  
The key lesson from experience is that programmes cannot 
outsource the ‘thinking’ behind market facilitation to such suppliers. 
Programme managers must understand exactly what they need, 
in what form and for what purpose and translate that into tight 
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terms of reference against which suppliers can be contracted and 
their performance monitored.  
For example:  Many programmes have tried to outsource their market 
assessment and impact assessment functions, with mixed experience. 
Market research companies cannot design survey methodologies 
and questions in response to a loosely defined concept of market 
analysis. They need to be briefed on background (eg preliminary 
analysis conducted) and what the programme wants to achieve with 
market research. Most importantly, programmes cannot expect them 
to interpret information generated.  
Similarly, M&E and information management is integral to effective 
intervention, to improve performance and prove impact. External 
specialists can provide specialised technical advice, independent 
assessments or human-resource intensive information gathering. But 
programmes cannot expect suppliers to understand (let alone define) 
their strategic frameworks and impact logics.   
Outsourcing facilitation
By contracting sub-facilitators programmes can scale-up their 
coverage more quickly than by working alone. Sub-facilitators may 
also bring new networks, connections, expertise and resources. 
If sub-facilitators are well placed in a local context they can be 
a means of rapid localisation and ownership over the market 
development agenda and help a programme build credibility more 
quickly than it could coming in ‘cold’ to a situation.  
Despite these apparent benefits, the experience of working 
through sub-facilitators has not proved straightforward. Unlike 
outsourcing tightly defined specific tasks, outsourcing facilitation 
requires that sub-facilitators ‘buy-in’ to the M4P approach and 
are competent in facilitating systemic change. Unfortunately, 
the advantage of sub-facilitators – being well placed in a local 
context – can also be a source of disadvantage: they tend to 
have established patterns of working, structures and systems and 
other paying clients which are not consistent with M4P (see Figure 
21). In practice therefore, the extent to which facilitation has been 
completely outsourced has been limited. 
Building facilitation capacity
The reality is that M4P is a relatively new and distinctive approach. 
In many contexts, market facilitation skills are not readily available 
in local labour markets, and ‘ready-made’ sub-facilitators (or even 
specialised suppliers) are not available for contracting. In some 
countries it has proved necessary for funders and facilitators to 
commit resources to building effective facilitation capacity as part 
of programme intervention, either within programmes or in other 
organisations. The extent to which this is necessary will vary from 
country to country.
Some programmes have taken the step of scaling up staffing 
numbers initially to implement preliminary interventions in-house, 
but with a view to helping staff to spin off at a later date and 
thus create a pool of M4P expertise to which the programme 
can outsource tasks or which can be used by other programmes 
pursuing market development objectives.  
If a staff spin-off strategy is pursued, it is important to 
ensure that remuneration rates within the programme 
are consistent with prevailing rates for consultants or 
NGOs. If rates inside the programme are significantly 
higher than outside, there is a risk that a spin-off strategy 
will be unattractive to staff or, if they do spin off, they 
are likely to remain dependent on the programme.
 
Such a personnel and capacity building strategy correlates with 
the idea of large M4P programmes acting as ‘supra-facilitators’ so 
they can achieve significant coverage and impact without having to 
main large organisational structures in their own right.
figure 21 pros and cons of outsourcing facilitation
l Manageable span of control
l Transparency of contracts with established players
l Building on local facilitators
l Appeals to funders as programme ‘overheads’ are kept  
 low and fund disbursement is predictable
l Flexibility and scope for adaptation and learning high
l Development of market-specific knowledge and methods
l Ensures strategic coherence and consistent application 
 of M4P approach
l Programme reduced to role of grant manager
l Limits learning about what’s going on in markets
l Limits flexibility to adapt to changing markets
l Capable facilitators with M4P vision and competence  
 may not exist and may have to be developed
l Risk that programme becomes a scattered and  
 incoherent mix of outsourced interventions
l Manageability of large and complex range of  
 interventions and activities
l Less appealing to funders as programmes perceive staff  
 costs as high
LARGE PROGRAMME WITH LIMITED OUTSOURCING OF FACILITATION
SMALL PROGRAMME OUTSOURCING FACILITATION
advantages disadvantages
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Ideally a programme should begin with strong in-
house implementation, so that it can learn and make 
the case for M4P. It should then shift to a more 
outsourced approach, accompanied by measures 
to inform and build the capacity of potential sub-
facilitators.
4.3 external relations
M4P programmes operate in complex environments and 
tend to interact with a diverse range of external partners or 
stakeholders. The complexity of this stakeholder picture can 
present challenges for programmes. There are three important 
issues that programmes need to deal with: (a) differentiating 
types of partner; (b) relationship management; and (c) credibility 
and branding.
differentiating types of partner 
The terms ‘partner’ and ‘partnership’ are overused in the 
development field; like the term ‘stakeholder’ they can 
encompass a variety of relationships. M4P experience indicates 
that it is useful to be clear about what partner or partnership 
means in different circumstances and for different purposes (see 
Figure 22).
Specifically, it is essential to differentiate between a programme’s 
political or legal partnership (eg as part of a bilateral agreement) 
and the variety of partnerships a programme may have for 
operational purposes (ie with co-facilitators or market players) 
to intervene in market systems. 
l Political or legal partner. Depending on the country, funder 
 and type of programme, a programme is often obliged to have 
 a political partner or official counterpart, usually a government 
 department or agency, for the life of the programme. 
 The programme may be housed within and funded through 
 government or government may only have a steering and 
 oversight role (see Section 4C and also Section 2).
l Operational or intervention partner. Depending on its type 
 and context a programme may have an operational partner 
 or partners, eg a joint venture with a co-facilitator or a contract 
 with a sub-facilitator for the duration or substantial part of the 
 programme. 
 In addition, a programme will have an array of shorter- 
 term intervention partnerships with market players for the 
 implementation of specific interventions.
Differentiating between these types of partners is important 
when it comes to managing relationships and expectations 
effectively:
l A political partner is important because it gives the programme 
 its ‘licence to operate’. In principle a political partner should 
 share a programme’s objectives and support its strategy, but 
 that is often not the case. Political partners can have complex, 
 politicised agendas and lack capacity and flexibility to engage 
 substantially in the diverse range of interventions of a typical 
 M4P programme. So, in practice the role of a political partner is 
 likely to be about oversight or endorsement of the programme 
 or activities focused tightly on roles that only government 
 can play (eg regulation). However a programme cannot afford 
 to ignore a political partner : if it wants a licence to operate, 
 a programme needs to main good relations with its political 
 partner. This usually means supporting the political partner to 
 undertake activities which it regards as a high priority – even 
 if they are sometimes peripheral to the programme’s main 
 strategy. M4P has to deal with realpolitik. 
l Programmes have more flexibility when it comes to operational 
 or intervention partners (see Section 3D). As far as possible 
 ‘why’ should lead ‘who’, ie partner choice should be driven 
 by a consideration of their capacity and incentives to perform 
 specific roles: it’s not just about partnership for partnership’s sake. 
 
 Operational partners may take two forms: (a) another 
 development agency external to the system, eg an international 
 NGO; or (b) a player from the market system, eg a business or 
 a university. In the latter case, facilitators need to ensure that 
 the relationship is conducted in a manner consist with the 
 guidance provided in Section 3D.
 In both these forms, the partnership is temporary. The 
 programme is engaging with an appropriate partner, over 
 a finite period, with the intention of catalysing some form of 
 change in market system.
l There is another type of partnership to be considered: 
 partnerships as outcomes, ie new arrangements between 
 players in the market system that emerge as the outcome 
 of intervention. For instance, government might form a public- 
 private partnership with a BMO to delegate to it licensing 
 issuing and fee collection authority as part of an improved 
 regulatory framework for an industry. 
relationship management
Smart public relations and communications and management 
of stakeholder expectations is essential in M4P. The market 
development task can be complex and is not always easily 
communicated to stakeholders, whether they are direct 
partners or other local or international stakeholders. Simple 
and clear messaging is therefore vital. However, different types 
of stakeholders will have markedly different expectations about 
a programme’s work, so a one-size-fits-all approach does not 
work. Programmes have to be effective at stakeholder analysis 
and packaging and communicating messages in a tailored way 
to suit different stakeholder groups. 
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figure 22
differentiating types of partner
Programmes should avoid falling into the ‘tell 
everybody everything’ trap which is common in 
development. Whilst such an open approach might 
be seen as transparent, in reality the vast volumes 
of information – much of it technical and jargon-
laden – generated in development programmes are 
more likely to be seen as a smokescreen and result 
in confusion or suspicion rather than understanding.
The portfolio approach (see Section 2) is important in this regard, 
as it can be used to ensure and demonstrate diversity and balance 
in a facilitator’s work (especially important if a programme has 
different stakeholders with multiple objectives). A portfolio 
approach can allow a project to maintain a mix of interventions 
which achieve different criteria (eg gender representation, 
geographic locations or consistency with government or funder 
policies): different criteria can then be highlighted in targeted 
communications to respective stakeholders.
Regular review is required to assess and revise the portfolio 
mix. This allows the programme to shift the direction of the 
overall portfolio in a way which meets stakeholder concerns 
while still allowing it to pursue diversity.
credibility and branding
M4P programmes need to be credible in the eyes of market 
players. Establishing credibility and influencing players in the 
public and private sectors is vital to successful facilitation of 
systemic change. Credibility may be established in several ways:
l Ensuring staff profiles are credible amongst key stakeholders. 
l Initiating and developing the programme through a joint 
 process with stakeholders.
l Involving credible stakeholders in the governance of the 
 programme.
l Working through credible market players or outsourced 
 suppliers or sub-facilitators. 
Managers and staff should have, or develop rapidly, the credibility 
to influence stakeholders across the public and private sectors. 
In countries where government is sceptical of new, more 
market-oriented approaches, it may be useful for programmes 
to build credibility by demonstrating how markets can be made 
to work better for the poor through private sector initiatives 
before attempting to influence policy-makers. However, systemic 
change will be reinforced if the new business models introduced 
by the private sector are underpinned by policy and institutional 
change. 
period of temporary intervention
programme: Political or legal partner
programme: Operational or intervention partner 
(co-facilitator)
programme: Operational or intervention partner 
(temporary partnership with market players)
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Branding can help establish a programme’s credibility. Some 
programmes have achieved this by trading on their development 
links. In other contexts, programmes have done this by pursuing a 
strategy of localisation, in terms of positioning within the domestic 
context, as well as through staffing profiles.  
Successful programmes also develop a ‘brand’ or distinctive 
voice with which to project their influence in a sector – often 
connected to a programme’s reputation for insight or innovation. 
It is harder for broad, multi-sector programmes to obtain such 
credibility and build a brand since their broad coverage requires 
that they communicate with a diverse range of stakeholders. For 
these programmes it may be more effective to build a voice or 
brand at the intervention level. This relates to the idea of ‘theme 
champions’ (see 4.2).  
The need to stimulate local ownership means that programmes 
often seek to be invisible to the final target group or ‘beneficiaries’ 
– ie they avoid waving a funder’s flag – so as not to come between 
the target group and the market players who serve them. 
However, for a number of reasons, invisibility may not be a realistic 
or desirable strategy with direct partners, such as government, 
BMOs or large firms. Funders will often want to see a programme 
with a certain profile that matches their expectations (see Figure 
23).
figure 23
What should a programme brand?
It is often useful therefore for programmes to develop multiple 
brands – towards market players (where the development image 
is downplayed) and towards funders (where the market image is 
downplayed).
4.4 systems and structures
The flexible and facilitatory nature of the M4P approach – 
involving multiple interventions and multiple partners – differs 
from conventional development programmes and does not 
always fit easily within conventional systems and structures for 
programme management and governance. Four areas in particular 
can be problematic: (a) budgeting and financial management; 
(b) contracting; (c) programme structure; and (d) programme 
steering. There are no definitive ways of dealing with these areas, 
but some of the key issues are considered below.
Budgeting and financial management
Budgets and financial management systems of development 
programmes are usually split into overheads (ie management 
and administration costs) and intervention costs (ie expenditure 
directly related to outcomes or beneficiaries). Concerns about 
aid effectiveness and efficiency mean that funders want to keep 
the level of overheads as a proportion of overall programme 
expenditure as low as possible. For programmes that deliver 
things directly to beneficiaries (eg vaccinations or seeds) this 
separation is relatively straightforward and the concern with 
delivery efficiency is warranted. 
For M4P programmes this separation – as it is handled 
conventionally – can cause problems. M4P programmes do not 
deliver things directly, but work indirectly to influence others. 
This is a human resource intensive process. The problem is 
that programme staff costs typically fall under the heading of 
overheads, so there is a tendency for M4P programme to over-
report overheads and under-report intervention costs – in effect, 
activity by staff is regarded as waste, something to be kept to a 
minimum. This distorts the picture of programme performance, 
from both a management and a governance perspective. 
It is imperative that funders and facilitators understand the 
nature of the facilitation process from the outset and ensure 
that facilitation costs are located appropriately in budgeting and 
financial management systems, ensuring that they are included 
within intervention costs and not overheads.
A second issue is the level of detail required in budgeting and 
financial management. M4P programmes tend to undertake a 
significant number of interventions with a diversity of partners, 
none of which individually may require significant amounts of 
money (indeed they often entail matching contributions from 
partners). Unlike single intervention, single partner programmes, it 
is therefore difficult to plan each of these interventions in detail far 
in advance, making accurate budgeting a challenge. Moreover, the 
sheer volume of activities can make financial reporting onerous in 
the extreme (eg in terms of number of budget lines). 
The experience has been that it makes more sense to define 
budgets and financial reporting on the basis of broader areas of 
intervention (eg on basis of cost per market or main areas of 
intervention). The corollary of this broader definition of budget 
lines is that programme management needs to ensure stringent in-
house financial monitoring, scrutiny and cash-flow management.  
activities with market players
Market research
events on programme experience
capacity building of other facilitators
case studies
not 
to brand
✔
To 
brand
✔
✔
✔
✔
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Initial interventions (Step 1 of the pathway to crowding-
in) can help programmes and their funders estimate 
market or intervention costs and enable budgeting 
to become more accurate through the life of the 
programme.  
contracting
As discussed in Sections 3D and 4.3, M4P programmes tend to 
have a variety of partnerships, which require different forms of 
contracts. 
Most obviously, any M4P programme will be subject to a single 
overall contract between a contractor responsible for implementing 
the programme and a funder who is financing the programme 
(for larger programmes there may be several contractors and 
funders). This contract lays out the fiduciary responsibility of the 
contractor and provides the basis for its legal accountability to the 
funder. The contract for an M4P programme will be similar in most 
respects to that for any development programme. However it 
should make provision for the flexibility requirements of the M4P 
implementation process described throughout the Guide and, as far 
as possible, emphasise outcomes and sustainability rather than the 
minutiae of inputs and activities. 
Once a programme is up and running within its main contract, 
the programme will need to engage a diverse range of different 
partners, which will require different contracting considerations: 
l Sub-facilitators. Some programmes may outsource substantial 
 elements of the facilitation process to other parties – sub- 
 facilitators. These are likely to be well-established organisations 
 and familiar with formal contracting arrangements. The key point 
 is that unlike commissioning a supplier for a specific technical 
 task (such as market research) which can have very tight 
 terms of reference, a sub-facilitator will be required to exercise 
 creativity and discretion. Therefore it is important that the 
 contract transfers the M4P impact logic and facilitation process 
 to the sub-facilitator to ensure their genuine commitment 
 and ability to facilitate systemic change. Experience suggests 
 that this may require capacity building of the sub-facilitator and 
 some level of ongoing support, which should be reflected in 
 the contract.
l Market players. Most intervention activities are likely to involve 
 working with some form of market player, such as a lead firm, 
 a government agency or representative organisation. In some 
 cases the level of interaction may not be sufficiently high to 
 warrant a contract – a simple MOU may be sufficient. However 
 if a contract is required it is important to use the principle of 
 ‘right-sizing’ (see Section 3D). 
For all partner types, contracts should try to reflect and build 
on incentives for good performance rather than penalise bad 
behaviour, partly to ensure ownership over activities and partly 
because in many countries enforcement of contracts for non-
performance is expensive and time-consuming. 
Because a programme’s involvement with a market player will be 
relatively short-term and of a low financial value, the levels of risk 
involved do not warrant burdensome contracts and bureaucratic 
contracting processes. Lengthy competitive tendering processes 
may not be appropriate in weak environments where there is 
a scarcity of competent market players or where players lack 
the capacity to engage in such processes. Contracting needs to 
preserve a facilitator’s ability to respond to partners who often 
operate on a different timeframe to a development programme 
(eg private firms). Contracting at the local level – for low-risk 
contracts at least – can help ensure rapid turnaround.
It is important to build in checks and balances if local contracting 
processes are used. 
For example:
l Ensure negotiations and contracting are handled by a team 
 from the programme, rather than an individual.
l Ensure that financial offers from partners are signed by the 
 head of the organisation in question (not just communicated 
 by email correspondence).
l If competitive processes are not realistic, ensure that the 
 reasons for non-competitive awards are documented and 
 maintained alongside the contract.
programme structure
In M4P local ownership is critical for fostering credibility and 
the ability to influence others to change practices and take risks. 
An important success factor in M4P programmes has been the 
extent to which key stakeholders in the public or private sectors 
have taken ownership of a programme’s objectives and strategy. 
Experience shows that ownership depends upon the extent 
to which concerned stakeholders are empowered and able to 
exercise strategic leadership rather than on a specific structural 
or legal form. This is borne out by the range of institutional and 
legal forms that define various M4P programmes.   
M4P programmes can take a variety of legal forms:
Projects or programmes
Are a common legal form. Typically, contractors (international in the 
main) are contracted directly by a single funder. For accountability 
reasons, inputs and outputs are often highly specific and detailed. 
Such tight specification conflicts with M4P’s requirements for: 
flexibility and access to diverse skills; incremental growth at a pace 
defined by opportunity; and longer timeframes. Contracting is 
typically conducted ‘off-shore’ and projects often operate outside 
of local governance arrangements. Projects can be co-financed 
by many donor agencies. However, this in itself has further 
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implications, as most agencies have specific accountability and 
process requirements. This can lead to tensions between funders 
and put pressure on programmes to be ‘all things to all funders’. 
Trusts
Have been used by a number of programmes. Country-specific 
programmes are established as trusts ‘on-shore’ in the host 
country. Multi-country and multi-funder programmes have 
more often been established as trusts ‘off-shore’. Trusts can be 
legally complex, challenging to establish and costly to manage. In 
principle, they can offer a number of advantages (over projects) 
in respect of the localisation agenda:  
l Trusts can offer a more convenient vehicle for pooled donor 
 agency funding arrangements.  By appointing trustees a trust 
 can reduce the cost and management time spent by funder 
 staff on oversight. This can be particularly attractive in 
 pooled funding arrangements.
l Projects are often subject to oversight from a form of 
 steering committee. Trusts on the other hand have the 
 option of appointing a Board of Trustees. The responsibilities 
 of a board member are often legally defined and committed, 
 unlike those for steering committee members. As such, 
 trusts can offer stronger management, advisory and 
 oversight commitments than projects. 
l If trusts can attract the right calibre of board member, the 
 benefits can be immediate and lasting. Board members 
 can help  programmes to establish networks, credibility 
 and profile quickly and visibly. They can offer opportunities 
 for government partners to take a real and committed 
 interest in M4P programmes.  
l Finally, trusts can offer longer-term career opportunities for 
 national staff. This assumes that the trust manages to 
 generate longer-term funding streams, but staff will be 
 working for a local organisation and not under contract to 
 an off-shore project management company. This can help 
 attract staff candidates from outside the typical pool of 
 labour from which donor-funded projects usually draw.
Government
In principle, it is feasible and even desirable for certain aspects of 
facilitation to be financed, owned and housed within government. 
Facilitation is a non-commercial activity and it therefore requires 
public funding of some kind. Whilst the facilitation focus will 
change and adapt, such is the scale of the challenge in many 
lower income countries that the facilitation function itself (ie 
specialist facilitation expertise and skills that might be applied to 
a range of challenges) may be required for many years. Getting 
government on board is therefore important – notwithstanding 
that government will often be a major focus for change itself! 
In practice, it is not always easy for a market development 
facilitator to be located close to or within government and still 
perform effectively. To do so, a number of conditions need to 
be met:
l Facilitators need to maintain the independence of their 
 analysis, their dynamic, flexible and entrepreneurial operating 
 culture, and their relationships with key non-government 
 players in markets.
l Facilitators need to access and lever key contacts and 
 relationships across government, afforded by a proximity to 
 government.
There are examples of (semi-)autonomous agencies of 
government that are tasked with private sector engagement 
and development functions (eg investment promotion agencies, 
export development agencies, competitiveness commissions). 
However, facilitating market change goes beyond each of these 
narrowly defined functions.  As such, it might be desirable and 
possible for facilitators to be close to or within government, but 
in practice this is often difficult to achieve without compromising 
the independence of the facilitator.
programme steering
In addition to programme structure, the way the strategic 
direction of the programme is steered can be crucial to 
establishing an M4P programme’s credibility in a local context. An 
important distinction needs to be made between single-sector 
and multi-sector programmes in this regard. Because change 
is an unpredictable process, the ability to set and, periodically, 
adjust the strategic direction of the programme to respond to 
changes in market conditions is essential for success. In the case 
of single-sector programmes, committed stakeholders serving 
on the governing body are well placed to track and respond 
to such changes. They may also fulfil the useful roles of acting 
as champions and facilitators of pro-poor change and provide 
the programme with the legitimacy and credibility needed to 
be successful.
Where programmes address multiple markets, it is more 
difficult to find informed, legitimate and credible stakeholders 
across the markets to be addressed. The boards of multiple 
market programmes should be made up of people who are 
champions of a market-based approach to development 
but their role could be limited to setting guiding principles 
and the exercise of fiduciary oversight. Strategic leadership 
over individual market interventions may be left to informed, 
committed and credible stakeholders within each market. 
In some instances champions of a market-based approach 
may be few and hard pressed to devote the time needed to 
provide effective leadership. In such cases, funders may have 
no alternative but to provide strategic leadership themselves. 
They will need to fulfil the role of multi-sector programme 
boards, involving stakeholders in providing leadership in 
individual market interventions.
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Some programmes have established advisory committees of 
key stakeholders to steer the programme. The efficacy of such 
committees has been mixed.
The advantages of these committees are:
l They are popular with funders as they are associated with 
 local ownership.
l They usually comprise prominent and well-connected 
 members, giving the programme credibility and entry points.
l They can help funders develop good local networks.
l Their multi-stakeholder make-up can provide the programme 
 with balance, eg avoid over-reliance on just government. 
 
However advisory committees have disadvantages, too:
l Prominent members are usually busy people and cannot devote 
 sufficient time and effort to the steering role; membership may 
 simply become a matter of prestige rather than value- 
 addition.
l Powerful members can exert pressure on the programme to 
 support their ‘pet’ projects.
l Members, by their very prominence, may actually be quite 
 distant from the types of market in which many M4P 
 programmes operate and therefore might not be the market 
 players that the programme actually needs.
An alternative or supplement to a single programme 
advisory committee is an informal sounding board 
of market players which can guide a programme’s 
interventions in individual markets in which the 
programme is active, rather than a highly formalised 
structure.
Programmes are sometimes anchored in government 
with a view to giving government ownership over 
the programme. However in practice government 
is given no fiduciary power or steering role. This 
lack of clarity about what ownership actually means 
can raise false expectations and adversely affect a 
programme’s licence to operate.
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5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
successful applications of M4p require broad consistency 
with the principles, frameworks and overall process outlined 
in preceding sections. ultimately, as in any programme 
situation, what matters is what people and organisations do 
in carrying out the specific activities required at each stage 
of implementation to bring about specific change; in turning 
an approach into reality. in some cases this is concerned with 
adjusting standard tools and methods; more commonly it is 
about applying M4p thinking to analysis and actions.
This section presents a range of operational good practices 
which organisations have used, are using or which are likely to 
be of use in the future. These good practices relate to: 
l The ‘codified’ experience of programmes – organisations’ 
 activities condensed into a recognisable form.
l Organisations’ experience in adapting and using standard 
 tools.10 
for each good practice, the notes summarise what the good 
practice is and why it is important, how it is used, the factors 
that are important for successful use and signposts to more 
information. 
This is not an exhaustive list – nor does it deal with the many 
generic management practices that are as applicable to M4p 
as to any other programme. The notes here focus on the most 
important and M4P-specific experiences and present these in 
a summary format.
10 Tools are discussed generically rather than with respect to branded versions – although these are cited where appropriate.
5.1 Vision building
5.2 Implementing demand-side surveys
 
5.3 Access frontier
 
5.4 Log frame
 
5.5 Developing the offer
 
5.6 Developing BMOs
 
5.7 Making a deal with lead firms
 
5.8 Promoting value chain development
 
5.9 Understanding incentives
5.10 Giving grants to business
 
5.11 Guiding participation processes
 
5.12 Livelihoods analysis
 
5.13 Knowledge management system 
 
5.14 Intervention impact logics
 
5.15 Interconnected markets
 
5.16 Stimulating demand
 
5.17 Anatomy of a transaction
 
5.18 Rapid market assessment
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5.1 Vision building
What and why? 
How to develop ‘pictures’ of how market systems should/
could work in the future, to provide the basis for planning and 
intervention design.
Without a vision of how market systems should work in the 
future – broadly, of who should carry out and who should pay 
for different market functions – interventions can lack direction 
and ambition. Many do lack this vision and are unclear of how 
to work with partners to develop it.
how does it work? 
In practice, vision building includes a spectrum of different tools. 
These vary in terms of the analytical frameworks used and, more 
important, the extent to which they emphasise (a) participatory 
processes as opposed to (b) externally driven (product) analysis. 
Vision building approaches11 differ according to where they lie in 
this process-product spectrum (Figure 24).
l Process-orientated. The emphasis is on capturing the 
 perspectives of market participants and building future visions 
 and plans around these. Workshop facilitators balance the 
 bottom-up views of market players – often focused on 
 business-specific problems – with wider analysis from their 
 own/other experiences.
l Product-orientated. Primarily using desk-based analysis 
 and discussions with key informants, the emphasis here is on 
 developing a tight ‘product’ of a detailed view of the future or 
 several different future scenarios.
key factors for successful use
Process orientation
These tend to revolve around workshops with key market 
participants and require:
l Appropriate participants. Representative but ensuring that 
 existing and potential leaders and change agents are present. 
l Communication with participants. Prior communication to 
 participants establishes the key objectives of (a) the workshop 
 and (b) the wider process of intervention of which it is a part. 
l Competent and informed moderator. Skilled in, at minimum, 
 the process of workshop facilitation and – depending on the 
 objectives of the process – knowledgeable on content.
l Informed by initial analysis.  How much prior analysis is necessary 
 also depends on the objectives of the process. More emphasis 
 on gaining a consensus for immediate actions requires less 
 attention to analysis. For instance, one well-known approach – 
 PACA – envisages a process of analysis and fieldwork including 
 a series of workshops taking only two weeks. Another – 
 SHAPE, a process aimed at developing sector strategies – takes 
 4-5 months.
Product orientation
These tend to be based on desk-based analysis and discussions 
with key informants and require:
l Correct identification of the strategic factors impinging upon 
 market system performance. This might include trends related 
 to competition, technology, market opportunities, consumer 
 tastes, regulations and standards, environmental pressures an 
 governance issues.
11 In practice, building a vision of a market system in the future and analysing current market conditions are closely linked.
figure 24
The continuum of approaches to vision building and market analysis
prOcess OrienTaTiOn
Participative process to build ownership
Eliciting shared commitment among 
stakeholders
Bottom-up; operational
Symptoms; organisation-level
Quick
Superficial analysis that provides 
no sound basis for intervention (‘wish-lists’)
Loss of the bigger strategic picture
prOducT OrienTaTiOn
Tight, rigorous analysis
Introducing new knowledge, perspectives 
and insights
Top-down; strategic
Causes; system-level
Slow
Abstract and distant; divorce between 
analysis and action
Miss out on vital knowledge source
Main focus of vision-building
Key emphasis:
Facilitators add value by:
Overall orientation:
Depth of analysis:
Speed of process from discuss to actions :
Risks:
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l Projection of the impact of likely future trends on market 
 system performance – establishing a ‘no intervention’ scenario 
 of the future.
l Projections of the future if key systemic constraints are 
 addressed – establishing a ‘with intervention’ view on the basis 
 of actions to enhance market performance.
At their most developed, these analyses can result in the 
development of different scenarios under different sets of 
assumptions. These can then form the basis for dialogue with 
stakeholders on future directions and the implications of these 
for immediate decision-making (as has been done successfully in 
the South African financial sector, for example). 
Achieving an appropriate process-product balance 
Good practice in vision building requires both rigorous analysis 
and a process that engages with market players. 
l An analysis that is not sufficiently deep means that facilitators 
 cannot bring overview, insight or guidance to their interventions 
 – and they can become dangerously dependent on the instincts 
 of market players only.
l A process that is not sufficiently participative misses out a vital 
 source of ideas (market players) and prevents facilitators from 
 making the link from analysis to actions; the point of analysis is 
 to do something with it.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l FinMark (2003); Vision 2010 scenarios of the South African financial sector; FinMark, South Africa
l Mesopartner (2006); How to introduce PACA; a guide for donor organisations in international development cooperation; 
 www.paca-online.de
l Illbury, C & Sunter, C (2001); The mind of a fox: scenario planning in action; Human & Rousseau, Cape Town
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5.2 implementing demand-side surveys
What and why? 
How to design, implement and disseminate the findings from 
demand-side surveys of consumers – actual and/or potential. 
These are used primarily to throw light on systemic constraints, 
establishing an information base with which to influence 
stakeholders and provide initial guidance on intervention 
processes. However, in practice the quality of these surveys and 
the reliability of data and findings emerging from them has been 
mixed and their usefulness limited.
how does it work? 
There are three broad stages:
l Agreeing on overall objectives. In particular, whether this 
 (a) will be a public document (product) or be used only by 
 a facilitator and (b) is seen as a one-off activity or might be 
 repeated in future as a function internalised within the 
 market.
l Implementation steps. The main ‘how to’ list of tasks to 
 be undertaken from initial scoping through sampling and 
 questionnaire design to data processing and analysis.
l Dissemination. Taking the raw information and turning it into 
 useful products that can feed into interventions.
key factors for successful use
Agreeing on overall objectives
If the aim is to develop a product that will be in the public 
domain, relatively more attention needs to be paid to the 
product’s final design and utility, and to ensuring a process that 
is rigorous and involves potential users. 
If the facilitator wishes to ‘keep the door open’ to internalising 
within the market, this will require a process that confers more 
ownership on potential ‘owners’ of a final product (eg research 
companies) by:
l Involving them in tasks and decision-making from the outset.
l Requiring part-payment either by sponsors or final users.
Implementation steps
Assuming that the aim is to produce a public document, there 
are a number of relatively standard factors to be considered 12:
l Scope the opportunity and obtain the buy-in. Activities might 
 include desk research, interviews with stakeholders and market 
 assessment workshops.
l Develop key relationships. Establish a formal (or informal) 
 advisory committee comprising individuals and organisations 
 who have relevant technical knowledge of the subject area or
  
 the process of doing surveys and can (a) act as a sounding 
 board throughout the process and (b) influence other 
 stakeholders on the potential value of the final product. 
 Typically this might include government, regulators, commercial 
 firms, statistics bureaux and researchers.
l Establish key budget headings. These are likely to include:
  - Administration costs: including logistics, travel, paperwork, 
   premises, equipment hire etc.
  - Survey-specific costs: including cost of a research company 
   (interviewers, data inputting, questionnaires, etc), project 
   management and fees for the central statistics office.
  - Promotion of final product: publication, launch, marketing 
   etc (see ‘Dissemination’ below).
l Create structures and procedures to ensure quality control. 
 These relate to questionnaire design, sampling procedures, 
 fieldwork supervision, communication between researchers 
 and managers and data capture and management.
l Contract a research organisation. These should have 
 appropriate experience in managing similar surveys and strong 
 networks with the central statistics bureau.
l Develop sampling structure and design. A range of technical 
 issues need to be agreed on including the rules for sampling, 
 how to weight data, appropriate precision levels, etc.
l Design the questionnaire. Use focus groups initially to develop 
 questions and pilot the draft questionnaire before finalising.
l Prepare and undertake fieldwork. Train interviewers and 
 establish survey administration procedures relating to, 
 for example, survey objectives, sampling methodologies, 
 understanding of each question, roles and responsibilities, 
 procedures for dealing with errors, etc.
l Process data. In particular, procedures for ensuring good quality 
 of data input such as the percentage of ‘back checks’ to be 
 done on each interviewer’s work.
l Analyse data. This should be focused on the main analytical 
 outputs that have been planned from the outset – for example, 
 the proportion of different target groups that use, are aware 
 of and understand particular products.
Dissemination
This is often considered almost an afterthought and consequently 
the potential of surveys to spark changed attitudes and behaviour 
is seldom fulfilled. In advance of survey completion, facilitators 
need to consider:
l The launch process. Including events, contacts with the media 
 and with key networks.
l Publications. Not just the main output but also ‘derivative’ 
 products – summaries, niche analyses etc. Accessible 
 presentation is especially important for survey data.
l Organisation-specific presentations and discussions. Taking 
 findings to particular audiences and highlighting their potential 
 relevance. Passively hoping that stakeholders understand and 
 act on survey findings is, at least initially, optimistic.
12 Taken from the FinScope Technical Manual.
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If facilitators envisage that the survey product should be 
internalised within the market system as, essentially, a commercial 
product, then part (or full) pricing is required. This might be 
done, for example, as a syndicated service with buyers investing 
upfront to shape the survey content and others buying the 
survey report(s) after completion. 
If this is seen primarily as a one-off activity, a decision must 
be made about pricing. Surveys are a ‘hard sell’, especially in 
low-income economies. However, if users pay nothing, it may 
be more difficult to ensure that they see value in and take 
ownership over the survey results.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l FinMark (2007); FinScope Technical Manual, FinScope, South Africa
l Miehlbradt, A (2001); Guide to market assessment for BDS program design; ILO, Geneva
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5.3 access frontier
What and why? 
How to use this analysis tool for understanding how markets work 
over time and their potential to serve poor people as consumers. 
Based on the idea that market growth takes place through a 
number of stages – in relation to structure, performance and size 
– the access frontier establishes the current limits of the market 
(the access frontier) and the potential to reach more underserved 
people. In doing so it provides guidance to facilitators on actions to 
push the frontier outwards. The access frontier can be used at any 
point in an intervention process but is most useful at the start.
Improving access is a central objective in M4P, yet – especially for 
consumer markets – there have been few attempts to analyse the 
process of extending access in detail; the access frontier potentially 
fills this gap.
how does it work? 
The level of development of the market for any product can 
be tracked in relation to usage as a percentage of the eligible 
population against time (Figure 25) with different categories of 
user/non-user identified, those who:
l Use it now.
l Could have it but don’t want it or, for other reasons, who have 
 not yet used it – these lie within the access frontier.
l Are within reach of the market in the foreseeable future based 
 on expected changes in product or market features in a 3-5 
 year period.
l Are beyond the reach of the market: the ‘supra-market’ group 
 who are currently outside the reach of market solutions.
In order to define a market’s current access frontier five steps 
need to be followed:
figure 25
access frontier
Step 1
Define the market. Specify the market in functional (rather than 
product-specific) terms and the user ‘unit’ (eg individual or 
household).
Step 2
Determine current usage levels and trends. The level of usage (as 
percentage of eligible consumers) currently and over recent 
years.
Step 3
Segment non-usage to assess the current access frontier and 
natural limit. Non-users typically fall into two main categories: 
those choosing not to use the product and those who don’t 
know about it.
Step 4
Assess positions of the future access frontier in the medium term. 
Estimate how foreseeable changes will affect the access frontier, 
including both demand- (eg consumer tastes) and supply-sides 
(eg technology and competition).
Step 5
Identify those in the supra-market group. Those, who, for ‘non-
choice reasons’ (chiefly low incomes) do not have access.
The current and projected position of a market shape the 
nature of interventions required (Figure 26). More immediate 
measures to bring in those on the fringes of the market (in 
the market enablement and development zones) might include 
competition and regulatory policies. For those in the supra-
market zone, where the most severe market development 
challenge lies, additional interventions may be required.
13 Adapted from Porteous (2005).
figure 26
Market policy zones13
%
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Beyond the reach of the market currently
Market can reach future
Market can reach now
Have now
100%
Don’t want it
Market enablement 
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Facilitation 
interventions 
seek to expand 
access frontier
Supra-market
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TIME TIME
Market development 
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100%
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key factors for successful use 
Acquiring proper data. The best use of the access frontier 
requires significant data. Some of this can be derived from 
national census statistics and some from commercial providers. 
Accurate data on reasons for non-usage requires detailed 
surveys but, in the absence of this, estimates can be made based 
on industry discussions and projections.
If accurate quantitative data are not available the tool still has 
value in providing a useful framework to allow facilitators to 
understand the state of the market and to shape their strategy 
for achieving market development. In practice, the access frontier 
may be used widely for this informal role.
The tool has been used principally in relation to different 
strands of financial and insurance services development 
(including transaction banking, insurance and housing finance), 
most notably by FinMark in Southern Africa. However, it can 
be used in any market where extending access to poor people 
as consumers is a policy priority, including those markets which 
might have some merit good characteristics such as mobile 
phones, water and health care.
In principle, use of the access frontier might be extended to 
markets where the poor participate as producers – for example, 
extending the opportunity to sell to specific markets (although 
this has not yet happened in practice).
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l Porteous, D (2005); The access frontier as an approach and tool in making markets work for the poor; DFID, London
l Meltzer, I (2006); Exploring access to insurance in South Africa using the access frontier; available via www.finmarktrust.org.za
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5.4 log frame (or logical/project framework)
What and why? 
How to use this generic planning and management tool, used 
widely among development agencies, to design and implement 
projects (facilitators) and to allow oversight and accountability 
(funders). 
Based (usually) on a matrix of four columns and four rows (16 
boxes)14, the log frame is a systematic way of organising and 
presenting information related to a project design. The ‘logical’ 
dimension is derived from the relationship between each of 
the boxes in the matrix, especially the flow of cause and effect 
which joins each of them.
Although log frames are widely used, the potential of the log 
frame to offer useful strategic management guidance and to act 
as the basis for accountability is seldom realised.
how does it work? 
The log frame links three elements found in any project situation 
(right-hand table in Figure 27):
l The project itself: its resources, what it does and what it achieves 
 directly.
l The impact that the project is seeking to have on the real 
 world.
l The wider environment: factors outside the project’s control that 
 impinge directly on it.
In using the log frame, there are three main steps:
l Going from impact to actions. Plan down column 1, develop the 
 initial hierarchy of objectives.
l Take account of the wider environment. Think up column 4, 
 identify the assumptions being made in the flow of objectives and, 
 if necessary, change these to make them more realistic.
l Focus on the M&E core. The essential planning platform for 
 thinking about indicators (column 2) and measurement 
 methods (column 3).
key factors for successful use
The rules that apply to using log frames generally apply to 
M4P as well. These relate to, for example, having one goal and 
one purpose only, the importance of process, and keeping 
assumptions focused on external factors beyond projects’ 
control.
However, there are two specific factors to bear in mind in 
developing log frames related to M4P: (a) ensuring consistency 
with M4P’s strategic framework and (b) balancing accountability 
and flexibility. Both of these procedures expose the limitations 
(and origins) of log frames – namely, the log frame ideal of a 
relatively fixed and predictable project (such as a construction 
project) where most internal and external factors are known. 
This is not the complex and dynamic world of market systems 
that M4P is seeking to influence and the use of log frames needs 
to be adapted to reflect this reality.
Consistency with M4P strategic framework
Column 1 of the log frame should conform with the underpinning 
logic of market development – system change resulting in 
growth and/or access benefits in turn causing a reduction in 
poverty (Figure 28). In writing objectives, there are a number of 
practical considerations:
l Focus on the problem and not the solution at the goal and purpose 
 level. Don’t add a ‘by’ or ‘through’ to the objectives statement 
 (eg “to increase incomes through improved market access”). 
 The solution is provided by the next ‘lower’ objective.
l Keep impacts at purpose level and above. Outputs are what a 
 project delivers – beyond that are ‘real world’ changes caused 
 
14 An extra supergoal level is often added to create another, final, level of impact.
figure 27
The log frame – a 16-box matrix covering three elements in a project situation
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 by these outputs. A common mistake is for outputs to focus 
 on the first level of impacts. While technically this is wrong, 
 in practice, as long as the overall flow of log frame logic is 
 consistent with the strategic framework, it is an error that 
 can be accommodated. Overall logical flow matters more than 
 precise labelling.
l Dealing with the ‘not enough boxes’ problem. Three levels of real 
 world change (system – growth/access – poverty) need to 
 fit in to the log frame. To do this, either insert a supergoal 
 level or merge the growth/access and poverty objectives at 
 goal level. This might be done by a formulation such as “To 
 improve the pro-poor performance of the financial services 
 sector” (ie combining growth/access and poverty objectives) 
 and by ensuring that indicator choice reflects this broader 
 objective (see Good Practice Note 5.14: Intervention 
 impact logics).
Balancing accountability and flexibility
Facilitators are accountable for their performance and this 
requires assessment against targets. However, one of the 
central tenets of M4P is that interventions are driven by an 
understanding of market system constraints and need to be 
designed and implemented iteratively to reflect learning and 
changing conditions. This key tension – between accountability 
and flexibility – is seen clearly in how projects design and use 
their log frames and, in particular, how they use column 2: 
indicators. A number of factors emerge from experience (see 
Figure 29):
l Be specific ‘enough for now’. The level of detail possible in a 
 log frame is determined by how much is known, what data 
 are available on the prevailing situation and the degree to which 
 specific intervention tasks have been fixed. So, for example, at 
 the outset it might be possible to use information from other 
 published and industry sources to estimate the overall scale 
 of performance improvement required – but only to describe 
 in more general terms the nature of market system changes 
 needed, not the specific detail of interventions. 
 By being ‘specific enough for now’, designers and funders 
 therefore are committing themselves to final ends without 
 knowing in precise detail the means to those ends. This 
 (unsatisfactory but unavoidable) reality needs to be recognised. 
 Attempts at fixing too much at purpose and outputs level 
 inevitably results in a tacit game of collective make-believe 
 and self-delusion where significant detail is specified without 
 justification or credibility.
l Learn and revise. Log frames are not intended to be fixed 
 throughout an intervention period. They should be adapted 
 to reflect new information, circumstances and results from 
 pilot interventions. Rolling workplans – for example, annual 
 or six-monthly – that allow more detail to be developed on 
 what a project will do and achieve directly are desirable. What 
 should be fixed in a log frame is essentially column 1; indicators 
 in column 2 should be the subject of regular review, especially 
 those related to the critical purpose level. Changes in a log 
 frame should of course be the subject of discussion between 
 different parties.
l Accountability through performance against purpose (and 
 goal) targets. The traditional view of facilitator accountability 
 – compliance with output deliverables – is less relevant in a 
 context where deliverables cannot be fixed in detail in 
 advance. As a project proceeds, more output detail becomes 
 possible and this becomes the basis of accountability. However, 
 the overall principle remains: M4P accountability is not primarily 
 about ‘hitting’ output targets.
l Intermediate indicators. Indicators need to reflect the nature 
 and chronology of change in market systems. For example, in 
 introducing a new service, a project might first be interested 
 in consumers’ and providers’ awareness and understanding of 
 this but, over time, take-up and usage become more important. 
 These changed indicators should be captured in new workplans 
 (and log frames).
l Balanced indicators. Indicators need to ensure that balanced 
 and significant market change is achieved. In practice this 
 means that they need to reflect key dimensions of market 
 development outreach (how many?), impact (how effective?) 
 and sustainability (will it last?). For sustainability, which is often 
 neglected, this means considering incentives, behaviour and 
 services that support further development and the extent 
 to which market activity continues independently of project 
 support.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
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figure 28
fitting the M4p strategic framework to the log frame
poverty reduction
improved 
access and growth
Market system change
systemic
intervention
M4p strategic 
framework
log frame 
level (column 1)
log frame considerations
The top level (goal or supergoal) relating to poverty 
reduction or other socio-economic welfare improvement for 
a particular target group. This might typically be expressed in 
terms of changes in: 
l Income or assets which are proxies for income (eg new  
 roof).
l Non-income dimensions of poverty such as health or  
 vulnerability. There may still be an economic dimension  
 here (eg productive health – working days lost to sickness).
Typically, the goal level focuses on increased opportunities 
and capacities for poor people arising from improved 
growth and access. This relates to:
l Stepping up (eg increased productivity, market share or  
 more appropriate goods and services).
l Stepping out (eg access or entry to new markets, new  
 employment, new goods and services).
l Hanging in (ie reducing vulnerability or instability). 
The key focus on systemic change should be reflected at the 
purpose level. Following the market system framework (core, 
rules and supporting functions), change is manifested in:
l Improved delivery of core function (eg increase in  
 participation rates or levels of satisfaction etc).
l Changes in practices, roles and performance of important  
 system players and functions.
l Crowding-in of system players and functions.
l Demonstrated dynamism of system players and functions  
 (eg responsiveness to changed conditions in the system).
The output level should focus on the main areas of intervention 
to change different dimensions of the system(s) in question. 
This is about tasks delivered rather than impacts achieved and 
typically will include interventions to: 
l Alter the attitudes and perceptions of key players.
l Strengthen capacity and practices.
l Change the alignment or roles of players. 
l Encourage linkages between players.
supergoal
or
Goal
purpose
Outputs and activities
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figure 29
stylised summary M4p log frame for value chain project where the key constraint is related to services
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l Gibson, A (2001); Developing indicators in small enterprise development projects. A tool for people involved in designing, implementing and 
 evaluating SED projects; SED Working Paper No 1, SDC, Berne
l GTZ (2004); Results-based monitoring. Guidelines for technical cooperation projects and programmes; Corporate Development Unit, GTZ, 
 Eschborne, Germany
Goal
purpose
Outputs
summary indicators how measured assumptions
To increase pro-
poor business 
competitiveness in 
three value chains
Against initial benchmarks, by 
the end of the project period, 
average and small-scale producer 
performance improves by xx % in 
relation to: 
l Output 
l Productivity 
l Employment 
To improve the 
performance of 
the market system 
impinging on three 
value chains
In each value chain, by the end of 
the project period:
Among SMEs
l Higher awareness of services
l Greater use of and satisfaction  
 with specified services
Among providers
l Increase in no. of providers
l Greater independent service  
 innovation
l Greater use of supporting 
 services/information
Market facilitation 
process designed 
and implemented
l Initial demand- and supply-side  
 research undertaken
l Key constraints identified and  
 analysed
l Workshop held with key  
 stakeholders 
l Intervention strategy designed
l Interventions implemented –  
 eg new ideas introduced with  
 selected partners, social  
 marketing campaigns undertaken
activities Not usually specified 
initially
Wider technology 
and consumer trends 
do not shift the 
prospects for and 
incentives within the 
market significantly
The poor’s interaction 
with the market 
remains primarily 
as producers and 
employees
Government strategy 
does not change 
markedly
Donor engagement 
remains generally 
non-distortional
change infrequently
change regularly as 
more knowledge on 
nature of constraints 
emerges
change regularly 
to reflect emerging 
workplans
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5.5 developing the offer
What and why? 
How to develop the service or activity that a facilitator ‘offers’ 
to its partners in exchange for a defined change in behaviour 
or actions.15
Interventions usually have to be with someone – a partner 
– in a market system. The offer represents the essence of a 
facilitating organisation – what it is and what it does in relation 
to these partners.
 
Although central to how businesses – and business-like 
organisations – must behave, for many agencies that are more 
accustomed to doing things themselves rather than with others, 
developing their offer is a discipline and process that does not 
emerge easily.
how does it work? 
Four key questions need to be addressed in developing an 
offer.
l Who is our offer aimed at? The types of individuals or 
 organisations, their location and context.
l Why should someone want our support? The direct benefits 
 that they could expect to derive from working with ‘us’. 
l What could they expect to get? The specific service or activity 
 that is undertaken.
l What do we expect in return? The price charged or other 
 form of quid pro quo.
In answering these questions, facilitators should apply both 
operational and strategic criteria (Figure 30).
key factors for successful use
Is it consistent with the main operational criteria? 
Successful offers meet three main criteria:
l Clarity. Both facilitators and partners should be clear about what 
 each will get from a relationship and how this will contribute to 
 their goals. In the absence of clarity, partners will give their own 
 meaning to the offer, guided by their own and wider impressions 
 of what ‘development agencies commonly do’ (for some, 
 giving handouts). This can be the source of misunderstanding 
 and eventual failure.
l Specificity. Unlike a ‘simple’ commercial transaction, exchanges 
 here are likely to involve different activities and commitments 
 as well as finance. Offers therefore need to go beyond general 
 descriptions to provide sufficient detail for each party to know 
 what they will get, what they will give and why and how this is 
 different from other relationships.
l Credibility. Partners need to have the necessary skills and 
 knowledge to deliver the offer and – as important – be seen 
 to have this capacity by potential partners so that they have 
 confidence that they will deliver.
Is it consistent with the main strategic criteria?
Successful offers promote wider crowding-in of other market 
development beyond the immediate partner. In practice this 
means that they should:
l Be clear over whether this is ‘one-off ’ temporary activity or 
 required in the market in the future.
l Be with the right market player in relation to their capacity and 
 incentives.
l Have an appropriate relationship with a partner which also 
 allows others to crowd-in (ie, is not exclusive)
l Be of the right intensity and scale to develop rather than 
 distort the market.
figure 30
developing an offer
15 ‘Offer’ is a term used commonly in commercial situations; its use here emphasises the need for facilitators to be ‘business-like’ in their activities and in their orientation to partners.
Operational criteria
l Clear?
l Specific?
l Credible?
strategic criteria
Does it encourage crowding-in?
l Who?
l Where?
l Relationship?
l Intensity?
The offer
Who - aimed at?
Why - they want it?
What - they get?
What - we get?
… and the main 
considerations in thinking 
about these questions
The key questions…
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In practice, there are a number of more detailed ‘do and don’t’ 
rules in developing a successful offer (Figure 31).
figure 31
do and don’t rules in developing an offer
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
dO
Be business-like – facilitators are not necessarily profit-
making businesses but do need to approach the 
transaction contained in the offer in a business-like manner.
Strike a balance between (a) the direct (private) 
perspective of a partner and (b) the wider goals of 
bringing in others in the market system.
Be specific about ownership questions – where innovation 
is supported, ensure that the ownership does not lie 
exclusively with the partner.
Use partner’s context to shape the offer – don’t seek 
to impose an external agenda but begin with partner’s 
objectives and build influence and the offer from that 
starting point.
Strike a balance between (a) the expressed needs of the 
partner (what they say they need) and (b) their objective 
needs (what they actually need – but don’t know it yet!). 
dOn’T
Confuse an offer with a mission statement – it has to be 
tighter and more focused than the loose sentiments and 
wording associated with mission statements.
Always insist that it is written down – this might be 
required (for example with a lead firm) but presenting an 
offer is often as much about a facilitator’s orientation as 
about written agreements.
Focus too much on the financial element – this may 
often be required as a sweetener but is seldom critical to 
success.
Overly define initially – leave sufficient ‘space’ to allow 
tailoring for specific partner context.
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5.6 developing business membership organisations (BMOs)
What and why? 
‘How to’ rules on understanding and working effectively with 
BMOs to enhance their role within market systems. 
This note builds on two facts. First, as organisations of and 
representing business, with an apparently natural market 
development objective and (at their best) bringing business skills 
to the wider market development task, BMOs would seem to 
be an obvious ally for M4P. Second, experience over many years 
in working with BMOs has been mixed and appropriate lessons 
must be drawn from this experience.
how does it work? 
Working with BMOs requires two broad steps:
l Understand the potential roles a BMO could play in a market 
 system. This involves assessing the current position of the 
 market and the constraints impinging on it.
l Follow key principles emerging from on-the-ground 
 experience.
key factors for successful use
Understand potential BMO roles 
From an M4P perspective, BMOs’ value lies in how they can serve 
market development (not the other way around). Therefore: 
l Identify the key constraints in the market system. Any 
 engagement with a BMO must be based on a detailed 
 knowledge of a market – not a superficial sketch.
l Identify potential areas where BMOs may be able to play a 
 role. Although there is no blueprint, typically BMO roles are 
 related to their core competence in (Figure 32):
  - Advocacy - representing members and communicating with 
   stakeholders.
  - Information - on trends, linkages, new ideas and 
   opportunities.
Other roles might also be played depending on capacity and 
context, such as: 
l Coordination: a strategic role requiring oversight and linkage 
 of key players. 
l Standards setting and enforcement (eg industry codes of 
 conduct). 
l New technology/product development: sponsoring new ideas 
 in practice.
l Delegated government functions (eg export certification).
A key consideration is to allow BMOs to play appropriate roles 
– to encourage their development but not to lure them into 
inappropriate roles beyond their competence.
figure 32
potential roles for BMOs in markets
Government
functions
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Follow the rules of engagement with BMOs
l Ensure that the BMO represents a genuine shared interest. Is the 
 BMO concerned with bringing more people into the market or 
 has it been captured and is protecting narrow vested 
 interests? 
l Check that the balance between private and public interest 
 is acceptable. Understanding incentives is critical to BMO 
 development. BMO leadership is usually driven by both self- 
 interest and wider (public) goals – a workable overlap between 
 these two goals is the basis for development. 
l Build around key people. As with small businesses, the potential 
 of BMOs is often shaped by the competence and motivations 
 of key leaders. Conversely, if leadership is weak, there may be 
 little basis for collaboration.
l Use workshops to influence the BMO vision. Collective vision 
 building workshops are useful in providing an open and 
 transparent platform to explore the BMO’s view of the market 
 development challenges ahead and the BMO’s role within 
 this.
l Find an initial focus. Build support around a logical area where 
 collective action (rather than by individual firms) is the only 
 feasible approach.
l Allow the facilitator offer to emerge. Rather than approaching 
 BMOs with a fixed offering, let this emerge in a context of a 
 process of assessing the strategic challenges in a market and 
 the potential role of the BMO within this.
l Balance ambition with pragmatism. While the wider experience 
 has been for external support to extend BMOs beyond their 
 realistic limits (with failure the result), given the right people, 
 incentives and encouragement, BMOs’ role can be more 
 strategic and influential.
l Engage over a period of time. Rather than investing significant 
 amounts of support, intervene in small, iterative ways so that 
 the level and nature of intervention is appropriate to the level 
 of BMO development. Let intervention support grow with the 
 organisation.
l A ‘tough’ line in intervention negotiation. The facilitator’s stance 
 shapes the incentives framework for the BMO. Make support 
 conditional, don’t give too much and focus on technical (non- 
 cash) inputs. Establish interventions’ value-added as knowledge 
 and skill based – not finance.
l Accept a degree of financial opaqueness. Changing BMOs into 
 models of financial probity is often an impractical aim, requiring 
 a degree of external support that would change their nature 
 (and increase their overheads). Small, specific interventions 
 may increase transaction costs but have a better chance of 
 maintaining the integrity of the relationship.
l Cost-share to increase BMO ownership. Although there is no 
 formula, more of the cost burden should be met by the BMO 
 over time.
l Remember that BMOs are not always necessary! BMOs are a 
 means to an end; their value extends only as far as the roles 
 that they can play. Don’t set out to work with them as a matter 
 of principle; only do so if they have the potential to be useful.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
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5.7 Making a deal with lead firms
What and why? 
How to develop a successful ‘deal’ with lead firms so that both 
developmental (M4P) and commercial (lead firm) objectives 
are met.
Lead firm interventions tap into the resources and incentives 
of established businesses and support them to change their 
‘business model’ in a direction which encourages wider 
systemic change and pro-poor benefits. At the heart of these 
interventions is a mutually beneficial deal between a lead firm 
and a facilitator.
Agencies increasingly see the potential benefits of engaging 
with lead firms. However, they are less clear on how to interact 
with lead firms productively – going beyond merely subsidising 
private operations.
how does it work? 
There are three broad steps in a lead firm-based intervention:
l Identify and approach potential lead firms within a market 
 system.
l Develop a pilot project with one (or a small number) of these 
 that has the potential to bring both private (lead firm) and 
 public (market system) gains.
l Build on these initial activities to crowd-in other market players 
 and stimulate wider, more sustainable change. 
This practice note deals with the first two points above – making 
a deal with lead firms (see Section 3D of this Guide for detailed 
information on crowding-in).
key factors for successful use
Balancing public and private benefits 
Change and innovation in process or product is introduced 
by an intervention with a lead firm partner, which results in 
commercial benefits for the lead firm, but more importantly, lays 
the basis for wider systemic change among other market players 
– so achieving greater and more sustainable impact through the 
market system. 
Interventions that result only in commercial gains for the lead 
firm are giving a private, anti-competitive ‘captured’ subsidy 
that, in the longer term, does not achieve pro-poor market 
system change. Balancing public and private benefits is central 
to successful intervention (Figure 33).
Ensuring facilitator capacity and practice
To engage effectively with lead firms facilitators must: 
l Have sufficient knowledge and confidence to engage credibly 
 with firms. Initial market assessment needs to be sufficiently 
figure 33
Shared goals in leads firm agreements
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 detailed to give facilitators a good understanding of the key 
 competitiveness issues – trends, threats, impending challenges, 
 etc – that will shape the future performance of the sector as a 
 whole. 
l Have developed areas of potential project ‘offer’ or an initial 
 idea of where opportunities for engagement might lie – often 
 innovations in product, service or process. Interventions based 
 around a financial offer only usually don’t work – firm 
 constraints are more likely to be about ‘how to’ rather than 
 money only. Facilitators shouldn’t have a fixed view of their 
 potential offer – but neither should they have a blank canvas 
 (see Good Practice Note 5.5: Developing the offer).
l Identify appropriate potential partners. Market assessment 
 should highlight the identities of key firms and, ideally, they will 
 already have been contacted as part of the process.  A lead firm 
 is one that has the potential to influence a market as whole on 
 the basis of its size, innovativeness or reputation (ie there’s no 
 point in dealing with the ‘small, dull and dubious’). 
l Approach potential partners in an appropriate manner. 
 Approaches should generally be personalised rather than 
 through a remote procedure (such as invitations to tender). 
 Successful lead firm engagement emerges from personal 
 discussions – and the initial approach needs to be similarly 
 direct.
Structuring the right kind of deal
A successful deal between lead firm and facilitator is one which 
has a number of characteristics: 
l Is clear on the transactional process –‘who does what’. The main 
 contributions (financial and non-financial) of each party should 
 be understood clearly, usually stated in a formal agreement. 
l Is clear on the objectives –‘who gets what’.  A deal has to recognise 
 (a) the commercial incentive of firms – often concerned 
 with allowing firms a head start, (b) discernible benefits for 
 disadvantaged people and (c) the scope to catalyse wider 
 change with other players in the market system.   Any agreement 
 must therefore ‘keep the door open’ to working with others in 
 some way.
l Tests commitment and builds ownership. For a deal to work, 
 the lead firm has to have appropriate capacity and incentives. 
Focus here…
Shared
goals
facilitator
Public / 
development goals
Lead firm
Private / business
goals
…to bring change here
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 The first is a function of resources – technical, financial and 
 organisational – but the second depends on the nature of the 
 agreement that is struck. In deciding on the allocation of tasks 
 and, in particular, cost-sharing, precise ratios or figures are less 
 important than the overall aim: a lead firm partner committed 
 to the pilot project.
l Is with one firm (or several). Ideally, facilitators should work 
 with more than one partner – to reduce risk and enhance the 
 chances of more successful crowding-in. However, in 
 competitive markets and with especially innovative projects 
 working with one firm will often be the only realistic option.
l Ensures ownership in implementation. A successful 
 implementation process requires continued collaboration 
 between facilitator and lead firm. The deal itself should be 
 formally monitored but, more important, it should encourage 
 close relationship between each party.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l Gibson, A (2006); Enhancing the supply-side in the maize market; Katalyst Case Study No. 4, Dhaka, Bangladesh
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5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
5.8 promoting value chain development
What and why? 
How to adapt ‘standard’ value chain analysis (VCA) so that it 
is consistent with M4P and contributes to the development of 
more effective and sustainable value chain systems. 
Although there are different variants of VCA, it is always based 
on the analysis of the flow of value added that is created as 
raw material is transformed into final products. Most firms are 
either located in value chains or interact with them. Interest in 
value chain development has grown significantly as governments 
and agencies realise the importance of focusing on changing 
systems (rather than individual firms) to achieve significant scale 
and that, for many firms, their value chain constitutes their most 
important system.
However, despite the ‘systemic’ character of the value chain, 
many value chain-focused interventions do not achieve their 
potential, in practice stimulating only limited change. Limitations 
in VCA lie at the heart of this problem.
how does it work? 
Adapting VCA to take account of M4P requires that its 
strengths and limitations in relation to its three main stages be 
understood:
l Mapping of the value chain. This requires that the main stages 
 in value added are assessed to generate a quantified picture 
 of the different channels of the value added process including 
 number of firms, employees and margins at each stage as well 
 as supporting services, including relevant national/international 
 comparisons.
l Analysis of the key constraints. Identification of ‘gaps’ that 
 undermine the performance of the value chain and, therefore, 
 the opportunities for intervention.
l Specification of actions. Given the above analysis, recom- 
 mendations for action by governments or agencies.
key factors for successful use
Adapting VCA requires that several factors are taken into 
account.
Recognise the common ground
Many firms exist within value chains. In an increasingly 
competitive global environment, VCA is a valid and practical 
way of examining the world around firms sharing a number of 
similarities with M4P:
l VCA recognises that the development task is concerned with 
 changing systems (it has a systemic perspective).
figure 34
The value chain as a market system
R&D
Information
Standards Values
integral part of 
the market system
1  Raw materials
2  Production
3  Processing
4  Distribution
5  Retailing
1 2 3 4 5
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l VCA fits within the M4P markets system construct, with 
 the main value added process in the core and the value 
 chain environment corresponding to rules and supporting 
 functions (Figure 34). However, unlike many versions of VCA, 
 the supporting functions and rules are seen to be an integral 
 part of the market system – not a secondary consideration.16
l Recent innovations in VCA thinking have emphasised the 
 importance of power and governance in value chains, especially 
 in relation to the position of small producers. This corresponds 
 closely to M4P’s recognition of formal and informal rules and 
 power and information asymmetries in market systems and 
 the need for supporting functions (for example, advocacy and 
 regulations) that address these.
From this observation of the common ground between M4P 
and VCA, the following points are concerned with how VCA 
can be adapted – or extended – by M4P.
Extend the analysis to interconnected markets
The solutions to value chain problems often lie in interconnected 
markets. These may be factor markets – for example land 
and finance – in agriculture or, increasingly, as knowledge 
and information become more important in determining 
competitiveness, they may be services – either fee-paying 
services or informal services embedded within value chain 
relationships. Similarly, the process of regulatory reform can be 
regarded as a ‘political market’. Interconnected markets can be 
viewed through the same analytical lens as the main value chain 
to identify and address underlying causes (see Good Practice 
Note 5.15: Interconnected markets). 
Distinguish between causes and symptoms
A common weakness in VCA is the disconnect that appears 
between mapping the value chain and analysis of key constraints. 
VCA always generates maps, but these only serve a descriptive 
purpose if they do not provide the basis for an analysis of the 
systemic constraints that determine overall performance.
This emphasis on the value chain map rather than on analysis 
can lead to ‘analysis as firm wish-lists’ – a failure to distinguish 
between a firm’s problems (not the direct focus of a facilitator) 
and the root causes of these (the correct focus). Problems in the 
core of any market system – including value chains – often have 
their cause and solution in its supporting functions and rules. If 
these are under-emphasised there may always be tendency to 
focus on superficial analysis and action.
Include sustainability in the analysis
The lack of emphasis given to sustainability in VCA means 
that there can be a tendency to underplay the importance 
of establishing clear forward direction for future value chain 
development.  Value chains, as with any market system, are multi-
function, multi-player processes. Any valid view of the future has 
to consider in depth the roles of players such as the private 
sector, government and BMOs in relation to key functions. M4P 
provides a framework to allow this view of the future to be 
developed.
Provide guidance on the ‘how to’ of interventions (from analysis to 
approach)
VCA is a means of examining the world but it does not provide 
guidance on how to take action – on how to intervene – to 
address the constraints identified. Analysis is useful of course 
but, for agencies and governments, it is only a means to an end. 
VCA stops at analysis – it is an analytical tool.17 M4P provides 
analysis and guidance – frameworks, good practices, principles 
– that can allow facilitators to intervene effectively; it is an 
overarching approach.  If this is not borne in mind, there is a 
danger that facilitators will take the loose prescriptions – such as 
the need for upgrading – emerging from VCA and act in a way 
that does not produce effective and sustainable change.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l FIAS (2007); Moving toward competitiveness. A value chain approach; Foreign Investment Advisory Service, World Bank, 
 Washington
l GTZ (2007); Value links manual; GTZ, Germany
l Herr, M & Rogovsky, N (2008); Value chain development for decent work – a guide for private sector initiatives, governments and 
 development organisations; ILO, Geneva
l Kula, O, Downing, J & Field, M (2006); Globalisation and the small firm: an industry value chain approach to economic growth and 
 poverty reduction; USAID micro report 42, Washington
l Schmitz, H (2005); Value chain analysis for policy-makers and practitioners; ILO, Geneva
16 Strictly speaking, each link in the chain of value added is a separate market system in its own right and should be subject to a separate analysis. This more detailed breakdown is often required but it is, nonetheless, 
 useful to conceive the whole value chain as one system.
17 In this sense references to the value chain ‘approach’ are misleading. VCA does provide a framework for analysis but it does not provide a framework to shape the design and management of interventions.
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5.9 understanding incentives
What and why? 
How to identify, and take into account, the incentives of key 
market players18 in the process of intervention design and 
implementation.
 
The role of incentives is increasingly recognised to be critical in 
explaining the development experience to date and in shaping 
development potential in the future. Many interventions fail 
because they:
l Make loose assumptions about market players’ motivations 
 and do not explore the underlying causes of behaviour; for 
 example, assuming that change processes only need a 
 champion rather than recognition of the multiple factors 
 driving change.
l Use methodologies for programme design which commonly 
 focus on the symptoms level of analysis19 and fail to reach the 
 underlying political economy of market systems.
l Don’t take incentives into account in their visions of how 
 market systems can operate in the future.
Conversely, interventions that are grounded in detailed 
knowledge of incentives and ensure that they are aligned 
with incentives have been shown to be capable of successfully 
unleashing the power of market systems.
how does it work? 
There are four general steps required to take account of 
incentives (Figure 35):
l Identify key stakeholders. This obviously includes the intended 
 final ‘beneficiaries’ but also all those groups that have an 
 interest in the outcome of an intervention.
l Identify stakeholders’ interests. These might be, for instance, 
 sympathetic or negative towards the objectives of an 
 intervention or, more likely, a more nuanced combination of 
 both.
l Determine the importance and influence of stakeholders. 
 How much do stakeholders matter in relation to intervention 
 goals and what is their potential impact on intervention 
 achievements?
l Determine priorities for action. Given the above analysis, which 
 stakeholders are the priorities for intervention (and what form 
 might this intervention take)?
figure 35
Blank stakeholder table
Whether using a formal framework – such as Participatory 
Stakeholder Analysis, in which a numerical scoring system is used – 
or through less formal, more intuitive processes, taking account of 
incentives always involves these steps.
key factors for successful use
Adapting stakeholder incentives analysis to the M4P requires that a 
number of points are recognised:
The wide range of players in a market system
M4P is built on a multi-function, multi-player view of markets that 
also recognises their interconnected nature  – the fact that one 
market (eg media) impinges on another (eg agriculture) – see 
Good Practice Note 5.15: Interconnected markets. The implication 
here is that interventions that seek to address underlying causes 
can take facilitators to a set of stakeholders seemingly a long way 
from where they start! For example, a problem of low productivity 
in agriculture might easily lead facilitators from an initial focus on, say, 
poor farmers to a final priority of business schools and consultants 
(Figure 36). Incentives need to be understood throughout these 
interconnections.
The importance of informal rules
While all market players operate within sets of formal rules that 
are supposed to guide actions, in practice informal rules are often 
more important. For example, firms are seldom as risk-taking and 
profit-maximising as economic theory would indicate; balancing 
risk with operating comfort and personal career objectives may be 
more important. Inter-firm cooperation is frequently undermined 
by cultural divides. Business associations often demonstrate an 
amalgam of personal, business, political and altruistic aims. Different 
levels of government hierarchies have conflicting priorities. Informal 
incentives are critical in adapting M4P to different environments.
The shifting nature of forces for change
The dynamic nature of market systems means that the relative 
importance of different influences also changes. Problems, crises, 
pressures, etc may create opportunities for interventions. For 
example, emerging issues linking climate change and food prices and 
corporate social responsibility all impact on the incentives impinging 
on players and have implications for the focus of interventions. There 
are, in reality, very few ‘perfect storm’ situations where a confluence 
of factors creates the ideal scenario for interventions, but there 
are often new opportunities – time and context-bound – that can 
build on players’ incentives. In this sense, successful interventions are 
always opportunistic.
18 The terms ‘stakeholder’ and ‘market player’ are used interchangeably here.
19 See for example DFID Briefing Paper, Using Drivers of Change to improve aid effectiveness, 2005.
stakeholders
priorities for 
action
importance 
and influenceinterests
101
The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
Placing incentives at the heart of planning and vision building
The ‘who should do – who should pay’ matrix linking players and 
functions that is central to considering the future sustainability 
of market systems is based around assessment of why market 
players should behave in a particular way.  Visions of the future 
should be ambitious but realistic, meaning they take into account 
(a) what players can do and (b) what they will want to do. In 
other words, incentives analysis is central to intervention design 
but also to planning for the future. 
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l DFID (1995); Stakeholder participation and analysis; DFID, London
l Jacobs, S (2006); Broad reform of the business environment: drivers of success in three transition countries and lessons for South Asia; 
 paper prepared for the conference on Creating better business environments for enterprise development; Donor Committee on 
 Enterprise Development, Bangkok
l MacArthur, J (1997); Stakeholder analysis in project planning: origins, applications and refinements of the method; Project Appraisal, Vol. 
 12, No. 4, Beech Tree Publishing, UK
figure 36
understanding the incentives of different market players in the vegetable market system
problem
Farmer productivity
Information to farmers
Business model of retailers/input suppliers
Advisory services and information to companies
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5.10 Giving grants to business
What and why? 
How to give financial support to businesses, of various sizes, 
so that individual firm-level change is stimulated, and wider 
sustainable benefits throughout the market system are 
stimulated.
For many agencies, their main resource and the easiest type 
of offer they can make is financial support to businesses – for 
example, grants to try a new service, develop a new product, 
invest in a new process or link with a new set of suppliers. In the 
spectrum of potential types of intervention (Figure 37), grant-
giving is an obvious option. 
The argument for grants is that they provide a direct incentive 
for pro-poor business innovation and kick-start a process of 
change which others can follow. The argument against grants 
is that they can result in gross distortion in market systems, 
undermining the information and incentives that are central to 
effective market functioning.  
figure 37
Grants as one intervention option open to facilitators
how does it work? 
Grants for business can take a number of forms, such as:
l Matching grant schemes are aimed at stimulating business’ use 
 of consulting services and based on a cost-share (50:50 usually) 
 between firms and agencies. They have been used extensively.
l Voucher schemes give coupons equivalent to a defined 
 proportion of the cost of a good or service (up to 100%) 
 to potential consumers and have been used in business 
 services and extensively for individuals in education and health 
 interventions. 
l Direct grants for individual firms, usually for a proportion of 
 project cost, and generally aimed at supporting innovations 
 or pro-poor investments. Challenge funds offer such support 
 through a competitive bidding mechanism.
l Direct grants plus technical support are offered as tailored 
 packages to firms, usually as part of a wider programme of 
 market development, in a process led by facilitators.
D = Demand
S = Supply
suppOrTinG funcTiOns
rules
cOre
Do-it-yourself
Direct financial support
Financial inducements
Direct non-financial support
Networking/player alignment
Awareness building
Do nothing
SPECTRUM OF OPTIONS 
FOR FACILITATORS
d
irect
indirect
d s
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key factors for successful use
In all the above situations, adapting grant-giving to M4P is aided 
by consideration of a number of factors:
Recognise the mixed experience
All types of intervention have the ability to change market systems. 
This change can be assessed against a distort (negative) or develop 
(positive) continuum (Figure 38). Grants are, by their nature, an 
invasive form of support, especially when they are focused at the 
core of a market system, since they seek to influence the incentives, 
prices and relationships central to market functioning. The develop-
distort dilemma is present whether or not grants are offered on 
the demand- or supply-sides of the market. 
Proponents of matching grants, for instance, see them as inherently 
better than support to consultants (suppliers) because they 
empower the demand-side and make suppliers more responsive 
to it. However, grants for service users can easily undermine their 
willingness to pay more commercial rates while encouraging 
suppliers to inflate their prices to take account of the grants offered. 
The net result can be to drive supply- and demand-sides further 
away from each other.
Focus grants on systemic constraints 
As a basic principle of M4P, grants (as with all interventions) 
should address the causes of poor market performance (or 
systemic constraints). Not every problem a firm faces is due to 
a systemic constraint – often they are attributable to internal 
factors (eg owner-managers’ attitudes and ambitions). Grant 
support, sometimes in response to the knee-jerk responses 
or the expressed needs of businesses, can easily see problems 
and solutions only in terms of lack of money. In doing so they 
address symptoms only and miss causes – a fatal error for 
any intervention. For example, matching grant and voucher 
programmes assumed implicitly that problems are concerned 
with incentives and information; if constraints are more related 
to supply-side capacities or offers they do not address these 
directly.
Build other interventions around grant mechanisms to crowd-in 
system change 
Grants on their own can induce change, but without conscious 
efforts to complement them, the benefits of change can be 
captured only by the direct grant recipient. Ultimately, grants 
that have a negative impact on competitiveness are not in the 
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
figure 38
The develop-distort continuum
FACILITATOR INFLUENCE
MARKET PLAYERS AND FUNCTIONS
l Diversity of different players
l Diversity of functions
l Indigenously owned/resourced
l Appropriate cost base
l Realistic expectations
l Increased market size
l Increased market inclusion
l Monopolistic/monolithic players
l Narrow range of functions
l Dependent on external support
l Bloated cost base
l Artificial expectations
l Limited market size
l Limited market inclusion
Facilitation always has the potential to change markets
Market distortion Market development
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further reading
 
l Christensen, C & Raynor, M (2003); The innovator’s solution; HBS Press, Cambridge 
l The Committee of Donor Agencies for Enterprise Development (2001); Business development services for small enterprises: 
 principles for donor intervention; www.bdsknowledge.org
 
interests of the poor.20 Acting to bring about greater change – 
beyond the immediate recipient – may require a number of steps. 
In some case, the ‘buzz’ created by initial support may induce a 
range of other market activity. In other cases, interventions to 
encourage changes related to information, services, attitudes, 
etc may be required which might also involve some grants but 
in combination with other interventions. Challenge funds, for 
example, were conceived simply as a grant mechanism but 
increasingly recognise the need to support wider systemic 
change (Figure 39). 
Size and duration matter! 
As a rule, grants that are larger in size and longer in duration are 
more likely to be distortional. Rather than prompting changed 
behaviour, they incentivise market players to seek more grants. 
However, in other situations, too much attention to precise 
costs is less relevant. For example, in lead firm collaborations, 
what matters is making ‘the deal’ work – since these are, by 
their nature, one-off interventions intended to stimulate other 
activity.
Grant mechanisms to promote sustainability
In most situations grants should be seen as temporary 
interventions to stimulate sustainable change. However, in some 
instances, grants to individuals can be seen as legitimate features 
of the market system. In health and education, for example, 
where there is an obvious valid public interest, vouchers may 
have a role to play in re-orientating supply to the demand-side. 
In these situations, where the long-term picture of the market is 
for continuing public finance, sustainability analysis assesses the 
reliability of this funding from domestic governments.
figure 39
evolution in challenge fund focus
20 Grants that are essentially to support one company’s operations with no ambition to stimulate wider change have limited validity in M4P.
D = Demand
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5.11 Guiding participation processes
What and why? 
How to use participatory approaches, commonly used in local 
economic and community development, so that they are more 
consistent with M4P. 
The potential benefits of more participatory approaches in 
development are well known. In principle they should lead 
to better-focused interventions, more local ownership of the 
development process and greater impact and sustainability. Yet 
‘standard’ participatory approaches are often criticised for (a) 
confusing means (participation) with ends (impact); (b) their 
perceived lack of depth and (c) the lack of efficacy of the quasi-
‘democratic’ mechanisms established. How can M4P make the 
best use of participatory approaches without inheriting their 
negative attributes? 
how does it work? 
There are typically four phases in participatory approaches, 
often consisting of a series of workshops and other participatory 
tools: 
l Set-up. This might include training of local facilitators, initial 
 assessment of target sector and networking with local 
 stakeholders and initial introductory workshops to understand 
 general opportunities and constraints. 
l Research. Focus group discussions, interviews and other 
 participatory methods involving local stakeholders for in-depth 
 assessment of opportunities and constraints (SWOT) and 
 local competitive advantage.
l Analysis. Evaluation of research findings in a planning workshop, 
 and formulation of interventions that address needs and that 
 promise quick returns. 
l Implementation. Presentation of proposals to the relevant 
 community, setting priorities through participatory 
 planning processes, setting up of steering groups to guide 
 implementation.
key factors for successful use
Adapting participatory approaches requires that several factors 
are taken into account:
Fit participatory approaches to the market diagnostic and 
implementation process (not the other way around) 
As Figure 40 shows, M4P and participatory approaches do 
not necessarily exclude each other. The key frameworks 
for understanding the poor – for market selection and for 
assessment, for example – can be used as diagnostic tools in the 
initial phase of participatory processes. However, it is important 
that participation serves the diagnostic process, and that it is 
seen as a means to the end of more inclusive, effective market 
 
systems.  This is a more tangible, meaningful form of participation. 
For example, setting up community-based organisations (CBOs) 
or steering groups as a fixed starting point in the process – 
a common approach – might not serve any functional M4P 
purpose. In many situations, meeting with key individuals and 
existing groups/associations is more useful.
Address the lack of rigour in participatory analysis 
Participatory processes are often useful only in identifying 
needs of the poor – the symptoms. However, poor people 
mostly have only a vague understanding of systemic constraints 
that underlie these symptoms. Understanding market systems 
in which the poor are participating requires that agencies go 
beyond the community borders – the confines of the poor’s 
own understanding – and speak to other market players; for 
example, buyers, suppliers, government, service providers, etc. 
Within a participatory approach therefore, technical expertise 
is required that will lead to interventions addressing systemic 
constraints. This process does not need to be entirely ‘expert-
driven’ – it could include measures that make it more transparent 
to target groups. However, agencies need to understand that 
what they offer is more than simply a process – it is ideas, 
knowledge and resources as well.    
Go from immediate results to systemic change 
Participatory processes often aim at short-term and visible 
outcomes that motivate local stakeholders to take on new and 
more demanding challenges. The problem is that these often do 
not lead to sustainable solutions addressing systemic constraints 
but rather create dependency on external funding. Managing this 
tension between the expectations for immediate results, often 
stirred up by participatory processes, and the need to address 
underlying constraints is a central implementation challenge. In 
essence, this is concerned with balancing operational tactics and 
strategic goals. Planning for ‘quick wins’ is often an important 
operational priority – and can serve as a platform for a more 
strategic focus on underlying causes. Appropriate participation 
can assist in achieving this balance by creating the right 
expectations among market players. 
 
Go from pilot tests to crowding-in 
Participatory approaches by nature are restricted to a limited 
geographical area (there are practical limits on how many 
people can participate) and therefore are limited in the scale 
that they can reach. However, participatory approaches can be 
useful in pointing interventions in the right direction. Relatively 
intensive and small-scale pilot-testing interventions that identify 
key constraints and trigger points for change can serve as a basis 
for (a) creating a future market vision and (b) building other 
interests to ‘crowd-in’ more activity. 
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
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figure 40
participatory approaches in relation to market system diagnosis21
further reading
 
l Albu, M (2008); Comparing M4P and SLA frameworks – complementarities, divergences and synergies; in Making markets work for the 
 poor – market development and sustainable livelihoods – a comparative assessment, The Springfield Centre, SDC
l Herr, M (2008); Local value chain development (local-VCD) – a guide; International Labour Organisation (ILO), Enterprise for Pro- 
 Poor Growth project (www.entergrowth.com), Sri Lanka  
l Meyer-Stamer, J (2003); Participatory Appraisal of Competitive Advantage (PACA) – effectively launching local development initiatives; 
 Mesopartner, Duisburg, Germany
21 The right side of Figure 40 is adapted from the PACA procedure framework (Meyer-Stamer, 2003).
M4P diagnostic process Common participatory approaches
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5.12 livelihoods analysis
What and why? 
How to utilise the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) to 
allow more detailed understanding of the position of the poor 
in market systems and better design of M4P programmes.
The starting point for M4P is a detailed understanding of the 
poor. However, M4P has, on occasion, been criticised for not 
addressing this ‘start with the poor’ requirement rigorously. 
In particular, some have seen it as top-down in its analysis 
and placing too much emphasis on monetary and economic 
exchange rather than on developing the more diverse livelihood 
strategies of the poor.
SLA on the other hand is criticised for its limited understanding 
of the wider market system of which the poor and their 
communities are a part. Its emphasis on participatory processes 
can further lead SLA to assessing symptoms rather than 
underlying systemic constraints. Its efficacy as an approach to 
intervention is consequently of limited value. 
However, SLA potentially offers value not as an approach to 
intervention but as an analytical framework that can be used to 
better understand the livelihoods context of the poor as part 
of the market system.   
how does it work? 
SLA is based on the premise that putting the poor and 
their livelihoods at the centre of development increases 
the effectiveness and social sustainability of development 
interventions. It seeks to gain an understanding of people’s 
strengths (assets or capital endowments) and how they convert 
these into positive livelihood outcomes. Although different 
methodologies are used they all are based around common 
features which form the SLA framework: 
l At the centre of this framework are people’s assets, which 
 they require to achieve positive livelihood outcomes. Assets 
 include not only financial resources but have social, human, 
 natural, physical and even psychological/spiritual dimensions 
 (represented graphically by constructs such as the asset 
 pentagon).
l The way people move into and out of poverty links assets to 
 the livelihood strategies that people choose in order to achieve 
 the livelihood outcomes they seek. 
l Crucially, people’s asset accumulation, their choice of strategies 
 and the outcomes they achieve are heavily influenced by 
 powerful external factors (the vulnerability context).   
SLA envisages scenarios in which people and communities can 
better maintain or enhance the assets on which their livelihoods 
depend (empowerment), can cope with and recover from 
stress and shocks (responsiveness) and can provide for future 
generations (sustainability). Participation becomes an important 
means by which to achieve this goal. 
key factors for successful use 
Three factors are especially important in bringing SLA – with its 
characteristic participatory diagnosis focus on household, family 
and community assets – constructively into M4P programmes:
The poor’s engagement with the external world
Although the SLA framework has clear limitations in 
understanding the external environment – the wider market 
system – it can provide useful insights into perceptions the poor 
have about the ‘wider world’, and how they interact with other 
market players. This is especially useful in understanding the 
poor and their context at initial stage of the M4P diagnostic 
process (Figure 41) – for example, in understanding the poor’s 
perception of service providers, reasons for use/non-use and 
comparison with informal sources.
figure 41
sla framework within the market diagnostic process
Intra-household dynamics
SLA can be useful in allowing a window on groups within 
households – for example women and children. Both may engage 
with the economy and wider social processes in ways that are 
different from the ‘average’ household response. For example, 
some types of economic activity may be more accessible for 
women (and vice versa) and economic gains for households 
may result in differential benefits for family members in relation 
to education, health and decision-making. 
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
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further reading
 
l Albu, M (2008); Comparing M4P and SLA frameworks – complementarities, divergences and synergies; in Making markets work for the 
 poor – market development and sustainable livelihoods – a comparative assessment, The Springfield Centre, SDC
l DFID (2001); Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets; DFID, London
l Dorward et al (2002); Critical linkages: livelihoods, markets and institutions; paper presented at the seminar on Supporting institutions, 
 evolving livelihoods, Bradford Centre for International Development, UK
Community and group dynamics
As an approach that focuses on community participation and 
empowerment, SLA frameworks can offer useful insights into 
how members of a community interact. This is particularly 
important, for example when trying to understand mechanisms 
of knowledge and information dissemination within communities 
and target groups (eg farmers sharing knowledge about cultivation 
techniques amongst each other) or of resource allocation (eg 
distribution of land for rental or sharecropping). Agencies have 
had mixed success in organising the poor in groups – and groups 
can often fail if there is no common interest. However, there are 
many situations in rural areas where there is a compelling logic 
to collaboration – for instance, to access technical and market 
services for agriculture or to exert appropriate pressure on 
public organisations. For such collaboration to be effective it has 
to build on group incentives and relationships.
SLA, as a means of analysis, can be useful in M4P. The wider 
challenge for SLA is to address systemic constraints rather 
than the symptoms of problems appearing in communities and 
households. For this to happen, the frameworks and processes 
outlined in the Guide need to be taken into SLA. 
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5.13 knowledge management system
What and why? 
An internal management system, developed in M4P programmes 
and used chiefly in promoting more competitive and inclusive 
industries. Its purpose is to regularly compare actual versus 
expected changes in market incentives, relationships and 
capacities at two different stages in a planned systemic change 
process:
l Transactions to relationships. Are interventions fostering more 
 productive interactions between market players – moving from 
 one-off transactions to longer-term commercial relationships 
 based on learning/innovation and shared benefit flows?   
l Scale-up/exit. Is there increasing evidence of ownership of 
 the change process among more market players and is this 
 ownership resulting in a significant shift in the norms/rules that 
 will drive market development and allow facilitators to scale- 
 up and exit? 
Effective facilitation requires an organisation with the capacity to 
read and react to local market signals. This helps in understanding 
the fine line between facilitating change and directing change and 
in capturing and using knowledge to determine if interventions 
are progressing in the right direction and at an acceptable pace.
how does it work? 
There are two key steps in developing a knowledge management 
system:
l Lay out industry pathway.22 A knowledge management system 
 starts by laying out expected changes along a change process 
 leading to a vision of competitiveness (Figure 42). These 
 observations are based on local and international analyses 
 of effective behaviour patterns in competitive industries and 
 then are applied to the local market/industry context. Pathway 
 observations provide a benchmark against which a facilitator 
 can compare expected with actual observations to determine 
 direction and pace of progress.  
l Establish knowledge capture system. A knowledge capture 
 system is required to compare how market players react to 
 opportunities and threats catalysed by the interventions. Of 
 course there are other potential factors that, if changed, will 
 result in shifting incentives and new behaviour patterns. To deal 
 with this complexity, a project needs to constantly compare 
 actual versus expected observations to assess nuanced 
 differences and determine if/when shifts in its interventions 
 should be considered (Figure 43).
The usefulness of the knowledge management system is 
dependent on the project’s ability to understand both tacit 
knowledge (knowledge that is held internal to an individual) 
and explicit knowledge (knowledge that is defined through a 
report or presentation). It is also critical to have confidence in 
the information that it is capturing to make sure it is accurate 
within a reasonable range of variability.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
22 The industry pathway is closely related to the pathway to crowding-in referred to in Section 3D of the Guide.
figure 42
an industry pathway
Market-responsive interventions 
to crowd-in relevant market functions 
and players
scale-up/exit
intervening to foster new/existing 
relationships based on commercial 
incentives
Transactions to relationships
More
competitive
not
competitive
Observed behavioural changes – benefits, relationships, learning –
 to achieve future vision of competitiveness
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figure 43
The knowledge management process
To capture tacit knowledge different qualitative methods can be 
used:
l A knowledge or learning-based operating culture – with 
 appropriate incentives (bonuses or kudos) – encourages team 
 members to share information and question why they are 
 doing a specific activity.
l Regular team meetings encourage the sharing of experiences, 
 capture success stories and learning and promote new ways of 
 addressing challenges.
l Staff-led exchanges with other team members foster increased 
 ownership and social pressure to share and use information 
 for improved performance.
l Participatory small-group learning workshops are effective tools 
 to extend learning and increase team member interaction.  
Different levels of explicit data capture can be used to ensure 
that quality of knowledge flows into project progress reviews:
l Monthly tracking reports on a set of quantifiable indicators 
 – investments, contracts, promotional events, sales – shows if 
 behaviour change is being adopted and becoming entrenched 
 in a lead firm and other market players.
l Quarterly and annual reports aggregate monthly tracking 
 report data and compares it against national level data 
 collection on industry-wide performance.
l Twice yearly household evaluation (to different standards of 
 rigour) provide a credible level of attribution to guide strategic 
 project decisions. 
No single indicator or source of information is sufficient to guide 
decisions in complex and evolving markets. The mix of tacit and 
explicit data sources/methods offers checks and balances to assure 
quality and timely information for decision-making. 
key factors for successful use
Two factors need to be borne in mind in developing a knowledge 
management system:
Effective market system facilitation is effective knowledge 
management 
To effectively facilitate a change process, agencies must understand 
and adjust to the adoption and crowding-in processes of local 
players. The triggers that cause social shifts which in turn alter 
behavioural norms are dynamic and rarely occur in a smooth 
and predictable fashion. This has implications for managing 
projects, both inside the market system with market players and 
outside with funders. 
Effective facilitation is highly dependent upon a management 
culture and structure that actively pushes information from the 
ground up to agencies’ headquarters and then back down to 
the field. Empowering a facilitation team with the knowledge 
and skills to fulfil this role is critical and highly dependent upon 
all team members having ownership of the agency’s systemic 
change objectives and approach. 
Knowledge management for decision-making 
At any point in time, facilitators may be at different points in 
the change process (from market entry to exit to re-entry) and 
engaged in a range of different roles (from direct to indirect 
to actively taking a ‘wait-and-see’ position). The knowledge 
captured from the system is used to guide them in confronting 
intervention challenges along the pathway. For instance: 
l Will this intervention foster increased competitiveness at a 
 systemic level? 
l Will it be conducted in a way that crowds-in local players to 
 take on responsibility? 
sTaGe 2
scale-up/exit
sTaGe 1
Transactions to relationships
More
competitive
less
competitive
evidence of market players’ ownership of change process increasing – 
without facilitator support
Behaviour Behaviour
compare actual and expected pathway changes
Observed        behaviour
collective learning drives follow-on facilitation activities
adjust 
facilitation 
activities
adjust 
facilitation 
activities
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l What role and related level of facilitator support is required?
l Will the facilitator be able to finish the intervention given 
 resource and time constraints?
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l Bear, M & Field, M (2008); Managing the process of change: useful frameworks for M4P implementers; Enterprise Development & 
 Microfinance, Vol. 19 No. 1, June 2008   
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5.14 intervention impact logics
What and why? 
How to use impact logics as a planning and management tool 
for specific interventions to ensure consistency with the overall 
strategic framework for M4P. 
M4P programmes need to have credible and practical ways of 
planning what they do, of ensuring that this fits overall objectives 
and of assessing performance. Impact logics are a way of planning 
interventions within the overall logic for market development. 
Typical programme planning tools such as log frames, while 
useful in establishing strategic clarity (see Good Practice Note 
5.4) are often not sufficiently detailed to be of operational 
value. Impact logics are complementary to these and serve two 
practical purposes23:
l As an internal planning tool they provide information on how 
 specific interventions fit into the overall strategic context and 
 how changes in the market system lead to changes in growth 
 and access.  
l For external reporting purposes, they help to demonstrate 
 plausible attribution between interventions and overall goals. 
how does it work?  
There are several steps in developing impact logics:
Establish the overall market logic
Impact logics must be set within a context of the overall strategic 
framework - which enshrines the market logic. The market logic 
is however not sufficient in itself to provide guidance for specific 
interventions hence the need for impact logics that focus 
on more detailed and immediate changes ‘further down’ the 
strategic framework.
Develop the logical cause and effect flow for specific interventions 
Breaking down the overall market logic into more detailed, 
operational steps requires that the different constraints in 
the system are addressed through different actions – for 
example related to services BMOs and regulatory change. Each 
intervention requires its own logic, linking activities to expected 
outcomes related to systemic change and growth and access 
(Figure 44 provides an illustrative example of one of these). 
Ensure that each impact logic contains realistic causality links
The connections between specific activities and their immediate 
effects on the market system and then to growth and access for 
the poor must be plausible.
figure 44
intervention impact logics in relation to overall market logic
23 Section 3E highlights impacts logics in relation to M&E. Here the focus is on impact logics as a planning tool, and linking them to M4P’s overall strategic framework.
Poverty reduction
Farmers make higher profits due to 
increased productivity and quality
MarkeT iMpacT lOGic
strategic framework
Farmers start using appropriate 
cultivation methods and inputs
Retailers share information and 
knowledge with farmers
Retailers trained on appropriate use 
of inputs and customer information
Identify supply company and assist in 
preparing retailer training module
inTerVenTiOn iMpacT lOGics
illustrative intervention areas
Services BMOs Regulations
aggregation
Compile key information 
from a series of 
intervention impact 
logics to access overall 
impact on poverty 
reduction
expansion
Translate wider market 
impact logic into a more 
operational and detailed 
impact logic for specific 
interventions in specific 
markets
Systemic
intervention
Improved 
access and growth
Market system change
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Using impact logics for M&E
Appropriate indicators and expected impacts (predictions) are 
selected at each level of change. Various means of information 
collection can be used to assess progress against indicators. 
key factors for successful use
Focus on systems
Impact logics are concerned with ‘exploding’ the details of 
changes at the system (the priority) and growth and access 
levels – ie with giving specific meaning to what is meant by 
systemic change. Rather than ‘getting lost’ in trying to prove 
the link between specific interventions and the overall poverty 
reduction goal, impact logics should be here. 
The achievement of the poverty reduction goal is addressed 
through correct selection of markets that provide opportunities 
for increasing growth and access and through correct analysis of 
the systemic constraints that prevent the poor from participating 
fully in markets. Interventions together all contribute to the 
poverty reduction goal.24
Focus on the practical
Although impact logics also serve external purposes – such 
as reporting to funders - they primarily fulfil a management 
and planning function. Impact logics need to reflect a practical 
view of how project managers and staff see change happening. 
Indicators and assumptions therefore need to be grounded in a 
clear idea of how market system change takes place and must 
be ‘owned’ by managers.  
Link to pathways to crowding-in 
When constructing impact logics, facilitators need to reflect 
on how specific interventions link to systemic change and to 
the other M4P frameworks related to systemic change. For 
example, impact logics help facilitators to think through the roles 
and incentives of market players (who does what – and why) 
and the pathway to crowding-in (ensuring that other market 
players and functions are brought in to the market development 
process – see Figure 45). 
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l Katalyst (2008): Impact management system manual – a guide to monitoring, impact assessment and reporting; Dhaka, Bangladesh
l Team Technologies (2001); The logframe handbook: a logical framework approach to project cycle management; World Bank, 
 Washington
24  This relationship between market and intervention logics is comparable to the distinction between programme and project log frames, sometimes referred to as ‘nested log frames’.
figure 45
intervention impact logics the pathway to crowding-in
Market system 
change
Market working 
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Growth and 
access
Poverty 
reduction
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working
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Individual intervention logics over 
time for specific interventions
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5.15 interconnected markets
What and why? 
How to understand the relationship - the interconnection - 
between different market systems in the process of market analysis 
and intervention.  
Markets do not exist in isolation from each other – players, functions, 
relationships and transactions overlap from one to another. Inter-
connected markets refer to market systems which, as well as being 
a market in their own right, constitute the supporting functions or 
rules of another market system. 
Their significance is that, as M4P programmes move through 
the diagnostic process towards identifying underlying constraints, 
they often find that causes and the focus of their interventions 
are in different markets apparently distant from those where they 
started.
While the complexity of interconnected markets is sometimes 
unwelcome, it is no more than a reflection of the complexity of the 
‘the real world’.25 Moreover, by taking account of interconnected 
markets facilitators can potentially increase both the scale and 
sustainability of their interventions. Agencies therefore need to 
be able to understand and act on the reality of interconnected 
markets. 
how does it work? 
Understanding and intervening in interconnected markets is an 
iterative process that has a number of key stages:
Understanding the initial market system
The starting point is to understand the key elements of the market 
system of immediate interest (Market 1 in Figure 46) focusing, 
as in any M4P situation, on which rules functions and players are 
currently underperforming and preventing the poor from fully 
participating in markets. Underlying causes of problems in the core 
market usually lie in supporting functions and rules. 
Going from priority constraints to a ‘new’ market system
Supporting functions/rules that have been identified as major 
constraints in the initial market are seen as the core of a new 
market system. Whatever the constraint is – training, finance, 
seeds, information, regulations etc – this can be seen as the 
‘core’ of a new market (Market 2). And around this core, new 
supporting functions and rules emerge. Different market players 
are also now entering the field of view, responsible for the 
performance of various functions and rules in the interconnected 
market. 
Understanding key constraints in the interconnected market
The interconnected market system is then subject to a market 
analysis, using the same frameworks as in Market 1, in which 
again supporting functions, rules and the roles and incentives of 
market players are analysed.   
Repeating the process if necessary
Steps 2 and 3 can be repeated if necessary thus seeing the M4P 
programme moving from one market to another (Market 3 and 
beyond).
Two brief and different examples illustrate interconnected 
markets in practice. Problems of small business finance (Market 
1) often lie with the quality of business financial reporting 
and proposals presented to providers which is a function 
of accounting services (Market 2) – where low levels of 
transactions may be explained by a number of factors, including 
inappropriate financial regulations impinging on small business 
(Market 3). Second, low levels of income for farmers (Market 1) 
might be explained partly by low productivity caused by poor 
quality seeds (Market 2) which, in turn, might be caused by weak 
market coordination and information (Market 3) which does 
not allow seed purchasers and producers to differentiate on 
the basis of quality.
figure 46
interconnected markets
25 Facilitators delude themselves if they pretend interconnected markets are – somehow – not there!
suppOrTinG 
funcTiOns
suppOrTinG 
funcTiOns
suppOrTinG 
funcTiOns
cOre cOre cOre
rules rules rules
Market 1 Market 2 Market 3
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key factors for successful use
Understanding the interconnection between market systems 
requires consideration of some key factors:
Set interconnected markets within the market diagnostic process
The driving motivation for programmes to move from one 
market to another is to focus interventions on causes not 
symptoms. M4P programmes thus often find themselves 
intervening in markets that are seemingly unrelated to the 
market in which the poor are located – but the connection is 
clear in a context of the diagnostic process (Figure 47).   
Use interconnected markets to increase impact and sustainability 
As programmes move from one market to another, the potential 
for reaching impact at scale increases. Figure 48 illustrates the 
point for an example where farmers’ low incomes are caused by 
poor practices. With limited resources, providing direct training 
to farmers can only result in limited impact and sustainability. 
Moving progressively from one cause, market and potential set 
of interventions to another (Markets 2, 3 and 4), and to working 
directly with other players – for example, retailers, retailer 
trainers (suppliers), service providers etc – allows the prospects 
for leverage, scale and sustainability to increase. 
Analysis and actions together
Understanding interconnected markets is not only an analytical 
process but should be connected to concrete action. In practice, 
analysis and action are interwoven. The process of intervening 
allows facilitators, as well as achieving impact, to learn how they can 
go further from a platform of greater knowledge and improved 
networks. Programmes often begin with limited operations but 
then can go to a next level, refocusing interventions on inter-
connected markets to seek wider impact. 
Balance ambition with pragmatism
The question often asked in this context is how often should 
M4P programmes go through the iterative process of moving 
from one market to another. Where are the limits? While there 
is no definitive answer to this, in responding facilitators need to 
balance two factors: 
l Their capacity and resources (what they can do).
l Their ambition (what they want to do).
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
figure 47
interconnected markets in the diagnostic process
figure 48
increasing impact through interventions in interconnected markets
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5.16 stimulating demand
What and why? 
How to simulate demand in weak markets for new ideas, 
practices or products, in particular through use of social 
marketing techniques. 
‘Weakness’ in market systems can be manifested in a range of 
constraints. On the supply-side, providers may lack incentives 
and capacity to innovate and deliver the appropriate offer for 
consumers. And often interventions need to focus on these issues. 
However, demand-side constraints are also especially apparent 
in weak markets. Consumers’ willingness to change behaviour 
or knowledge of the benefits of change and how to change 
may be deficient. In an ideal situation, demand drives change 
in the supply-side, so bringing about change here is especially 
important.26 
Stimulating the demand-side can be pursued through a variety 
of approaches (Figure 4927). One of the most important of 
these is social marketing. Social marketing refers to the adoption 
of marketing principles (used to sell products) to ‘selling’ ideas, 
attitudes and behaviour not for the direct benefit of the 
marketer but for wider development purposes. In essence, it 
is about improving the knowledge and information in market 
systems that allow consumers to learn, make more informed 
decisions and change.
Social marketing has been used extensively in the development 
of health systems but also in other spheres such as business 
services. 
how does it work? 
Facilitators using social marketing to stimulate demand in weak 
markets should follow a number of basic steps.
Understand the message to be delivered
As in any marketing campaign, be specific about the nature of 
the message to be delivered. In particular, the potential benefits 
of change – for example, from trying a new service - and the 
evidence to support this message need to be clear. 
Be specific about the audience to be reached
Marketing campaigns should be transparent about the 
audience(s) – the demand-side segment – they are trying to 
reach and be based on a good understating of their audiences’ 
existing perceptions. 
Use appropriate media
The most relevant media will vary with different audiences. In 
many African countries, radio is the most important mass media, 
in others it may be TV or newspapers. In more niche markets, it 
may be specialist sector-based journals. Often a variety of media 
need to be used.
Be specific about indicators
Social marketing is aimed ultimately at increasing demand (ie 
changing behaviour) but more immediately it is concerned 
directly with raising awareness and changing perceptions. 
Indicators need to be developed that assess these characteristics 
– without this there is a danger of social marketing as a ‘black hole’ 
for resources with little feedback on their level of usefulness.
figure 49
illustrative options for social marketing in different market situations
26 Suppliers, however, are not passive in market systems and are often the leading source of change.
27 Adapted from materials developed by Jim Tomecko for the Making Markets Work training programme offered by The Springfield Centre.
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117
The Operational Guide for the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
key factors for successful use 
A number of factors need to be considered in successfully using 
social marketing.  
Balance (narrow) individual versus (broader) developmental goal 
Social marketing is often undertaken along with other supply-
side interventions, eg to initiate a new service. In these situations, 
a balance must be struck between benefits for the provider 
(awareness of them and their service) and for the market 
as a whole (awareness of the service in general). Certainly, 
if the campaign is focused on the provider – the so-called 
‘manufacturer’s mode’ referred to in social marketing in health 
systems – benefits can be captured by them at the expense of 
the (more important) overall market. Equally, however, there 
must be enough specific benefits for direct organisational 
partners.
Emphasise the tangible benefits from change 
Messages must be in a form and language that is meaningful to 
consumers. In particular, the positive reasons (with evidence) 
why they should change need to be stressed. ‘Development-
speak’ must be avoided! Identifying and working with 
appropriate marketing and communication firms is therefore 
important. Experience suggests that active management of 
these contractors – especially understanding the nature of the 
task – is required.
Don’t brand as a ‘development project’
While some providers may believe that there is extra credibility 
to be gained from an association with a facilitator, marking a new 
product/service as a development initiative is more likely to lead 
to development-dependence than ‘normal’ market behaviour.
Be clear about how this fits into systemic change 
Innovation, calculated risk-taking, educating consumers and new 
product development are all necessary continuing elements in 
vibrant and sustainable market systems; they are not simply one-
off activities.  There are convincing arguments that can be made 
for more generic social marketing interventions to address 
(essentially information-based) market constraints. However, 
continual judgement needs to be made on whether these are 
spilling into tasks that should be undertaken by providers. 
Don’t use social marketing to undermine media development
The development of many market systems is often undermined 
by weaknesses in mass media markets. Developing more 
innovative, diverse and responsive media can potentially address 
the information weaknesses in many markets, in particular by 
highlighting new ideas and practices. ‘Buying’ awareness through 
social marketing runs the risk of further dis-incentivising the 
media from seeing their role to be information providers in 
market systems. If resources permit, therefore, facilitators should 
seek to build mass media markets as a means of addressing 
broader information constraints.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
further reading
 
l Weinreich, N (1999); Hands-on social marketing: a step-by-step guide; Sage Publications, USA
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5.17 anatomy of a transaction
What and why? 
A tool to understand the initial factors explaining the dynamics 
and nature of transactions at the core of a market system. 
Markets that are functioning effectively for disadvantaged and 
poor people have:
l high levels of transactions – exchange between consumer 
 (demand-side) and provider (supply-side); and
l high levels of inclusiveness – a significant proportion of poor 
 people included on either supply or demand sides.28
Understanding transactions – especially if transaction levels are 
low – is a critical first step in assessing markets and identifying 
underlying market constraints. This tool offers a means of 
gaining an understanding of the dynamics – or anatomy – of 
transactions in markets.
 
how does it work? 
In any market system, supply and demand-sides exchange 
successfully when a number of factors are present.
With respect to Figure 50, taking the example of small 
businesses experiencing under-performance and potential 
services to address this29, from a demand-side perspective ( ), 
transactions occur successfully when:
a) SME can identify the immediate causes of their 
  underperformance – skills, processes, finances, products etc.
b) SMEs can identify potential solutions – services, equipment, 
  information etc.
c) SMEs are willing to acquire this solution from appropriate 
  providers – businesses, informal networks etc.
28  Although benefits often come indirectly through interconnected markets. For example, the poor may not be direct participants in improved agriculture input markets – but benefit as farm employees (labour 
 markets).
29 The tool can, however, be applied to any market context.
figure 50
The anatomy of a transaction (for an sMe service market)
SME constraints
eg skills gaps, poor 
equipment, inefficient 
systems and resource use 
etc
f) Impact on SME 
performance
a) Causes of 
under-performance are 
recognised
SME under-performance
eg low profits, high 
fixed costs, declining 
sales, etc
Solutions
eg training, advice, 
recruitment, product 
development, finance, 
accounting, etc
c) Willingness to acquire a 
solution
d) An ‘offer’ that 
SMEs value
Sources of solutions
eg businesses, 
govt, associations, networks 
etc
Supply-side flow
Demand-side flow
b) Solution is required e) Capacity to deliver
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From a supply-side perspective ( ), transactions occur 
when:
d) Providers can develop and present an ‘offer’ that SMEs value 
  – a package that is accessible and relevant to reach SMEs. 
e) Providers have the capacity to deliver – having reached SMEs, 
  the technical capacity to deliver value to SMEs that can 
  positively impact on their performance.
If factors (a) - (e) are evident, final benefits should flow to SMEs 
(f).
If, therefore, strong transaction activity is not taking place, 
two conclusions follows. First, a range of constraints will be in 
evidence in relation to:
l Consumers – unable to identify the cause of underperformance 
 and unwilling to act to do something about this.
l Providers – without an appropriate offer and without the 
 necessary capacity to deliver this.
Second, interventions logically need to focus on these identified 
constraints.
key factors for successful use
Using the anatomy of a transaction tool requires a number of 
steps.
Recognise this as a first step 
Identifying the immediate causes of low levels of transactions 
is a necessary step in understanding any market system – and 
in providing an initial guide to what the focus of interventions 
should be. For some markets it may be appropriate to use 
different consumer research tools to expand this analysis - for 
example, the demand-side perspective can be subjected to more 
detailed examination of awareness and understanding and image. 
Whatever the complexity of methods used, the overall process of 
understanding market systems can be seen essentially as a process 
of continually asking ‘‘why?’’ – and this tool offers a useful starting 
point for doing so. 
Apply to hidden or embedded services 
The tool can be applied to cash-based exchange and to non-cash 
transactions. In both cases, the general requirements on demand 
(recognition of problem and willingness to actively to do something 
about it) and supply-sides (offer and capacity) are the same.
5. GOOD PRACTICE NOTES
figure 51
core transactions in the wider market system
suppOrTinG funcTiOns
rules
Inputs
R&D
        Information
Regulations
Values
Standards Regulations
Coordination
Finance
Underlying causes of 
transactions 
in the core of 
the market 
lie in rules 
and supporting 
functions
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Fit transactions into the wider market system
Beyond the initial analysis of transactions, gaining sufficient 
understanding of markets to guide actions requires that the 
underlying reasons for weak transaction flow are assessed 
(Figure 51). This means looking at the supporting function and 
rules in markets, such as:
l The quality, relevance and accuracy of information impinging 
 on consumers’ knowledge.
l The services available to develop providers’ capacity. 
l The attitudes and norms influencing consumer and provider 
 behaviour. 
l The role of government in shaping provider incentives.
further reading
 
l Field, M, Hitchins, R and Bear, M (2000); Designing BDS interventions as if markets matter; Microenterprise Best Practice Project, 
 USAID, www.microfinancegateway.org
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5.18 rapid market assessment
What and why? 
How to better understand complex market systems in a short 
time with limited resources. Rapid market assessment (RMA) is a 
generic term referring to use of iterative and interactive research 
methodologies. It can be applied in a variety of contexts:
l As entry point to markets.  A way in which relief or development 
 programmes get a ‘first picture’ of specific markets. RMA 
 enables a programme to make decisions on whether it should 
 engage in a market or not and the direction it might initially 
 pursue. For this reason RMA is commonly used in post-crisis 
 situations, where quick action is required.
l For product testing and placement. Businesses use RMA to 
 conduct basic market research before testing or launching a 
 new product - and agencies have supported SMEs to develop 
 their capacity to conduct RMA. In other cases facilitators 
 use RMA in pilot testing new products/ideas that they wish to 
 introduce to a market system. 
l As intervention strategy. Used as a participatory tool in LED 
 processes as a means of enabling local stakeholders to assess 
 their markets and jointly plan interventions (thus creating a 
 sense of local ownership).30 RMA here becomes part of the 
 intervention itself.
l As a management tool. Used as part of an iterative process 
 by which facilitators refine their understanding of complex 
 market systems on an on-going basis, in order to adapt their 
 interventions (ie monitoring). RMA is a means of testing pilot 
 interventions and informing crowding-in strategies, providing a 
 feedback loop from target groups to facilitator.
how does it work?  
The application of RMA depends on the context in which they 
are used. However, in practice RMA processes share some 
common characteristics in the way they are implemented.  
Process
RMA goes through similar stages, differing in time (for example, 
from 2-3 days in a post-crisis situation to several weeks in the 
case of participatory approaches to LED) and scope of research. 
The main stages tend to be:
 l Stage 1: Setting objectives and framework. This involves some 
 form of market selection in which the objectives and target 
 group are defined and RMA strategy is outlined. 
l Stage 2: Doing the analysis. The actual RMA itself is often 
 divided into preliminary mapping and then more detailed (or 
 participatory) research and analysis through various means of 
 information collection. 
l Stage 3: Moving from analysis to action. The information 
 derived from RMA can be used for a range of purposes, such as 
 a strategic decision, the launch of a new product or refinement 
 of intervention etc. 
Purpose
Methods used in RMA can be seen on a scale ranging from 
formal survey-based research at one end to ‘assessment-by-
doing’ at the other, each fulfilling different purposes (Figure 
52). The degree to which participatory approaches are used 
depends on whether the outcome of an RMA is intended for 
planning purposes or seen as an intervention itself.  
figure 52
rMa methods: a spectrum of options
Formal market 
research
Product testing
Focus group 
discussions
Participatory 
approaches
Pilot actions
research acTiOn research
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Tools and sources for RMA
RMA encompasses a diverse range of different tools, assessment 
methodologies or sources of information (eg value chain analysis, 
socio-economic studies, livelihoods analysis, etc). RMA uses these 
tools and sources within a limited timeframe and therefore 
does not necessarily claim scientific rigour, but to enable and 
inform fast decision-making and action. Specific tools tend to be 
better suited to understanding specific elements of the market 
system (ie the core of the market, supporting functions and 
rules) rather than understanding the entire market system.  
key factors for successful use
Four factors need to be considered when using RMA within 
M4P programmes:
See RMA as process leading from symptoms to systemic causes
Market assessment needs to be an iterative and affordable 
process – not just a large, one-off formal study. RMA – in 
whichever form – should help programmes to understand 
market systems without the burden of formal and time-
consuming studies. The critical point here is that RMA should 
be conducted frequently throughout the life of a programme, 
to build the depth of analysis, identifying systemic constraints 
as well as roles and incentives of market players, and steering 
interventions. 
Triangulation by using different tools 
Seldom will a single tool, assessment methodology or source of 
information be sufficient to develop good understanding of a 
market system. RMA needs to be seen within the overall M4P 
diagnostic process (see Figure 53), so that programmes have 
a clear understanding about what information is needed and 
which tools can be used to collect this information. In practice 
the combination of several tools or sources is likely to be more 
effective than a single tool or source in generating essential 
information about market dynamics. This is often referred to 
as ‘triangulation’, a method that looks at a specific market from 
multiple perspectives to develop a more rounded view, testing 
preconceptions and assumptions and the natural biases of 
individual tools and information sources.
RMA for strategic planning
Market assessment needs to guide a facilitators’ action (ie market 
assessment is not conducted out of academic interest alone). RMA 
should enable facilitators to take decisions about market selection, 
to identify underlying causes of market underperformance and 
narrow down potential entry points for intervention. RMA can 
also be used to develop a programme’s intelligence which can be 
used to influence market players. Facilitators therefore need to 
be clear from the outset about how RMA are going to be used 
to shape intervention strategies and actions.
figure 53
rMa within the M4p diagnostic process
Symptoms
focus of 
intervention(s)
Causes
The poor and their context
Specific market system(s)
Socio-economic studies, census data, poverty assessments, 
livelihoods analysis, investment climate surveys, 
competitiveness analysis, drivers of change
Access frontier, value chain analysis, consumer research, 
productivity studies, regulatory reviews, organisational 
appraisal tools, stakeholder analysis, participatory and 
consultative tools
Focused interaction with relevant informants: interviews, 
focus group discussion, brainstorming
systemic
constraints
POTENTIAL RMA TOOLS AND SOURCES
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Distance from the market
The ‘distance’ of an organisation from a specific market determines 
the extent of market assessment requirement and in particular 
the utility of RMA. RMA are best suited to organisations that are 
close to a market, which have short feedback loops and are able 
to respond immediately to informal and regular assessments 
(eg facilitators). Organisations that are more distant from a 
market (eg donors) tend to be better served by more formal, 
periodic and larger scale market assessment, which are used to 
determine higher level strategy or assess impact, rather than 
steer specific interventions.
futher reading
 
l Albu, Mike and Griffith, Alison (2005); Mapping the market: a framework for rural enterprise development policy and practice; Practical 
 Action, Bourton-on-Dunsmore (UK). 
l Helvetas (2002); Clients first! A rapid market appraisal toolkit – theoretical background and experiences from various RMA events; 
	 Experience and Learning in International Co-operation, Volume 3, Zurich (Switzerland).
l ILO (2000); Rapid market appraisal: a manual for entrepreneurs; Small Enterprise Development Department (SEED), InFocus 
 Programme, Geneva (Switzerland).
l Nourse, Tim et al (2007); Market development in crisis affected environments: emerging lessons from achieving pro-poor economic 
 reconstruction; The SEEP Network, Washington DC. 
l Palmade, Vincent (2005); Industry level analysis: the way to identify the binding constraints to economic growth; in World Bank Policy 
 Research Paper 3551, Washington DC.
l SEEP Network (2005a); All paths lead to learning: common mistakes in BDS market assessment and how to avoid them; Practitioner 
 Learning Program in BDS Market Assessment – Technical Note No. 2, Washington DC.  
l SEEP Network (2005b); Information to action: tips for using market information when piloting BDS market development interventions; 
 Practitioner Learning Program in BDS Market Assessment – Technical Note No. 5, Washington DC.
l de Ruyter de Wildt, M, Elliott, D and Hitchins, R (2006); Comparative approaches to private sector development; Employment and 
 Income Division, SDC, Berne.
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